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The present thesis examines the way in which two twelfth century authors, the 
Cistercian monks, Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry, used Augustine in 
the articulation of their mystical thought. The approach to this subject takes into account 
the fact that in the works of all these medieval authors the “mystical” element is 
inescapably entangled with their theological discourse and that an accurate understanding 
of their views on the soul’s direct encounter with God cannot be achieved without a 
discussion of their theology.  
This thesis posits that the cohesion of Bernard’s and William’s mystical thought 
lies in their appropriation of the guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical theology: 
“You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (conf. 1.1.1), 
reflected in the subtle interplay of three main themes, namely (1) the creation of 
humanity in the image and likeness of God, which provides the grounds for the 
understanding of the soul’s search for direct contact with God; (2) love as a longing 
innate in every human being, which explores the means to attain immediacy with God; 
and (3) the soul’s direct encounter with God, which discusses the nature of the soul’s 
immediate experience of the divine presence that can only be achieved in lasting fullness 
at the end of time. This examination of Bernard’s and William’s use of Augustine is 
structured on the basis of these three core themes which form the scaffolding of their 
mystical thought. 
Investigating the specific methods of their reception of Augustine will highlight 
the originality and uniqueness of each of the two Cistercian authors, who while drawing 
on the same patristic source use it nevertheless in various ways, by focussing on different 
aspects of Augustine’s immense oeuvre and by arriving at distinct mystical programmes.  
Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,  
 Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.  
 
„What you have as heritage,  
 Take now as task; 
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It is for others to serve God, it is for you to cling to him; it is for others to believe 
him, love him and revere him; it is for you to taste him, understand him, be 
acquainted with him, enjoy him. (…) For that is your profession, to seek the God 
of Jacob, not as the ordinary run of men do, but to seek the very face of God, 
which Jacob saw, he who said: “I have seen the Lord face to face and yet my life 
was not forfeit1. 
 
These lines from the Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei, written by William of St. Thierry 
around 1144 and addressed to the Carthusian hermits of Mont-Dieu, capture perfectly one 
of the distinctive features of monastic life in the twelfth century, namely the search for 
immediacy with God or what in modern terminology may be referred to as “mysticism”. 
In the history of Western Christendom the twelfth century represents “the age of the 
richest development of the monastic mystical tradition”2. More than the preceding 
monastic writers, the new monks, chiefly the Cistercians, placed great emphasis on the 
direct encounter with God as the essence of the cloistered life3. While this fundamental 
characteristic is not clearly distinct among the founders of Cîteaux, it becomes 
undeniably manifest in the subsequent generation of Cistercian monks, dominated by the 
outstanding figures of Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) and William of St. Thierry (c. 
1080-1148)4. Their ardent desire to find the face of God left an indelible mark on their 
writings, which frequently discuss the nature of and the means to attain direct contact 
with God.   
Since the beginning of the last century the writings of these two Cistercian monks 
have been under intense scholarly scrutiny. The pioneering studies of Étienne Gilson on 
Bernard of Clairvaux and those of Jean-Marie Déchanet on William of St. Thierry have 
contributed a great deal to reawaken the interest of contemporary scholars in the 
medieval monastic tradition, which had previously been neglected in favor of the 
scholastic tradition. Their efforts were especially directed at elevating “mysticism” to the 
1 Ep. frat. 16; 25.  
2 McGinn (1994) xiii. 
3 Pennington (1973) 23; Renna (1994) 382. 
4 Some scholars manifest reluctance when it comes to considering William of St. Thierry a Cistercian 
monk.  He spent most of his life as a Benedictine monk and abbot of the monastery of St. Thierry and only 
the last years of his life he spent at the Cistercian community of Signy, leaving the black habit of the 
Benedictine monastic order for the white habit of the Cistercian monks. 
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level of theological discussion. However, in spite of their invaluable contribution to the 
study of Bernard and William, their penchant for finding the sources of the mystical 
thought of these two Latin authors in the exotic soil of the Greek patristic writers, has 
plagued subsequent scholarship for many decades. More recently this tendency has been 
extensively questioned in the light of substantial evidence demonstrating that the 
theological background of these authors is to be found primarily in more proximate 
sources such as Augustine and other Latin patristic authors. While William’s Augustinian 
spirituality has been the subject of a seminal work, which convincingly showed the 
primacy of Augustine among other patristic sources5, Bernard’s dependence on 
Augustine is still largely under-researched. It is the aim of the present study to explore 
the way in which Bernard and William drew on Augustine’s legacy in the articulation of 
their mystical thought, by covering neglected material and by systematizing the 
contributions of previous scholarship.  
As this study does not deal with Bernard’s and William’s teaching as a whole, but 
attempts to focus only on those aspects which are related to their understanding of the 
soul’s contact with God and which may be said to form their mystical thought, it is 
necessary to clarify what is understood by the terms “mystical” and “mysticism”. This 
clarification is so much more needed since mysticism, which is a notoriously fluid 
concept, may be problematic when applied to twelfth century monastic literature.  
While the qualifier mystikos with its Latin equivalent mysticus meaning simply 
“hidden” or “secret” was often used in the first Christian centuries6, the noun 
“mysticism” is a neologism first attested in English in 17247, corresponding to the French 
term “mystique” coined in the early seventeenth century8. The meaning of the newly 
created term was decisively shaped by the views on the soul’s contact with God 
5 Bell (1984). 
6 Bouyer (1980) 42-56 demonstrated that the term mystikos was used in the early Christian texts in three 
different contexts. The oldest and the most important context is that of the biblical exegesis, when the term 
mystikos is applied primarily to the deeper sense of the scriptural text. Later, the term occurs in a liturgical 
context, being attached to liturgical objects, texts or ceremonies. Sporadically, the term occurs in what 
Bouyer calls the ‘spiritual’ context, referring to the life of Christian. McGinn (1991) 416, n. 127 has 
counted 124 occurrences of the terms mysticus and mystice in Augustine, who uses the terms in the same 
three ways. 
7 Oxford English Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “Mysticism”. 
8 For the emergence of the noun “mystique” in French, see De Certeau (1964) 2:269-291. The noun 
“mysticisme” was first attested in French in 1804, see Le Grand Robert de la Langue Française, 2nd ed. s.v. 
“Mysticisme”.  
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expressed by Spanish mystics, such as Theresa of Avila and John of the Cross. As such, 
the term refers to extraordinary religious states of consciousness, emphasizing the 
passivity of the soul and the need for infused grace9. Increasingly the Christian literature 
devoted to the exploration of the subjective states of personal religious experience has 
become separated from the more objective aspect of theology that is its doctrinal element. 
As Thomas Merton wittily observed, dogmatic and mystical theology have become “set 
apart in mutually exclusive categories, as if mysticism were for saintly women and 
theological study were for practical, but alas, unsaintly men”10.  
The divorce between mysticism and theology in the West had a twofold 
consequence for the study of Christian authors who wrote before this separation became 
manifest. On one hand, modern systematic theologians were not interested in considering 
the teaching of those authors labeled as mystics in their works dealing with doctrinal 
aspects. Adolph von Harnack, who does not consider Bernard worthy of a chapter in his 
Dogmengeschichte, is a case in point. On the other hand, the so called “common–core” 
theorists of the mystical phenomenon who focus on the essential qualities of the mystical 
experience cutting across time, religions and cultures, and who emphasize its 
psychological aspects, totally disregard the theological discourse in which an 
overwhelming part of the Christian mystical experiences is wrapped11. Without doubt the 
intense scholarly scrutiny of some of Augustine’s accounts of personal mystical 
experience from the central books of the Confessions represents the most illustrious 
example of how the model of experiential mysticism has been applied to the work of a 
patristic author, often with no attention paid to the theological context in which these 
narratives are deeply embedded. Such an approach resulted not only in a deformation of 
Augustine’s teaching, but also led to a debate which spans over a century and which 
reached deadlock with scholars arguing pro and contra Augustine’s mysticism on the 
9 TeSelle (1984) 24; De Certeau (1964) 2:269-291. 
10 Merton (1962) 254-255.  
11 The pioneering studies of James (1902) and Underhill (1911) which focused especially on mystical 
experience as a major psychological event have been followed by a multitude of other studies in the same 
vein of which I name just a few: Otto (1917); Zaehner (1957); Stace (1961); Lewis (1971); Hardy (1980).  
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basis of an abstract consideration of the essential characteristics of the mystical 
experience12.   
In approaching the works of Bernard and William, who wrote before the early 
modern period, it is important to be aware of the fact that the mystical and the doctrinal 
elements are inextricably intertwined and that an attempt to separate them always 
involves a distortion of their thought. It is the merit of Étienne Gilson to have stressed the 
fact that the mysticism of the Cistercian authors is formulated theologically. He referred 
to both Bernard and William as “speculative mystics”13. In demonstrating the coherence 
and depth of Bernard’s theological thought in his classical study The Mystical Theology 
of Bernard of Clairvaux, he convincingly refuted the views of those who considered 
Bernard to be no more than a pious devotional author.  
In order to explore the mystical element inherent in complex theological texts of 
patristic and medieval authors, scholars such as Bernard McGinn14 and John P. Kenney15 
suggested a model of mysticism derived from and compatible with their writings. In 
contrast to the experiential model of mysticism, in this new model the emphasis shifts 
from the mystical experience and its psychological aspects to the theological context. 
These scholars are not interested in establishing whether a person is a mystic or not on 
the basis of his or her experiences, which can be defined as mystical. Their objective is 
rather to focus on the theology of texts containing mystical elements, on their cognitive 
content and to establish their significance in the history of Christian mysticism. Thus, 
Bernard McGinn drew attention to three important aspects in his understanding of 
mysticism. First, mysticism must be understood as an element of a concrete religion; 
second, it has to be considered as a process or way of life, rather than simply 
concentrating on the culmination of the process and artificially isolating it from the path 
that leads there; third, he prefers to speak of the achieved goal in terms of consciousness 
of the immediate presence of God rather than in terms of union, since mystics had 
12 For a history of the debate see Mandouze (1954) 3:103-168. For a more recent assessment of Augustine’s 
mysticism from the same perspective see Bonner (1994) 113-157 who relies in his article on Hardy’s 
definition of mysticism. 
13 Gilson (1955) 164-168.  
14 McGinn (1991) xi-xx and (1994) x-xii. 
15 J. P. Kenney presents his approach to what he names “patristic mysticism” in a series of articles and in 
the introduction to his book on the mysticism of Augustine’s Confessiones. See Kenney (1993) 329-336; 
(1997) 125-130; (2001) 199-218; (2005). 
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recourse to a variety of categories in order to express their attainment of this final stage, 
of which union is but one.16 Finally, he suggests a definition of the mystical element in 
Christianity as “that part of its beliefs and practices that concerns the preparation for, the 
consciousness of, and the reaction to the immediate or direct presence of God”17. This is 
the sense in which the terms “mystical” and “mysticism” shall be used in the present 
thesis. Taking this wider view of mysticism will enable us to put together a more 
complete account of the main theological themes that went into Bernard’s and William’s 
understanding of the significance of the soul’s direct contact with God.  
Neither Augustine nor Bernard nor William arranged their insights on mysticism 
in a systematic form. It usually happens that a particular subject is approached from 
different perspectives and developed each time differently. However, a coherent picture 
of their mystical thought emerges when the main theological themes important for their 
understanding of the soul’s contact with God are assembled. What they all have in 
common is the conviction that the grounds for the possibility of any form of direct 
contact with God lie in the nature of the human being created in the image and likeness of 
God and that the means to attain direct contact with God is by way of love. Therefore, in 
studying the way in which Bernard and William use Augustine I will focus on three main 
themes: image and likeness, love and the soul’s direct encounter with God. The role of 
Christ is also important for the possibility of the soul’s direct contact with God, however 
it will not be dealt with as a separate chapter, but will be touched upon in the discussion 
of the other themes.  
Previous scholarship has mainly highlighted only one aspect deriving from 
Augustine and which the Cistercian authors used in the articulation of their mystical 
thought. É. Gilson mentioned the role of Augustine’s teaching on love for Bernard’s 
mysticism18; in a recent article T. Renna focused on the way in which the Cistercian 
authors used Augustine’s teaching on image and likeness adapting it to their 
contemplative goals19. The only exception to what is usually a one-sided approach to the 
relation between Augustine and the Cistercian authors is the study by David N. Bell on 
16 McGinn (1991) xvii. 
17 McGinn (1994) xi. 
18 Gilson (1940) 220, n. 24. 
19 Renna (1994) 380-400. 
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William of St. Thierry. He convincingly demonstrates that several elements, which can 
be traced back to Augustine, need to be taken into account in the understanding of 
William’s spirituality: image, likeness, participation and love20. The main argument of 
the present thesis goes along the lines indicated by Bell, but presses things a step further 
in claiming that if image and likeness, love and direct contact with God are connected in 
the mystical thought of the Cistercians, it is because Augustine encourages them to see a 
link between them. It is particularly Augustine’s biblical commentaries and his major 
treatises, such as the Confessiones and the De Trinitate that contain the bishop’s view on 
the noble destiny of the human being created with a restless tendency towards God as a 
consequence of his creation in the image and likeness of God21. This view may be 
summed up using a famous quotation from the Confessiones, which Andrew Louth 
reckoned to represent the “guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical theology”22: “You 
made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you”23. As this line of 
thought, salient especially in Augustine’s writings of the early and middle period, is less 
discernable in the bishop’s late works against Pelagians, where a more sombre picture of 
the human destiny is presented, numerous modern scholars focused on what they 
considered to be a fissure at the heart of Augustine’s thought, speaking even of the “two 
Augustines”24. One recent example of this scholarly trend is the study of Gerald Bonner 
who considers as irreconcilable the “optimistic” or “dynamic” field of Augustine’s 
theology where he confidently speaks of the soul’s quest for God and of deification, and 
the “pessimistic” aspects of his theology on grace, predestination and original sin 
developed in the anti-Pelagian works25. While this perspective on the contradictory 
tensions of Augustine’s thought was predominant in the last few decades, there have been 
significant attempts, coming from scholars such as Goulven Madec26 and more recently 
20 Bell (1984) 252. 
21 For an excellent study on Augustine’s idea that the human being was created with a tendency toward 
God, see Bochet (1982).  
22 Louth (2006) 134. 
23 conf. 1.1.1. 
24 Brown (1967) chapter “Lost Future”, is undoubtedly the most famous advocate of the “two Augustines” 
theory, which for a few decades represented the scholarly consensus regarding Augustine’s intellectual 
evolution. 
25 Bonner (2007) 26 and (1987) 1:210.  
26 Madec (1989). 
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Carol Harrison27, to approach the vast continent of the bishop’s works as forming a 
coherent whole.  
Based on these insights, the present thesis intends to explore whether Bernard and 
William follow Augustine in his “optimistic” view of the destiny of the human kind by 
drawing mainly on the bishop’s works from the early and middle period and whether they 
manifest any interest for some of Augustine’s late anti-Pelagian works. It also intends to 
establish whether like numerous modern scholars they are sensitive to any rupture lying 
at the heart of Augustine’s thought or whether they read his works totally unaware of the 
seemingly contradictions that have so much puzzled his modern interpreters. 
As this thesis intends to approach the relation between the two Cistercian authors 
and Augustine through the prism of reception, focusing on the same themes in our 
treatment of each author will help to illustrate more pertinently the way in which the 
same source can be exploited in different ways. Bernard and William were intimate 
friends and collaborators who constantly inspired and supported each other in their 
creative enterprises. Their interests are so similar that for many centuries some of 
William’s works were confused with those of Bernard, circulating and reaching fame 
under his friend’s name28. However, in spite of their treatment of the same themes and in 
spite of developing their mystical thought along the lines established by Augustine, each 
of them emerges as an original thinker in his own right.  
In the present thesis the method of reception cannot be applied by concentrating 
solely on the examination of the quotations that Bernard and William extract from 
Augustine and adapt to their own goals. The reason why we are bound to use reception as 
a rather loose methodological tool arises from the way in which Bernard and William 
draw on their sources. Whereas the latter quotes at length from Augustine especially in 
his treatises where he applies the method of compilation, Bernard is notorious for the way 
in which he changes his sources beyond recognition at the level of linguistic expression. 
Therefore, rather than searching exclusively for exact terminological congruence, similar 
27 Harrison (2006). 
28 William’s treatises De contemplando Deo and De natura et dignitate amoris circulated together with 
Bernard’s De diligendo deo under the title De amore Dei, being all attributed to Bernard. See Hourlier 
(1953) 223.  Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei had an identical fate, circulating under Bernard’s name for 
centuries. For more details see Déchanet (1980) ix-xiii and p. 106, n.1 and n. 2. 
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ideas or similar terms need to be taken into account in the attempt to understand how 
Bernard makes use of Augustine in building up his own mystical thought.  
Apart from the mere identification of quotations, terms or ideas, which can be 
traced back to Augustine, by embracing the perspective of creative reception we intend to 
scrutinize the way in which material taken from Augustine is selected, to reflect on the 
possible reasons that determine a particular selection of Augustine’s texts or ideas, to 
investigate the possible amalgamation of this material with material coming from other 
sources, especially Greek, and finally to evaluate the way in which Bernard and William 
respectively incorporate and adapt Augustine’s thought to their contemplative agenda. 
Moreover, the present investigation will concentrate on material derived directly from 
Augustine, and to a lesser degree, received through compiling mediators. It will not 
embark on a wider analysis of “Augustinianism” where tradition added its own material, 
but still called it “Augustinian”. 
As Bernard and William do not produce systematic treatises on mysticism it is 
difficult to isolate a specific corpus of their works on the basis of which to examine their 
use of Augustine. Moreover, some of their works, which are said to be more doctrinal in 
character, contain essential material for the understanding of some of the issues that they 
develop in relation with their mystical thought. This is the case with Bernard’s rather 
dogmatic treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio, or with William’s Expositio super 
Epistolam ad Romanos, which formed the doctrinal foundation for the works William 
wrote during the years 1135-114529. However, the research on Bernard in the present 
thesis concentrates especially on his main works De diligendo Deo, De gratia et libero 
arbitrio and the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum. Other sources, such as his letters, 
the treatises De consideratione, De gradibus humilitatis, his Sermones de Diversis, 
Sermones per annum etc. are also used as evidence but they are not predominant in the 
present analysis. For William, I relied chiefly on his early treatises De contemplando 
Deo, De natura et dignitate amoris, Meditativae orationes and on his mature works 
Speculum fidei, Aenigma fidei and Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei. Occasionally I 
turned to some of his other works such as the Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos, the 
De sacramento altaris and the Disputatio adversus Abaelardum. 
29 McGinn (2006) 9-10. 
9
At the level of structure this thesis consists of two parts devoted to Bernard and 
William respectively. Each part opens with a preliminary section which reviews the 
relevant literature on the subject and which attempts to understand the attitude of the two 
Cistercian authors towards what they name patres and doctores in order better to 
comprehend their approach to the patristic sources. In the case of Bernard we also 
address the problem of discerning his sources and suggest a specific methodology in the 
attempt to find a solution to this difficulty. Following these preliminary remarks each part 
unfolds in three chapters which examine the themes that contribute to the main argument 
of the thesis, namely image and likeness, love and direct encounter with God. Thus, the 
first chapter of the part devoted to Bernard focuses on his early treatise De gratia et 
libero arbitrio in an attempt to highlight the role played by Augustine in the abbot’s 
location of the soul’s direct encounter with God at the level of the restored likeness. The 
second chapter follows Bernard in his use of Augustine in the development of his views 
on love from the emphasis on the primacy of divine love, through the development of the 
human love as desiderium, to the significant theme of ordinatio caritatis, which deals 
with the ordering of human affections, the sine qua non condition for the soul’s loving 
encounter with God. Finally, the last chapter deals specifically with various perspectives 
on the mystical experience, understood either in Augustine’s terms as contemplatio, visio 
dei, ecstasis or under an aspect which does not feature explicitly in Augustine, that of 
unitas spiritus. The analysis of unitas spiritus attempts to demonstrate Bernard’s use of 
Augustine’s distinction between unum and unus spiritus, which the bishop formulated 
against the Arians, but which Bernard uses for his own contemplative agenda.  
The first chapter from the second part of the thesis devoted to William discusses 
his indebtedness to Augustine, Claudianus Mamertus and Gregory of Nyssa in his 
development of the theme of image and likeness. We also attempt to demonstrate that his 
location of the vision of God at the level of perfect likeness of the soul with God depends 
directly on Augustine’s texts. In the second chapter, we approach the theme of love 
through the prism of the various definitions that William gives to the term. Thus, we 
follow William in his understanding of love in Augustine’s terms as voluntas, motus, 
pondus or affectus. We analyse the use of Augustine’s theory of sense perception and 
thought formation from Book XI of the De Trinitate in William’s development of the 
10
notions of sensus amoris and intellectus amoris. Another section deals with Augustine’s 
idea of the Holy Spirit as love which William makes the backbone of his mysticism. 
Finally the last section of this chapter examines the progress of human affection from 
voluntas, to amor, dilectio and finally unitas spiritus, attempting to detect the role played 
by Augustine in William’s view on the ascending stages of love. The final chapter 
devoted to the soul’s direct encounter with God examines the way in which William uses 
one of Augustine’s main texts on the vision of God from the Epistula 147 in advancing 
his own view on visio Dei. Finally the last section on unitas spiritus highlights the central 
role of Augustine’s idea on the Holy Spirit as love for William’s understanding of the 
union of the soul with God. In this section we also attempt to refute Paul Verdeyen’s 
claim30 that Bernard’s and William’s different views concerning the unitas spiritus led to 
a controversy, which undermined their friendship towards the end of their lives.  
The appendix contains the Latin text of the most substantial quotations from 
primary sources, which due to their considerable seize have not been included in the 
actual footnotes. 
The present study of Augustine’s reception in the mystical thought of Bernard of 
Clairvaux and William of St Thierry is expected to make a further contribution to 
scholarship in several ways. It will offer concrete evidence for elements from 
Augustine’s thought being used by Bernard and William in the scaffolding of their 
mystical theology. It will highlight different reception techniques of the main literary 
sources, such as the Bible and the patristic sources, in these two twelfth century monastic 
medieval writers. It will provide a more accurate estimation of the place of Augustine 
among other patristic sources used in the monastic twelfth century putting an end to a 
scholarly trend that claimed erroneously a greater dependence of Bernard and William on 
Greek patristic sources. Finally, the reception perspective will contribute to a more solid 
reconstruction of the dynamic appropriation of ideas taken from patristic sources in these 
two medieval thinkers. Furthermore, the method of reception will enable us to capture 
more accurately the originality and uniqueness of both Bernard and William, who draw 
on exactly the same Latin biblical and patristic heritage, but use it differently.   
 
30 Verdeyen (1990) 73. 
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In his monumental History of Dogma, Adolph von Harnack spoke of Bernard of 
Clairvaux as Augustinus redivivus, adding that “he moulded himself entirely on the 
pattern of the great African, and that from him what lay at the foundation of his pious 
contemplation was derived”2. This view came soon to be neglected, when, a few decades 
later, Étienne Gilson in his influential study, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 
drastically reassessed the extent of Bernard’s debt to Augustine. According to Gilson, the 
main sources of Bernard’s mystical theology are to be found in a combination of three 
doctrinal blocks consisting of: a) a series of scriptural quotations from the first Epistle of 
St. John speaking of the union of the soul with God; b) the theme of deification by 
ecstasy present in a text of Maximus the Confessor accessible in Latin in the translation 
of Eriugena; c) the recurrent idea of renouncing one’s will of which speaks the Rule of 
St. Benedict3. Augustine’s influence, on the other hand, is described as “diffuse”, hence 
difficult to grasp, but apparent nevertheless in Bernard’s doctrine on love4. In another of 
his works, Gilson reckons as certain Bernard’s acquaintance with the Latin translations of 
the works of Greek authors such as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Denys the Areopagite and 
Maximus the Confessor5. In his view, Bernard achieves for the first time since Eriugena a 
synthesis of the Eastern and Western theological traditions, uniting “the Greek theology 
based upon the relation of image to model with the Latin theology based upon the 
relation of nature to grace”6. While Bernard’s direct dependence on various aspects of 
                                                 
1 The title of this chapter is inspired by a remark made by Étienne Gilson regarding Origen’s mysticism, 
which he labeled as “the mysticism of an exegete”, see Gilson (1940) 28. Later De Lubac observes that one 
may also legitimately speak of “the exegesis of a mystic”, see De Lubac (2000) 158-159. Mutatis mutandis 
the same may be said of Bernard as De Lubac concludes that: “If then, it is indubitable that the exegesis of 
Bernard is the exegesis of a mystic, it is no less true that, more essentially, by its very texture, his 
mysticism is the mysticism of an exegete”. See De Lubac (2000) 162. 
2 Harnack (1899) 6:10. 
3 Gilson (1940) 20-32. 
4 Gilson (1940) 220-221. 
5 Gilson (1955) 164. 
6 Gilson (1955) 164. 
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Origen’s thought is beyond question7, it is difficult to assert the same about his reliance 
on the other Greek authors mentioned by Gilson8. It has been recently lamented that 
Gilson’s enthusiasm for detecting Bernard’s Greek sources has diverted for years the 
attention of scholars from the more likely sources of his thought, such as Augustine and 
the Latin Christian authors9. Taking their cue from Gilson, many scholars contented 
themselves to refer to Augustine’s influence on Bernard as “vast and diffuse”10 and 
manifested little or no interest in exploring in depth the relation between the two authors. 
Consequently, apart from a handful of articles and occasional sparse treatments of 
Bernard’s use of themes or ideas originating in Augustine’s works, the abundant 
scholarly literature on Bernard has not much to offer on this particular subject11. 
1. The problem of sources  
 
Discerning the patristic sources that inspired Bernard’s writings is far from being 
a straightforward matter. The difficulty of this task for the modern interpreter consists 
                                                 
7 Bardy (1945) 420-421; Daniélou (1953) 46-51; Manning (1963) 385-386; Leclercq (1962) 283-285 and 
287-290; Brésard (1982) 111-130, 192-209 and 293-308; Evans (1983) 82-85; De Lubac (1998) 204-205. 
For a more detailed discussion on Bernard and Origen see above pp. 29-31. 
8 Following Gilson (1940) 17, Daniélou (1953) 52-55 argued for a direct influence of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
De opificio hominis in Eriugena’s translation on Bernard’s view on the image and likeness developed in 
SC. 80-82. However, most scholars regard this claim with suspicion. More recently, while acknowledging 
that apart from Origen, Bernard knew Gregory of Nyssa, Denys and Maximus, Lackner (1976) 394, speaks 
rather of an indirect influence of these authors on the abbot of Clairvaux. The similarities between 
Bernard’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s commentaries on the Song of Songs have been traced back to a common 
source, namely Origen. See Ohly (1958) 141. Regarding Bernard’s knowledge of Denys the Areopagite, 
Fracheboud (1957) 329-333 claimed that Bernard was well acquainted with the Corpus Areopagiticum. E. 
Boissard has questioned these claims in two articles, which have established the scholarly consensus on this 
matter. Although Bernard may have known sections of the Corpus Areopagiticum, due to his contacts with 
the learned men of his time, such as Hugh of Saint-Victor, who produced a commentary on Denys’s 
Celestial Hierarchies, it has been established that there is no substantial evidence to sustain the allegation 
of Denys’s influence on Bernard’s works. See Boissard (1953) 114-135; Boissard (1959) 214-263 and 
McGinn (1976) 222-224. Finally, while Gilson (1935) 188-195 and (1940) 25-28 spoke confidently of the 
existing links between Bernard and Maximus through Eriugena’s translation, more recent scholars regard 
these links as rather tenuous. See Casey (1988) 31; Ruh (1990) 1:272.   
9 Leclercq (1990b) xxii. 
10 Casey (1988) 47. 
11 Especially Bernard’s early treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio was the object of scholarly research of 
Augustine’s influence, see Faust (1962) and more recently Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2004) 301-321. Bernard’s 
dependence on Augustine in his articulation of the theology of grace was studied by Rydstrøm-Poulsen 
(1992) 307-343. The influence of Augustine on Bernard’s view on memory was briefly treated by Coleman 
(1992) 169-192 and was the subject of a more detailed study by Griggs (1997) 475-485. Other articles 
dealing with Bernard’s use of Augustine are Rigolot (1992) 132-144 and McGinn (2006) 7-11, which 
highlight the role played by Augustine with regard to Bernard’s spirituality and mysticism respectively.  
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primarily in the fact that, while acknowledging that he follows in the footsteps of his 
illustrious Christian predecessors without any attempt to introduce novelties in the 
doctrine received from early Christian writers, with a few rare exceptions, Bernard does 
not consider it necessary to name his patristic sources. The only explicit source 
acknowledged and carefully quoted in Bernard’s texts is the Bible12. In neglecting to 
mention the name of the authors on whose writings he was drawing, Bernard does not 
differ from other medieval writers who have a similar attitude toward the use of the 
patristic heritage. However, in Bernard’s case, the modern researcher is confronted with 
an additional difficulty due to the fact that, apart from not indicating his sources, direct 
quotations are also extremely rarely present in his writings13. Moreover, Bernard does not 
simply repeat what he might have read in previous authors; he is not a compiler. As a 
skilled artisan with words who combined the gift of natural talent with intensive work on 
his texts at the level of composition, correction and revision of his manuscripts, Bernard 
retained faithfully the meaning of his readings while transforming significantly the 
outward expression. Thus, R. W. Southern attributes the originality of Bernard’s style to 
two main elements: on the one hand, to his exquisite command of the scriptural 
undertones, and on the other hand, to Bernard’s familiarity with the French vernacular 
“which gave the old language a fresh fluency and vivacity”14. The result is then, as 
Étienne Gilson has rightly observed with regard to Bernard’s mystical theology, “an 
incontestably original creation, albeit altogether made up of traditional elements”15. 
And yet, no matter how arduous the task of discerning the patristic sources used 
by Bernard might be, it needs to be undertaken, since one cannot hope to understand 
properly his texts without a constant reading of his thought against the biblical and the 
patristic background. Moreover, in order to appreciate Bernard’s links with the Christian 
past, it is necessary to understand the immediate context of his reception of the patristic 
                                                 
12 Leclercq (1962) 276. 
13 Searching for direct quotations in Bernard’s Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, Leclercq is able to 
indicate with exactitude merely two sentences from ancient satirical authors, a short fragment from a 
liturgical hymn, two sentences from Fulgentius and other two short sentences from Augustine, see Leclercq 
(1962) 275-319. 
14 Southern (1953) 215-216. Mohrmann also considers Bernard’s phrase as revolutionary, leaving behind 
the hypotactic structure of the Classical Latin phrase and adopting, like Augustine especially in his 
sermons, the paratactic construction characteristic of the oral style.  See Mohrmann (1961) 347-367 and 
Evans (1983) 104. 
15 Gilson (1940) 20.  
 14
texts. Thus, looking at the habits of reading and learning in the monastic environment, 
while also taking into consideration Bernard’s method of writing, might help us to 
understand better significant aspects of his dealing with the patristic sources. It is worth 
noting that in the case of Bernard there is a close and fundamental relation between the 
author and his texts, therefore, as Michael Casey has judiciously remarked: “Bernard’s 
life and writings cannot be separated…To understand the man, to understand his 
situation, to understand his writings: these three distinct and irreducible tasks are yet 
somehow one”16.  
2. Monastic learning 
 
In his conversations with his friends Bernard himself used to say playfully that he 
had never studied and that the only masters he had were the oaks and the beeches17. It is 
known, however, that before entering Cîteaux, he started his education at the canons of 
St. Vorles18. Although there is no information about the content of Bernard’s early 
studies, it is presumed that he had received at the canons of St. Vorles his introduction to 
classical culture and that literature and not dialectic formed the basis of his education at 
this time19. This would explain to some extent the frequent quotations from or 
reminiscences of the classical authors present in his writings20. Another possibility would 
be that he had received a fractured classical culture by reading preponderantly the 
ecclesiastical writers who in many of their works refer to the pagan realities of their 
time21.  
The choice Bernard had made fairly early in his life between the study in an urban 
school and the seclusion of the monastery had as a result his exposure to a new and 
particular way of learning. Instead of being taught by a master in a town school, he most 
probably pursued his education in the cloister under the personal supervision of a 
spiritual father. Instead of secular or classical writers he was occupied with the Bible and 
                                                 
16 Casey (1988) 22. 
17 Vita Prima 1.4.23: et in hoc nullos aliquando se magistros habuisse, nisi quercus et fagos, joco illo suo 
gratioso inter amicos dicere solet. See also Ep. 106. 2, where Bernard appreciates more the knowledge he 
acquires from nature than that which is to be found in books. 
18 Evans (2000) 7. 
19 Leclercq (1976) 14. 
20 For Bernard’s use of classical literature see, Déchanet (1953) 56-77; Renna (1980) 122-131. 
21 Mohrmann (1961) 348. 
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the patristic authors that were read during lectio divina and during the liturgy. As strict 
observers of the Rule of St. Benedict, the Cistercians could not have neglected the role of 
reading among other activities present in the life of the monk22. The holy reading or lectio 
divina finished in meditation: meditari aut legere. Jean Leclercq reminds us that during 
the Middle Ages the monks had not the same habits of reading as today. They used to 
read not only with their eyes, but also with their lips, pronouncing the words, and with 
their ears, hearing and listening to the phrases23. This “acoustical reading”24 is an active 
reading that leads to meditatio and to oratio. In Usus Ordinis Cisterciensis it is stated that 
the monk is free to interrupt his reading at any time and go and pray in the church25. 
While in the town schools of the same time the purpose of the reading was to lead to 
quaestio and disputatio within the limits of the text, in the cloister, lectio divina was 
practiced as a means to seeking God in contemplative prayer. In order to achieve this 
goal, there should be as few distractions as possible.  
William of St. Thierry presents the monastic method of reading in the Epistula ad 
fratres de Monte Dei26. It is highly likely that Bernard practiced this method as well since 
William describes in fact the method of reading outlined in the Rule of St. Benedict27. 
William advises his novices to read regularly and only one text at a time, until they grow 
accustomed with the style of the author. The novices should read in this way the Epistles 
of St. Paul and the Psalms of David until they recuperate the “spirit” in which these texts 
were written. Dispersing their attention between too many texts or reading casually 
would destabilize their mind rather than render it more stable. Memorising some part of 
the daily lectio divina would enable the readers to digest them more carefully and to 
bring them up again for frequent rumination. The metaphor of rumination applied to the 
holy reading is used frequently and is suggestive of the way in which the sacred texts 
needed to be approached. Reading is seen not as an end in itself but it should give rise to 
prayer. The interruption that prayer might cause is not to be considered as an obstacle to 
                                                 
22 RB 48. For the importance of reading the patristic authors (patres) in addition to the biblical books, see 
RB 73. 
23 Leclercq (1982a) 15. 
24 The expression belongs to Leclercq (1982a) 15. 
25 Usus Ordinis Cisterciensis 3.71.  
26 Ep. frat. 51-52. 
27 Southern (1953) 188-189. 
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reading, on the contrary, its purpose is to apply to it a mind more purified and more 
prepared for understanding. 
G. R. Evans observes that William of St. Thierry was writing this passage from 
the letter to the brethren at Mont Dieu at the same time as the section from the Vita Prima 
where he discusses the education received by Bernard28. In this biography, Bernard is 
presented as reading in order (seriatim) and rather frequently (saepius) and with no other 
intention than that of understanding the sacred texts. In order to support his reading from 
the Holy Scripture he turned to the patristic authors, whose judgment he accepted 
humbly29. He acquired such a foundation of his knowledge, says William, that, since 
then, Bernard was able to use these sources in teaching with confidence and for the 
benefit of his audience.  
The habit of quoting from memory could lead sometimes to errors as Bernard 
himself recognizes in the Retractatio to his small treatise De gradibus humilitatis et 
superbiae, where trying to support his point of view with a biblical passage, he quotes it 
in a wrong way: 
It was rash to do it from memory, because afterwards I could not find it in the 
Gospel. I was mistaken in thinking the text said ‘Nor did the Son know’. It was 
not a deliberate error. Yet although I remembered the words wrongly, I got the 
sense right. I should have said, ‘Not even the Son of Man knows’ (Mk 13:32)30.  
 
The monastic way of learning and reading, which, as we could see, engages the whole 
person - body, soul and mind - had direct and significant consequences on the way of 
teaching and writing in the cloistered communities. Jean Leclercq observed that the 
method of contemplative prayer, which unites reading, meditation and prayer, explains 
the phenomenon of reminiscence, in other words the spontaneous remembrance of 
quotations and allusions, which evoke one another only given the similarity of the words. 
Similar words are grouped together and the evocation of one of them will attract in a 
spontaneous and effortless way the presence of the others31. The phenomenon of 
                                                 
28 Evans (1983) 49. Bernard’s first biography is a joint endeavour, being written by three of his 
contemporaries who knew him well: his friend William of St. Thierry, his secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre 
and Arnold of Bonneval, whose connections with Bernard are not always clear. For more details on the Vita 
Prima and its authors see Bredero (1996) 90-141.  
29 Vita Prima 1.4.24. 
30 Hum. Retractatio. 
31 Leclercq (1982a) 73-74. 
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reminiscences affected also the way of writing in such a way that frequently the 
occurrence of one word with a biblical flavour anticipated a whole biblical quotation, 
which evoked in turn the mentioning of other similar scriptural verses. 
It is beyond any doubt that the Bible was Bernard’s most extensive source32. His 
familiarity with the biblical text was so great that it is difficult to say “when the Bible 
ends and when Bernard begins”33. However, it would be erroneous to think that his 
command of the biblical text results entirely from the individual study of the different 
books of the Bible.  Although the way of reading is very important and explains some of 
the aspects of the reception process, this is not the only occasion in which the monks are 
exposed to the sacred texts. More important than lectio divina, the liturgy provides the 
spiritual context in which the Bible and the patristic authors can be heard on a daily basis. 
Jean Leclercq considers that it is legitimate to ask whether the Bible was for Bernard a 
book meant merely to be read and argues that in fact the liturgy is the main of Bernard’s 
sources, where he could have become acquainted with all other sources34. Leclercq 
remarks that often the biblical quotations do not follow the text of the Vulgate, but are 
made according to the text of the Old Latin Bible which is found in the patristic authors 
or which is used in the liturgy: “Evidently the chanted portions of the Divine Office, its 
responses and antiphons, were imprinted in his memory even more than were those of the 
Mass. He received his Scripture from tradition. For him the Bible was the word of God 
living in the church”35. Along the same lines, G. R. Evans argues that Bernard’s active 
way of life as a busy abbot and preacher would have constituted an impediment for his 
studious activities. Apart from the daily communal reading, there is not much evidence 
supporting the idea of Bernard’s solitary reading36. Therefore, orality plays an important 
role in understanding the reception of the texts in the Middle Ages. According to Brian 
Stock, Bernard perfected the oral techniques commonly practiced in the monastic 
environment37. 
                                                 
32 Farkasfalvy (1969) 3-13. The author of this article estimates that in Bernard’s Sermones super Cantica 
Canticorum, a biblical quotation occurs every two lines. For Bernard’s use of the Bible, see also Bodard 
(1953) 24-45 and Dumontier (1953).  
33 Casey (1988) 24. 
34 Leclercq (1962) 296-297. 
35 Leclercq (1976) 21-22. 
36 Evans (1983) 44. 
37 Stock (1983) 407-410. 
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The other sources for biblical quotations are the writings of the patristic authors, 
which were read both independently during the lectio divina and in a liturgical context. 
Bernard follows them cautiously, because his greatest concern is not to introduce any 
novelties in his preaching38. His declared intention is to say nothing new, but to say 
something that is right. This might be one of the reasons why he is not preoccupied with 
indicating his sources, making thus a clear distinction between his own contribution and 
the biblical or patristic thought. Bernard’s position follows the position of many Christian 
authors. He is not willing to go beyond the limits of tradition; on the contrary, his 
preoccupation is to stay within the boundaries set by his patristic predecessors39. 
Bernard’s reluctance against novel things can be better understood if we 
remember the reforms that were taking place in the urban schools of his time, the 
birthplace of scholastics. Leclercq’s distinction between monastic and scholastic 
theology40, although questioned recently by scholars for attributing to the twelfth century 
a reality which suits better the subsequent century41, can still be found useful for defining 
the essential parameters of a particular type of theology which follows in the footsteps of 
patristic theology and which is practiced in the twelfth century particularly in the 
cloister42. According to Leclercq the monastic theology of which Bernard was the most 
prominent representative differed from scholastic theology in object, method and goal43. 
Although the Bible and the works of the patristic authors remained the scholastics’ main 
texts, the latter were also interested in using extensively sources from outside the 
Christian tradition, such as the pagan philosophers and in particular Aristotle. They 
                                                 
38 Ep. 77. 
39 See the discussion on the importance that Bernard attached to the idea of not transgressing the borders set 
by his Christian predecessors below, pp. 25-29. 
40 This topic is discussed in Leclerq (1953) 1-23; Leclercq (1982a) Chapter 9; Leclercq (1982b) 68-88;  
41 Otten (2004a) 366 and (2004b) 1, where speaking of the twelfth century pre-scholastic climate of 
thought, Willemien Otten observes that categories such as monastic and scholastic theology do not really 
do justice to the complexity of this intellectual period when the walls of the monasteries were by no means 
impenetrable. With particular view to Bernard, many studies have attempted to demonstrate that although 
not trained in an academic environment, he was not, however, ignorant of some of the methods, which were 
being popular in the schools. Thus, Bernard makes use of dialectic in his treatise De gratia et libero 
arbitrio, which is an ample answer to a question raised by one of his students regarding the relationship 
between grace and free choice. Also, it has been demonstrated that Bernard expected the clergy to be 
trained in dialectic in order to communicate the truth of the Church and in order to edify the ignorant, see 
Sommerfeldt (1977) 169-179. G. R. Evans also notices that Bernard does not oppose dialectic as such, but 
only the mode and the purpose of the use of the dialectical skill, see Evans (2000) 43.  
42 Leclercq (1953) 8: «Le moyen âge monastique est le prolongement de l’âge patristique».  
43 Leclercq (1953) 10.  
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applied to the study of religious texts the method of quaestio and disputatio. Finally, the 
scholastics were pursuing knowledge for its own sake. In the monastic environment, 
while the pagan sources were not opposed as such, they were used only as a means to a 
higher end. While not being entirely rejected, these sources needed to be handled 
cautiously since the knowledge they contained did nothing to help the monk in his search 
for God44. The approach to the text was not based on quaestio and disputatio but on lectio 
divina or on the exposure to the biblical text and the Christian authors during the liturgy. 
While authors such as Abelard, for instance, attempted to explain the objective reality by 
means of the dialectical method, for Bernard the fact was already established by the Bible 
and the patristic authors, and by means of lectio divina, meditatio and oratio, it needed 
only to be reassimilated45. Finally, knowledge pursued in the schools for its own sake is 
overtly condemned in the monastic circles where the knowledge had a salvific value, 
having a direct impact on and affecting the entire way of life of the contemplative 
monk46. Following the patristic tradition since Tertullian, De anima 2 and De 
praescriptione haereticorum 14, knowledge for its own sake is linked by Bernard with 
curiositas. He opposes true wisdom with vain curiosity. Between these two extremes 
there are several stages. On the lowest level, Bernard places the curiosity or the 
knowledge for its own sake. He links the knowledge sought for boasting with vain glory, 
the knowledge looked for in order to edify the others with love. Finally, the knowledge 
pursued for the sake of God and for the love of God, is conjoined with wisdom47. 
Bernard’s view on curiositas has similarities with Augustine’s understanding of the 
concept. The term was mainly used with a negative connotation even in Augustine’s early 
works, where the study of the disciplines is said not to have a goal in itself but to be 
oriented towards divine contemplation48. Curiosus is a pejorative term contrasted by 
                                                 
44 SC. 36.1-3 and SC. 37.2. The problem of the use of pagan authors in the monastic environment is not a 
straightforward one and more recent scholarship has coined the expression “monastic humanism” in order 
to refer to monks’ tendency to admire and even to assimilate the style and content of ancient works. 
Bernard himself, recommended the study of the liberal arts to the clergy, but he did not see its utility for the 
monastic learning. See Renna (1980) 122-127. 
45 Stock (1983) 407. 
46 Stock (1983) 405. 
47 Sent. 3.57. For a detailed discussion of Bernard’s views on curiositas see Leclercq (1990a) 92-100. 
48 ord. 2.16.44. For more details on Augustine’s view on curiositas see Labhardt (1986) 188-196; Marrou 
(1938) 278-279; 350-352; 472-473; Torchia (1999) 259-261. 
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Augustine with studiosus49, religiosus50 and capax51. It designates the person who 
indulges in knowledge (cognitio) for its own sake. This knowledge is capable of 
deviating the soul from the contemplation of eternal things52. Augustine also links 
curiosity with vanity53.  
The reception of important Christian texts, including the Biblical and patristic 
sources, in the monastic environment of the twelfth century emerges as a regulated and 
complex process, containing a strong element of orality. This must be taken into 
consideration when dealing with the patristic sources of the medieval authors. Although it 
would be impossible to clarify or to indicate beyond the shadow of a doubt the way in 
which the ideas circulated from one author to another, knowing something about the 




Apart from understanding the way of reading and learning in the monastic 
environment and apart from taking into consideration the significant oral element 
involved in the communication of texts and ideas, it is also necessary to approach 
Bernard’s texts by being aware of his specific method of writing, which may reveal 
additional significant aspects of his dealing with the sources. Bernard was not 
academically trained in the way that some of his contemporary theologians who attended 
the courses of the cathedral schools used to be54. Therefore, he never made use in his 
works of the technique of compilation, nor did he dedicate his time to collecting 
sentences from the patristic authors in the fashion of the school students. As he himself 
testifies in a letter sent to Ogier, canon of Mont-Saint-Eloi, the whole process of writing 
was for him highly laborious and he sharply contrasts the effortful activity of 
composition with the ease of conversation. Instead of peace and quiet, one experiences 
                                                 
49 ord. 1.11.31; 2.5.17. 
50 ord. 2.15.42. 
51 doc. Chr. prol. 1. 
52 mus. 6.13.   
53 mus. 6.13. 
54 Bernard’s friend William of St. Thierry was most probably a former student of the School of Reims, 
where he might have studied even together with Abelard. See Bell (1979) 221-248.  
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mental turmoil, when toiling on a text searching for the precise expression to convey the 
exact content of one’s ideas. Many phrases competing for expression come to one’s mind 
when writing, and yet the exact formulation of one’s thoughts escapes capture55.  
Bernard was primarily a talented speaker, for whom writing came second to 
speaking56. A great number of Bernard’s works developed from his preaching; other 
works, especially his treatises, have been written for a particular occasion or at a specific 
request. Based on a few rare statements pertaining to Bernard57 and on the testimony of 
his friends and disciples58, Jean Leclercq was able to reconstruct the stages traversed by a 
Bernardine text before reaching the polished form of the final version. At the outset, 
Bernard addressed orally his audience (loqui, dicere) while his secretaries took notes of 
what he said (stylo excipere). Next, the text was transcribed either by Bernard or by his 
secretaries (scribere, transcribere) and later Bernard himself revised the text (corrigere), 
when this was not transcribed by himself. The final stage was the publication (edere).  
Bernard’s treatises, probably, are not the result of this multifold process of 
composition, since Bernard uses with regard to his opuscula the term scribere rather than 
transcribere.  While the latter retains the meaning of transcribing already a written text, 
the verb scribere refers in this context to works that are not based on a verbal 
presentation59. Also, Bernard’s masterpiece, the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, 
most likely contains material which had never been orally delivered in front of the 
monastic audience, in spite of the multitude of oral features which appear in the text due 
to Bernard’s scrupulosity towards the rules of the homiletic genre60.  
Not only the distinct process of composition might have affected Bernard’s 
handling of the sources, but also the different literary genres that he adopts dictate the 
way in which he incorporates the patristic material to his works. The most careful 
quotations and even the designation by name of the Christian authorities occur especially 
in Bernard’s letters. The least frequent citations figure in the Sermones super Cantica 
Canticorum, where, in addition to almost the total absence of direct references to the 
                                                 
55 Ep. 89. 
56 Evans (1983) 51. 
57 SC. 54.1; Ep. 17; Ep. 18.4-5 and Ep. 153.2. 
58 William of St. Thierry and Arnold of Bonneval. See Leclercq (1962) 3-25. 
59 Ep. 18. See also Leclercq (1962) 9. 
60 Leclercq (1962) 193-212. 
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previous Christian authors, the possible traces of the sources have been obscured through 
Bernard’s arduous work on the text, until all external elements integrated naturally in the 
new narrative.  
Apart from searching diligently for the best way to convey the content of his 
thoughts clearly, Bernard also worked assiduously on his text for achieving a literary 
effect. His deep concern for the euphonic, esthetical and rhetorical qualities of his texts 
led him to subtle corrections, which sometimes regarded, the exchange of a word with 
another, or merely the substitution of a letter for another if this could have as a result an 
unexpected assonance. Bernard also changed frequently the order of the words if this 
contributed to influencing the rhythm of the phrase or he operated changes at the 
morphological level, by modifying the case of a noun or of an adjective, or by choosing 
the passive voice for a verb that was initially used with an active meaning, etc61. All these 
corrections however were meant only in order to enhance the sense and not to alter the 
initial meaning of the text:  
Presque jamais les changements n’atteignent le sens, bien qu’ils en modifient 
quelque fois la nuance.  Mais ce sont des corrections d’artiste, d’homme de 
lettres, d’humaniste exigeant pour soi-même, soucieux de maintes détails qui sont 
de pure esthétique, améliorant avant de mourir l’œuvre qu’il va laisser à la 
postérité.62 
 
Preoccupied rather with remaining faithful to the sense conveyed in the writings of his 
predecessors, than with maintaining their formulations ad litteram, in his arduous search 
for the perfect expression, Bernard frequently transforms his sources beyond any easy 
recognition. In a literary work such as the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, where 
the quotations are deliberately avoided and the references given by the author are 
minimal, similar words or similar expressions may constitute then the sole indices of 
Bernard’s dependence on the texts of the previous Christian authors and they need to be 
taken in consideration. However, even if one succeeds in indicating the link existing 
between Bernard’s texts and the Christian past, it still may remain exceedingly difficult to 
appreciate whether Bernard read his sources directly, whether he read them integrally or 
partially, whether the traces surviving in his work were borrowed from another author, 
                                                 
61 Leclercq (1962) 321-351. 
62 Leclercq (1962) 349.  
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heard during the liturgy or picked up during a conversation. In such a situation, knowing 
something of Bernard’s reading and writing habits may be paramount for advancing an 
accurate hypothesis of his use of the sources.  
 
4. Bernard and the “Fathers” 
 
 
Tout comme on perçoit constamment dans le style de S. Bernard la résonance de 
la Vulgate63, même là où il ne puise pas directement de l’écriture sainte, ainsi 
l’héritage des Pères est toujours là comme une espèce de substrat64.  
 
Indeed there is no doubt that Bernard absorbed his patristic sources to such an extent that 
he could have legitimately claimed like John of Fécamp: Dicta mea dicta sunt Patrum65. 
His resistance to the theological methods developed in the schools of his time made him 
even more dependent on a Christian past concentrated in the Bible, the liturgy and the 
writings of the previous Christian authors. In fact, these sources were traditionally closely 
interconnected so as to form a “unified system of authority”66. The message of the Bible 
read during lectio divina or heard during the liturgy was frequently obscure and patristic 
interpretation was required in order to explain and solve textual difficulties.   
If the patristic authors play such an important role in shaping Bernard’s thought, 
offering constant assistance in his efforts to interpret the Scripture, then it is imperative to 
ask who exactly were those who Bernard called “Fathers”, and what was his attitude 
towards them. The answer to the first question will enable us to avoid the confusion 
existing nowadays among the modern scholars who do not share a unanimous view 
regarding the delimitation of the patristic period. The answer to the second question 
might enable us to discover additional aspects of Bernard’s handling of his sources and of 
his patristic sources in particular.  
                                                 
63 But see above my remarks about the various Latin Bible texts available to Bernard, p. 17. 
64 Mohrmann (1961) 350. 
65 John of Fécamp, Confessio theologica 2. Leclercq & Bonnes (1946) 121. 
66 Pelikan (1978) 223. Pelikan refers only to the inseparable authorities of the Bible and of the patristic 
authors. However, the liturgy may be also included since as Leclercq (1982a) 71 has pointed out: “The 
liturgy (…) is the medium through which the Bible and the patristic authors are received, and it is the 
liturgy that gives unity to all the manifestations of monastic culture”. For the close link between the biblical 
books and the works of the patristic authors, see also Smalley (1964) 37. 
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Certain modern scholars see the patristic period extending until fifth century and 
including all Christian authors regardless of their doctrine. Other scholars, adopting 
especially the view of the Catholic Church, reduce the number of the Church Fathers to 
sixteen and see the patristic period ending in the West with Isidore of Seville (†636) and 
in the East with John Damascene (†749). Finally, there are those scholars who accept as 
Church Fathers all Christian authors who expressed in their works the true doctrine of the 
Church whatever the period of time in which they lived67. Among these modern 
conceptions of the Church Fathers, the third view shares more similarities with the view 
that prevailed in the Middle Ages68, and to which Bernard himself appears to have 
adhered.  
Bernard uses most often the term patres in order to refer to Christian authoritative 
writers, such as Augustine or Ambrose69 among others70. However, the perusal of the 
occurrences of patres in Bernard’s works shows that the meaning of this term was not 
restricted to designating Christian authors. Bernard calls patres the patriarchs of the Old 
Testament such as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob71. The hermits of the Egyptian desert are 
also named patres72. Bernard uses the same term in order to refer to Benedict73, the 
author of the monastic rule adopted in the Cistercian monasteries, and he applies it to the 
founders of the Cistercian order74. In his correspondence, Bernard occasionally addresses 
some of his contemporaries as pater, if the recipient of his letter is an abbot, a prior75 or a 
bishop76. The popes Inocentius II and Eugenius III are equally addressed as pater77. As 
Bernard usually prefers to speak of patres in general, the exact sense of the term has 
almost always to be deduced from the context. 
                                                 
67 For different modern views regarding the periodisation of the patristic age see Werckmeister (1997) 51 
and Elders (1997) 337. 
68 Werckmeister (1997) 51.  
69 Ep. 77.7. 
70 From the West he also mentions by name, Jerome, Hilary of Poitiers, Gregory the Great. From the East 
he mentions Athanasius and Basil the Great.  
71 Miss. 1.3; Miss. 4.8. 
72 Apo. 9.23. 
73 Ded. 5.1. 
74 Ant.  Prologus. 
75 Ep. 11.  
76 Ep. 61. 
77 Ep. 190; Csi. 5.24. 
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A second term used by Bernard to denote Christian authoritative writers is 
doctores, whose meaning is narrower than that of patres. In the Epistula 190, with the 
purpose of refuting Abelard, Bernard appeals to the authority of the doctores nostri, who 
came after the apostles78. While Bernard concedes that the doctores follow 
chronologically the apostles, he does not attempt to draw the superior temporal line, 
which would mark the end of the patristic period. Among the later Christian authorities 
he mentions by name Bede79 without calling him either a doctor or a pater, and he is 
totally silent with regard to Anselm, who in Bernard’s time was highly praised80. Does 
this mean that for Bernard the patristic period ends in the seventh century with Gregory 
the Great (†604)? Probably not, since although Bernard does not refer explicitly to later 
Christian authors in his works, in designating an author as a pater or a doctor he was not 
following his own judgment but most likely respected the usage of these terms 
established by tradition. The scholarly findings show that by the twelfth century the 
meaning of the term patres was so broad as to include “not only apostolic fathers, early 
councils and popes and such figures as Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome and Gregory, but 
later thinkers as well, beginning with Bede”81. In addition, there seems to have been a 
tendency among medieval authors to avoid a sharp delimitation of the patristic period. 
Thomas Aquinas writing in the thirteenth century is as elusive as Bernard when it comes 
to indicating the limits of the period of the authoritative Christian authors82. In the light of 
these observations, it is probably more accurate to consider that in Bernard’s view the 
patristic period extends beyond the first seven centuries. 
It is also unclear from Bernard’s statements, whether a controversial author such 
as Origen needs to be included among patres and doctores. Needless to say, that he never 
uses these terms on the few occasions when he mentions Origen by name83. However, 
Bernard’s friend, William of St. Thierry does not hesitate to mention Origen together 
with Augustine and Ambrose as one of the great doctors of the Church84. In considering 
                                                 
78 Ep.190.11. 
79 Ep.77.15. 
80 Bernard’s contemporary, John Salisbury wrote a biography of Anselm in view of his canonisation, see 
Pranger (1997) 188. 
81 Peters (1996) 345. 
82 Elders (1997) 337-339. 
83 Div. 34.1; Ep. 190.3; Nov1. 4.3.  
84 Exp. Rom. Praefatio. See below p. 109. 
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Origen the equal of the greatest early Church authorities, William does not express his 
personal opinion; rather he continues a long tradition in the West85. Therefore, we must 
assume that in spite of Bernard’s silence with regard to Origen’s status and in spite of his 
acquaintance with Origen’s controversial treatment of a few doctrinal issues86, like 
William and the majority of their contemporaries, Bernard, most likely, did consider the 
Greek author as one of the doctors of the Church.  
All the evidence discussed so far leads to the conclusion that in speaking of the 
patres or doctores, Bernard made no attempt to demarcate exactly a specific period of the 
Christian past as the sole producer of Christian authorities. Both the terms patres and 
doctores are used in a broader sense than any of the meanings with which they are 
invested by modern scholars. While doctores seems closer to the modern conception of 
Fathers of the Church since Bernard places them in time after the apostles, however, by 
the fact that the term includes authors who have expressed not only the true doctrine of 
the Church in their teaching, such as Origen, it still maintains a larger meaning than the 
broadest modern conception of the term Fathers. In what follows, we will avoid speaking 
of “Fathers” in order to refer to the patristic authors, as it has been shown that Bernard 
uses the term patres with a much broader meaning.  
In turning now to the exploration of Bernard’s attitude towards the church 
authorities in his sense (patres and doctores), it is necessary to draw attention from the 
outset to the fact that the majority of Bernard’s occasional statements on his dealing with 
the patristic sources derives from his polemic with Abelard. Against him most often 
Bernard87 quoted or alluded to three biblical verses, which represent the basic rules 
needed to be respected for a sound attitude toward the patristic heritage: Non sum melior 
quam patres mei “I am not better than my Fathers” (3 Kgs 19:4), Ne transgredi terminos 
antiquos quos posuerunt patres nostri “Do not transgress the boundaries set by our 
Fathers (Prv 22:28) and the condemnation of the “novelties of opinions” (vocum 
novitates) deriving from 1 Tim 6:20. Thus, in a passage from the important letter on 
                                                 
85 For an impressively long list of Western authors who consider Origen a doctor and a pater, beginning 
with Isidore of Seville and ending in the twelfth century with Bernard’s contemporaries, see De Lubac 
(1998) 173-174. 
86 Div. 34.1; Ep. 190.3. 
87 Ep. 77; Ep.189.1; Ep. 190.11.  
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baptism addressed to Hugh of St. Victor, where most likely he hints at Abelard88, Bernard 
seizes upon the principles, which contain the quintessence of the appropriate approach to 
‘theologising’89:  
 
Therefore, we do not search for “battles of words” and according to the apostolic 
teaching, we also avoid the novelties. We oppose [to him] only the sentences and 
the words of the Fathers and not ours; for we are not wiser than our Fathers90. 
 
Despite Bernard’s declaration that his intention is not to add anything novel to the 
patristic teaching, following the patristic authors and not transgressing the boundaries of 
the Christian doctrine established by them, was not a straightforward matter. During the 
eleventh century Eucharistic debate, medieval theologians were faced with irreconcilable 
discrepancies existing between the patristic authorities who dealt with this subject. In 
their attempt to cope with the conflicting patristic views, the medieval theologians 
committed themselves to the effort of discovering a patristic consensus behind 
discrepancies91. In the twelfth century, one of the most famous books providing a method 
of dealing with the contradictions encountered in the works of the patristic authors is 
Abelard’s Sic et Non. Apart from systematizing the techniques in use for decades on the 
part of the earlier canonists92 (the corruption of the manuscripts, the author’s own 
retractations, the authorial intention), Abelard breaks with the tradition in two main 
aspects. First, he differentiates between the authority of the Scripture and that of the 
patristic authors, claiming that the latter does not deserve “the undoubting faith” 
appropriate to the writers of the biblical books93. Second, he suggests a procedure of 
achieving patristic consensus, which presupposes, when all the other techniques were 
unsuccessfully applied, to compare the authorities and “that which has the stronger 
                                                 
88 Ep. 77 is addressed to Hugh of Saint Victor, but it is highly likely that in the introductory part of his letter 
Bernard refers to Abelard, see Heiss (1991) 349-378. 
89 I use here the term ‘theologising’ suggested by W. Otten, as an alternative to the term ‘theology’, which 
in the first half of the twelfth century was still not clearly distinguished from other disciplines. See Otten 
(2004b) 1. Bernard himself uses the term theologia in a negative context when speaking of Abelard and 
mocks it making it rhyme with stultilogia. See Ep. 190.9.  
90 Ep. 77.  
91 Pelikan (1978) 216-223. 
92 Colish (2004) 372. 
93 Sic et Non. Prologus. Boyer & McKeon (1976) 103. For a discussion of this aspect see Pelikan (1978) 
224. 
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witness and the greater support should be given preference”94. This comparison resulting 
in the preference of one patristic authority over another cannot be carried out by someone 
who persists in the traditional mindset, according to which one has to humbly subject 
one’s judgment to that of the patristic authors95. Approaching the patristic sources by 
means of ratio and ingenium96 in order to perform his choice, Abelard abandons the 
traditional humble attitude towards patristic authorities.    
Bernard himself was also aware of the patristic authors not being always in 
agreement regarding a particular matter97, but his dealing with the contradictions 
encountered in their works was distinct from the controversial procedure suggested by 
Abelard, which encouraged the choice among patristic views. In contrast to Abelard, 
Bernard refuses to show his preference for a Christian author to the detriment of another 
and chooses a traditional solution for the impasse98, dismissing the treatment of the 
problem as completely irrelevant for one’s spiritual growth and being reluctant in 
presenting his own opinion on a theological issue which generated divergent views 
among the patristic authors: 
 
The patristic authors seem to have held divergent views on the problem and I 
must confess that I cannot come to a decision about the view I might be justified 
in teaching. But I am of the opinion that knowledge of these matters would not 
contribute greatly to your progress99. 
 
In the famous Epistula 190 addressed to Pope Innocent II, Bernard touches upon two 
other issues which made Abelard’s theological approach highly controversial from a 
traditional perspective100: the breach that Abelard introduces in the unified conception of 
                                                 
94 Sic et Non. Prologus. Boyer & McKeon (1976) 96. 
95 For William’s description of Bernard’s method of reading the patristic authors see above pp. 15-16.  
96 Otten (2004b) 133 has observed that for Abelard, the word ingenium apart from referring solely to one’s 
talent hints also at the emergence of a theological approach based on doubt and jeopardizing the certainty 
of all human knowledge. 
97 SC. 5.7. 
98 D’Onofrio (1991) 124 showed that Eriugena had recourse to exactly the same method in his attempt to 
cope with the differences existing between the Latin and the Greek patristic authors. Another similar 
example is Lanfranc of Bec (1009-1089), Archbishop of Canterbury, who, several decades before Bernard, 
recommended the same cautious approach to the difficulties arising from conflicting testimonies of 
authority. See Epistula 50. PL 150:544. 
99 SC. 5.7. 
100 Here I deal exclusively with the problems related to the patristic authority. For useful discussions of 
other aspects present in this letter see Otten (2004a) 353-354; Pranger (1997) 182-189. 
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Christian authority by differentiating between biblical and patristic authority, and his 
inappropriate exaltation of ratio and ingenium to the detriment of faith.  
In Bernard’s view, Abelard finds himself in opposition with the entire patristic 
tradition, when he decides to prefer to the unanimous patristic consensus about a 
particular doctrinal matter101, his own opinion stated repeatedly with the phrase ut nobis 
videtur102. Against Abelard, Bernard firmly reasserts the strong tie existing between the 
patristic authors and the biblical authorities, and emphatically demonstrates that the 
univocal position of the former is deeply rooted in Scripture103. He confronts Abelard 
with the testimony of the Old Testament: Ad Prophetas te ducam104, and just in case 
Abelard might find their authority insufficient as well, Bernard provides additional 
evidence from the New Testament in support of the patristic consensus questioned by 
Abelard: Veni mecum et ad Apostolos105.  
Bernard was also alarmed by Abelard’s audacity in scrutinising anew sacred 
matters left deliberately unsolved by the patristic authors, without any authoritative 
support only by means of reason and mere human ingenuity. What was considered for 
centuries a matter of faith, Abelard dared to explore rationally, deriding the patristic 
authors “because they held that such matters are better allowed to rest than be 
resolved”106. 
                                                 
101 The power of devil over human being. 
102 Ep. 190.11. 
103 While I acknowledge the merits of Pranger’s analysis, I nevertheless disagree with his conclusion stating 
that Bernard’s confidence in the attack he directs against Abelard derives only from his appeal to the 
biblical authority presented in a highly dramatic manner in order to impress his readers. In my opinion, it is 
not the manner of the presentation of the biblical authority that provides the key to Bernard’s resounding 
success in his scolding of Abelard; more important than the rhetorical impact of his address on his readers 
is the reason that lies behind the emphatic appeal to the biblical authority, which is invoked especially 
because for Abelard as well it represents the supreme authority, see Sic et Non. Prologus. Boyer & McKeon 
(1976) 101. Bernard’s main point is that going against the patristic authors who echo the Scripture, Abelard 
is opposing the scriptural authority also. As it has been observed, auctoritas in the twelfth century is made 
out of “whole cloth”. See Otten (2004a) 360 and p. 22, n. 66, above. There is continuity and uniformity 
between its different segments and they need to remain in harmony, otherwise turning against one of its 
segments, it may discredit the others. The rhetorical wrap of Bernard’s attack contributed without any 
doubt to a certain extent to Bernard’s victory over Abelard, but it is not because of Bernard’s rhetorical 
skill that Abelard was condemned. Bernard’s accusations from the Epistula 190 raised against Abelard 
have to do both with the content of his teaching and with his theological method.  
104 Ep. 190.13. 
105 Ep. 190.14. 
106 Ep. 188.1.  
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In contrast to Abelard’s approach, Bernard preferred to underline his inability in 
saying anything new and worthy, by means of his own talent, without the aid coming 
presumably from God and the biblical and patristic authorities:  “I do not pretend that left 
to myself, I can make any new discovery, for the reason that I lack sufficient depth and 
power of penetration”107.  
Surprisingly for the modern reader, Bernard manifested more concern when he 
discovered that he had proposed an opinion, which lacked the support of patristic 
authorities, than when he followed a source without acknowledging it: 
 
In another place I wrote something about the Seraphim, which I have never heard 
anyone say and nowhere read. At this point may my reader pay attention to the 
fact that I said, ‘I believe’, wishing to indicate that this was only my opinion, 
because I could not support it from Scripture108. 
 
And yet, in spite of these major concerns not to add anything new to the teaching of the 
patristic authors, Bernard’s use of the biblical and patristic sources was in no respect rigid 
or narrow. He took liberties vis-à–vis the biblical and patristic authority, and 
accommodated them to his own narrative. Bernard justified his freedom in using the 
sources by declaring that: “If something is said after the Fathers, which is not against the 
Fathers, I do not think it ought to displease the Fathers or anyone else109”.  
Bernard’s respect of the patristic consensus and of the view established by 
tradition is transparent also in the way in which he deals with a controversial author such 
as Origen, “who enjoyed something of a renaissance in the twelfth century and among the 
first Cistercians”110. The interest of Bernard’s disciples and contemporaries in Origen 
extended beyond the safe reading of his commentary on the Song of Songs to Origen’s 
more controversial writings, whose content was likely to trouble or do harm to the 
readers, who approached these texts without caution. This happens in fact to Bernard’s 
monks who read a difficult passage from Origen’s homilies on Leviticus, prompting thus 
Bernard’s reaction:  
                                                 
107 SC. 10.1: Non sum ego profundi sensum, neque adeo perspicacis ingenii, ut novi quippiam ex me 
adinvenire queam. 
108 Hum. Retractatio. 
109 Miss.  4.11: Sed si quid dictum est post Patres quod non sit contra Patres, nec Patribus arbitror, nec 
cuiquam displicere debere.  
110 Casey (1988) 30. On the reading of Origen in the Latin West see De Lubac (1998) 161-225. On Origen 
and the twelfth century see, Leclercq (1951) 425-439. On Origen and Bernard, see above p. 12, n. 7. 
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I do not think I should be silent on this matter, for the authority of the Fathers 
warns us that he wrote some things which are clearly against the faith and that he 
is therefore not to be read without caution111.  
 
Bernard succeeds in elaborating a nuanced attitude towards Origen’s problematic 
teaching which allows him to make extensive use of Origen while remaining on a wholly 
traditional ‘orthodox’ ground. On a few occasions, Bernard refutes categorically 
controversial aspects of Origen’s teaching112. In other circumstances he deals with the 
difficulties encountered in the Origenian text in the same way in which he deals with 
obscure biblical passages, trying to disentangle the subtleties of the argument. He may 
even attempt to make an apology for this important Christian thinker, by saying that: “It 
may be perhaps that he spoke hyperbolically. In any case, it is his business, not ours”113. 
Finally, he does not see any harm in drawing extensively on Origen’s commentary of the 
Song of Songs especially in his Sermones super Cantica Canticorum114. Bernard’s major 
concern toward Origen regarded the effect that his teaching might have had on his 
monks, leading them astray from the right faith. However, he never recommends them 
not to read Origen, on the contrary, he has to be read, but with discernment, cautiously, 
meaning that they need be aware of those doctrines condemned by the Church. We may 
assume that this is how he himself read Origen on whose assistance he relied in his 
commentary on the Song of Songs. 
In conclusion, Bernard’s attitude towards the patristic authors may be seen as 
continuing a long practice in the Church. He respects their judgment, entertaining no 
doubts about their authority. He does not go against them by teaching novelties likely to 
                                                 
111 Div. 34.1. 
112 In SC. 54.3 Bernard speaks directly against apokatastasis and in Div. 34.2 he opposes the idea implied 
in Origen’s text that there is sadness in heaven. 
113 Div. 34.1: Potuerit forsitan hyperbolice loqui. Ipse viderit, nihil interest nostra. Henri de Lubac has 
pointed out that Bernard borrows here the expression Ipse viderit from Rufinus’ Apology. See De Lubac 
(1998) 205. 
114 During his lifetime, Bernard was even accused by Berengar, Abelard’s disciple, of having plagiarized 
Origen’s commentary on the Song of Songs in his own sermons on the Song of Songs. See Berengar, 
Apologeticus. PL 178:1863B. Modern scholars however cannot take this accusation seriously as Berengar 
himself later recanted his entire work written against Bernard. See Luscombe (1966) 319-337. For evidence 
of Bernard’s use of Origen in his Sermones super Cantica Canticorum see Leclercq (1962) 283-285 and 
287-290. Also on the similarities between Bernard and Origen in their interpretation of the Song of Songs, 
see Brésard (1982) 113-130; 192-209 and 293-308.  
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contradict their teaching. In dealing with contradictory patristic views, he bluntly refuses 
to favour the position of one patristic author to the detriment of another.  
 
5. Bernard and Augustine 
 
It is beyond doubt that like the rest of the Western medieval theologians, Bernard 
is indebted to Augustine. However, it remains a difficult task for modern scholars to 
estimate the extent of Bernard’s direct knowledge of Augustine. As a young monk, 
Bernard might have had access to the large collection of Augustine’s volumes available 
at Cîteaux115. A fragmentary catalogue of the library of Clairvaux, discovered and 
minutely analysed by A. Wilmart116, provides valuable information with regard to the 
manuscripts available to Bernard during his abbacy. Only two pages survived from this 
ancient catalogue, but they indicate that in the Clairvaux collection, the Libri sancti 
Augustini followed immediately the six volumes of the Libri textus divini. Like in other 
medieval monastic libraries, in Clairvaux as well, the manuscripts were not arranged in 
alphabetical order, but in an order that reflected the relative importance of various 
authors117. The third position on the list of patristic authors present at Clairvaux, was 
occupied, surprisingly, by the Libri Origenis118, situated ahead of the manuscripts of 
other Latin patristic authors, such as Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome or Gregory the Great. This 
testifies for the popularity of Origen among the patristic authors read in the monastic 
environment119.  
A significant aspect of Augustine’s presence at Clairvaux is that the library of this 
monastery did not only possess a simple collection of some of Augustine’s works, but, 
                                                 
115 The library of Cîteaux boasted a collection of forty volumes containing Augustine’s works. See De 
Ghellink (1950) 72. 
116 Wilmart (1917) 127-190. This study was reprinted in COCR (1949) 101-127, 301-319. Other important 
studies on the library of Clairvaux at the time of Bernard, are De Ghellinck (1950) 63-82; Vernet (1979); 
Bouhot (1992) 141-153. 
117 We encounter exactly the same situation at the library of the monastery Pomposa in the eleventh 
century. See Leclercq (1982a) 97. 
118 The Libri Origenis at the library of Clairvaux consisted of eight manuscripts, containing, apart from the 
commentaries on the Old and New Testament, the Periarchon as well as Pamphylos and Eusebius’s 
Apology of Origen in Rufinus’s Latin translation. See Leclercq (1982a) 94.  
119 De Ghellinck (1950) 67.  
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quite exceptionally for the period, a complete edition of Augustine’s Opera omnia120. The 
works of Augustine were gathered in almost fifty volumes, among which seven volumes 
contained Augustine’s short works assembled under the title Opuscula Augustini121. The 
final volume of the Opuscula Augustini finishes at Clairvaux with the Conlatio cum 
Maximino Arianorum episcopo, the Contra Maximinum Arianum and the pseudo-
Augustinian work Contra Felicianum122.  
More evidence for the presence of Augustine’s works at Clairvaux during 
Bernard’s life comes from a document dating from 1147-1148, discovered by Jean 
Leclercq. According to this document, the prior of Clairvaux informs the abbot of the 
monastery of Lissies that it would be difficult to send him the works of Augustine that he 
requested, since they are inserted in volumes of large format. The prior suggests that a 
monk should be sent to Clairvaux in order to transcribe Augustine’s works needed in 
Lissies123.  
In light of this evidence, Bernard appears to have had ample opportunity to 
consult directly a wide range of Augustine’s works, both at Cîteaux, in his early years as 
a monk, and at Clairvaux, during his abbacy. However, as Bernard’s busy life as an abbot 
could not have offered him the sufficient leisure necessary for solitary study, the 
Augustinian texts that the modern scholars contend that Bernard certainly knew, were 
mainly his homiletic works included in the liturgy and in the Office of the Vigils124.  
Throughout Bernard’s writings, Augustine’s name occurs nearly twenty times. No 
other patristic author is mentioned by Bernard quite as much125. Apart from referring to 
him simply as Augustinus, at times, Bernard adds to his name the epithet beatus126 or 
sanctus127. Frequently Augustine is named together with other important patristic authors. 
Thus, in Epistula 77, apart from quoting (in an unusual way for him) entire passages from 
                                                 
120 De Ghellinck (1950) 63. 
121 Wilmart (1949) 115 mentions forty three manuscripts gathered in forty six volumes; Bouhot (1992) 148 
inexplicably mentions fifteen. In retr. 1.1, Augustine speaks of having written opuscula, libri, epistolae and 
tractatus. It is likely that Augustine’s seven volumes of the Opuscula Augustini represent the work of the 
same librarian monk, see De Ghellink (1950) 70-71.  
122 Bouhot (1992) 149. 
123 Leclercq (1952) 52. 
124 Casey (1988) 27. 
125 Gregory the Great follows Augustine with thirteen occurrences.  
126 Div. 102.1; Ep. 2.7; Ep. 3.  
127 Hum. 1.14; Div. 2.1; Ep. 77.7; Pre. 20.61; Pre. 17.52.  
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Augustine, Bernard refers to him and to Ambrose as representing the “pillars” of the 
Church128. In the Sententia 51, Augustine, Jerome and Gregory the Great are named 
“great harvesters” (messores magni). In Parabola 6, Augustine, Ambrose and Hilary are 
addressed as “holy doctors and magnificent confessors of faith” (sancti doctores et 
magnifici confessores)129. Bernard acknowledges Augustine’s individual merits as a 
combatant against the heretics in the Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 80, where he 
refers to Augustine as “the mighty hammer of heretics” (validissimus malleus 
haereticorum)130. It has been observed that Bernard mentions the name of Augustine in 
mainly three situations: as a founder of the monastic order, as a defender of the orthodox 
faith and as an authority on biblical exegesis131.  
In the Latin West, Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636) was the first to have given 
explicitly to Augustine pride of place among patristic authorities, both Greek and 
Latin132. In the subsequent centuries Augustine consolidated his position as the greatest 
of the patristic authors, his authority following immediately that of the apostles133. 
Bernard must have been totally aware of the way in which the bishop of Hippo was 
generally perceived in relation to the rest of the patristic authors; however, he makes no 
explicit reference to Augustine’s privileged status. The fact that Augustine is often 
mentioned by Bernard in the company of other representatives of the Christian tradition, 
without any declared intention in singling him out and making him the supreme authority 
among the others, may very well indicate that, in naming authorities, Bernard was 
interested in underlining that the faith of the Church is based on a multitude of patristic 
views, rather than being identified solely with the views of a particular author. Once 
again Bernard’s attitude seems to reflect a well-established tendency within the Church, 
which refuses to reduce the Christian doctrine to the teaching of a single author, even if 
that author happens to be Augustine134.    
                                                 
128 Ep. 77.8: Ab his ergo duabus columnis, Augustinum loquor et Ambrosium, difficile, crede mihi, avellor. 
129 Here the term confessor refers particularly to confession of faith. For the threefold meaning of the words 
confiteri, confessio and confessor, see Courcelle (1968) 13.  
130 SC. 80.7. 
131 Rigolot (1992) 136. 
132 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 6.7.3. PL 82:237B. 
133 Marrou (1957) 155-160.  
134 In the West, the Church progressively selected a group of maiores doctores, consisting of Augustine, 
Ambrose, Jerome and Gregory the Great, see Marrou (1957) 155. It may be said that William of St. Thierry 
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The few acknowledged quotations from Augustine are usually too short to be 
considered as conclusive evidence for a direct reading of Augustine’s works they derive 
from. In one of his sermons, Bernard repeats the famous phrase of the Soliloquies: 
noverim me, noverim te135. In his early treatise De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae, he 
borrows from Augustine the definition of pride (superbia) as “the love of one’s self-
excellence” (amor propriae excellentiae)136. Against Abelard he probably quotes from 
memory Augustine’s definition of faith understood as “certain knowledge”, as he respects 
the sense of Augustine’s sentence, but changes its wording:  
 
Ep. 190.9:  
Fides, ait, non coniectando vel opinando 
habetur in corde in quo est, ab eo cuius 




Non sic videtur fides in corde, in quo et, ab 
eo cuius est; sed eam tenet certissima 
scientia, clamatque conscientia. 
Bernard makes use of Augustine against Gilbert of Porée, when he quotes a sentence 
from the De Trinitate in a slightly abbreviated form, preserving only the theological 
content and leaving outside the philosophical element present in Augustine’s phrase: 
 
SC. 80.7: 
Deus nonnisi ea magnitudine magnus est 
quae est quod ipse. Alioquin erit maior 
magnitudo quam Deus. 
 
Trin. 5.10.11: 
Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine 
magnus est quae  non est quod ipse  est 
quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus 
est- alioquin illa erit  maior magnitudo 
quam deus. 
 
The Epistula 77 contains the most extensive quotations from Augustine. Bernard quotes 
verbatim a passage from Augustine’s De Baptismo 4.29 and another short passage from 
the Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, 3.84: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
adopted the same attitude as Bernard, since in his writings he usually claims to follow the patristic authors 
in general rather than a particular patristic author, see Déchanet (1972) 141-143.  
135 Div. 2.1; sol. 2.1.1. 
136 Hum. 1.14; Gn. litt. 11.24.25. 
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Ep. 77.7: 
‘Baptismi, inquit, vicem aliquando implere 
passionem, de latrone illo, cui non 
baptizato dictum est: Hodie mecum eris in 
paradiso, beatus Cyprianus non leve 
documentum assumit’. Et addit: ‘Quod 
etiam atque etiam considerans invenio, 
inquit, non tantum passionem pro nomine 
Christi, id quod ex baptismate deerat posse 
supplere, sed etiam  fidem 
conversionemque cordis, si forte ad 
celebrandum mysterium  baptismi in 
angustiis temporum succurri non potest’. 
Et infra: ‘Quantum itaque, ait, valeat etaim 
sine visibili sacramento baptismi quod ait 
Apostolus : Corde creditur ad iustitiam, 
ore autem  confessio fit ad salutem, in illo 
latrone declaratum est. Sed tunc, inquit, 
impletur invisibiliter, cum mysterium 
baptismi, non contemptus religionis, sed 
articulus necessitatis excludit’.  
 
 
(…) Item in alio loco Augustinus (…) 
infert: ‘Ex his colligitur, ait, invisibilem 
sanctificationem quibusdam affuisse et 
profuisse sine visibilibus sacramentis, quae 
pro temporum diversitate mutata sunt, ut 
alia  tunc fuerit et alia modo sint’. Et paulo 
post: ‘Nec tamen, inquit, visibile 
sacramentum  omnino contemnendum, nam 
contemptor eius invisibiliter sanctificari 
non potest’.  
bapt. 4.29: 
baptismi sane vicem aliquando implere 
passionem de latrone illo, cui non 
baptizato dictum est: hodie mecum eris in 
paradiso, non leve documentum idem 
beatus Cyprianus adsumit. quod etiam 
atque etiam considerans invenio non 
tantum passionem pro nomine Christi id 
quod ex baptismo deerat posse supplere, 
sed etiam fidem conversionemque cordis, si 
forte ad celebrandum mysterium baptismi 
in angustiis temporum succurri non potest. 
(…) quantum itaque ualeat etiam sine 
visibili baptismi sacramento quod ait 
apostolus: corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore 
confession fit ad salutem, in illo latrone 
declaratum est. sed tunc impletur 
invisibiliter, cum ministerium baptismi non 
contemptus religionis, sed articulus 
necessitatis excludit. 
 
qu. Lev. 3.84: 
 
proinde colligitur invisibilem 
sanctificationem quibusdam adfuisse atque 
profuisse sine visibilibus sacramentis, quae 
pro temporum diversitate mutata sunt, ut 
alia tunc fuerint et alia modo sint.(…) 
nec tamen ideo sacramentum visibile 
contemnendum est; nam contemptor eius 
invisibiliter sanctificari nullo modo potest. 
 
The relatively long and exact quotations indicate that most likely Bernard had 
Augustine’s texts in front of him when he wrote this letter. He also recommends the 
reading of the Book 4 of Augustine’s treatise De baptismo137, which suggests that, in 
order to give such advice, he probably had a good knowledge of the entire tract.  
From the perusal of these sparse quotations, it seems as if Bernard usually 
reproduced some of Augustine’s famous brief phrases which did not require any 
particular investigative efforts on his part and which he had most likely picked up from 
                                                 
137 Ep. 77.7. 
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the general usage and easily memorized. However, especially the last example presented 
above demonstrates that when required to help in finding the canonical solution to a 
doctrinal debate, Bernard carefully researched his patristic sources, from which, contrary 
to his habit, he quoted accurately in order to support his position.  
6. Methodology 
 
It has certainly become obvious by now that, because of a multitude of reasons 
having to do with various issues (the education of the author, the habits of reading of 
authoritative texts in the cloister, the complexity of the process of composition) Bernard’s 
works do not lend themselves easily to an investigation of their sources or to a study of 
the means of transmission of ideas. Methods that have successfully helped to discover the 
sources of other medieval authors may prove totally inconclusive when applied to 
Bernardine texts. Thus, the method of textual parallels, declared by Pierre Courcelle138 as 
most reliable in helping to determine not only the ultimate but also the intermediary 
sources of an author, may fail lamentably when applied to Bernardine texts, since the 
possibility of finding long quotations or paraphrases of passages from patristic authors is 
minimal. On the other hand, the method of doctrinal similarities considered by Courcelle 
as extremely unreliable, as it determines the mere consonance or similarity of ideas, may 
be more relevant for tracing down a source in Bernard since, as a general rule, he alters 
dramatically the expression of an idea coming from an author, while conveying faithfully 
its content139.  
However, as neither the method of textual parallels nor that of doctrinal 
similarities can shed significant light on Bernard’s use of Christian authors, in the 
concluding remarks of his study on the problems of Bernard’s sources, Jean Leclercq 
proposed a new method for achieving progress in this area of research:  
S. Bernard ne donne presque pas de références (…) Mais il dépend, certainement, 
des Pères; l’un des indices de cette dépendance est dans sa façon de citer 
l’Écriture comme tels auteurs, qu’il fréquente, l’on fait avant lui. De ce point de 
vue, l’identification de ses variantes scripturaires dans les témoins de la littérature 
chrétienne antérieure à lui- celle des Pères ou du moyen âge- donnera des 
possibilités dont on peut attendre beaucoup: si un progrès peut être fait dans la 
                                                 
138 Courcelle (1969) 6. 
139 See the discussion above p. 22. 
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connaissance de ses sources patristiques et théologiques, il viendra en grande 
partie de l’examen de ses citations bibliques140. 
 
In Leclercq’s view if any progress is to be made in determining Bernard’s sources this 
can be achieved especially through an examination of his biblical quotations. The French 
scholar did not develop this suggestion any further but it is not difficult to see the 
advantages of pursuing this path in the investigation of Bernard’s sources and especially 
in the investigation of Bernard’s use of Augustine, because both authors were excellent 
interpreters of the Bible supporting each idea of their teaching with biblical quotations.  
As it has been already explained in this study, Bernard’s vast knowledge of the biblical 
text is largely due to his exposure to the liturgy and to the writings of the patristic 
authors141. This had a decisive influence on the way in which Bernard quoted and 
interpreted the biblical text. It is not surprising then, that the examination of the scriptural 
quotations can reveal a different source than the Bible itself. Thus, small identical 
alterations of a scriptural quotation unattested by any versions of the Bible may be 
sometimes the unique evidence for a direct relationship between two authors. Resembling 
contexts or a similar way of interpreting the same biblical verses may also be indicative 
of a specific intertextual relation between Bernard and a patristic source. Clusters of 
identical biblical quotations present in two different writers should also be taken into 
consideration since they may indicate a possible link existing between the author and his 
source.  
 In searching for traces of Augustine’s ideas in the articulation of Bernard’s 
mystical thought it is especially this last method suggested by Leclercq and based on the 
examination of some of Bernard’s key scriptural quotations (1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10, Rom 5:5, 
Sg 2:1, 1 Cor 6:17, Ps 72:28 and Ps 63:9) that is going to be extensively used in this 
thesis. The methods of textual parallels and of doctrinal similarities are not going to be 
disregarded but used either in conjunction with the main method or whenever it may 
seem appropriate.  
   
  
                                                 
140 Leclercq (1962) 318. 
141 See above, p. 17. 
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Chapter 1: Image and Likeness: The Anthropological Grounds of 
Bernard’s Mysticism 
 
It has been accurately observed that the mystical theology of the great Cistercian 
authors cannot be properly understood apart from their teaching on the soul and its 
powers141. The centrality of anthropology for the understanding of Bernard’s mystical 
theology cannot be denied, although, unlike other great twelfth century theologians142, he 
never wrote a work dedicated exclusively to the nature of the soul, its faculties, its 
functions, etc. in the fashion of the technical anthropological tracts circulating at that time 
especially under the title De anima. He has, nevertheless, frequently in his works 
reflected upon anthropological matters, approaching them from various perspectives and 
with different purposes, almost always in an unsystematic way143. As a result of this 
modus operandi, Bernard left us distinct anthropological accounts which are difficult to 
reconcile and which cannot be always harmoniously organised in a coherent and cohesive 
synthesis. Thus, there is significant discrepancy between what Bernard has to say on the 
theme of humanity created in the image and likeness of God in one of his early treatises, 
De gratia et libero arbitrio, and his reflections on the same topic contained in the 
Sermones super Cantica Canticorum 80-83. Already his contemporaries raised objections 
against the inconsistencies of his anthropological teaching. Bernard defended himself 
arguing that the accounts on this topic that he had produced during the years might be 
different but they must not be considered as contradictory, they are diversa… sed, ut 
arbitror, non adversa144. Faced with the multiple facets of Bernard’s anthropological 
                                                 
141 Le Bail (1937) 1472. 
142 Some of the theologians of the twelfth century contemporaneous with Bernard left us anthropological 
treatises: William of Champeaux, De origine animae and Hugh of St. Victor, De arrha animae. Among the 
early Cistercians, William of St. Thierry wrote De natura corporis et animae, Isaac of Stella, Epistola de 
anima and Aelred of Rievaulx, De natura animae.  
143 Bernard’s most extensive anthropological reflections are to be found in Gra. 9-10 and SC. 80-83. Casual 
and usually undeveloped statements of the anthropological theme are to be encountered in Hum 7.21, SC. 5, 
SC. 11, SC. 18, SC. 21, SC. 24-27, SC. 34-38. For a discussion of all the passages from the Sermones super 
Cantica Canticorum see Casey (1988) 131-190. Other important scholarly treatments of Bernard’s 
anthropology are Standaert (1947) 70-129, Von Ivanka (1953) 202-208, Hiss (1964), McGinn (1988) 3-50, 
McGinn (1994) 168-174, Anderson (2004) 265-301. 
144 SC. 81.11. 
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teaching one modern scholar, M. Standaert, observed that “Bernard does not have one 
doctrine, but several doctrines of God’s image and likeness in human beings”145.  
Needless to say, the present investigation does not pretend to be exhaustive and to 
take into consideration all the various facets of Bernard’s anthropological teaching. As 
the main goal of this chapter is limited to understanding the role played by Augustine’s 
works in enabling Bernard to “locate mystical consciousness within the process of the 
restoration of the likeness to God”146 we will turn our attention mainly to one of 
Bernard’s works where he is most indebted to Augustine: the early treatise De gratia et 
libero arbitrio (1128)147. Augustine’s impact on Bernard’s De gratia et libero arbitrio 
was under scholarly scrutiny148 in the past and this chapter goes along the lines indicated 
by Bernard McGinn in a recent article, where he looks at the reception of Augustine by 
some of the great medieval mystics149, while seeking to bring more evidence on 
Bernard’s use of Augustine’s ideas and to reflect upon the way in which he handles the 
ideas he selects from Augustine’s works. 
De gratia et libero arbitrio is addressed to William of St. Thierry whose 
theological knowledge is highly praised by Bernard and who is required to intervene in 
the text and to make emendations of the obscure statements. It is difficult to estimate 
nowadays the extent of William’s contribution in establishing the final version of this 
important Bernardine text, but it is essential to bear in mind the communication existing 
between the two friends on theological matters, in order to grasp the way in which their 
theological thought was shaped by their interaction. 
                                                 
145 Standaert (1947) 100. However, Standaert also recognises that a basic consistency underlies these 
various treatments of the imago-similitudo theme. In his opinion, Bernard did not intend to formulate a 
unique and definitive position on the anthropological theme, but he attempted merely to present a set of 
variations on a basic triple pattern: formatio, deformatio and reformatio. The tendency to underline the 
consistency of Bernard’s approach, in spite of the different formulations of his views continues in more 
recent scholarship. Thus, Robert Javelet is one of the scholars who compared the two seemingly 
irreconcilable views presented by Bernard in Gra. 9-10 and in SC. 80-83 and he concluded that: “Il est 
évident qu’il use des même matériaux, des mêmes idées pour le traité et pour les sermons”. See Javelet 
(1967) 194-195.  
146 McGinn (2006) 7. 
147 Scholarly discussions of this work are to be found in Schaffner (1950) 43-57, Venuta (1953), Faust 
(1962), Javelet (1967) 1:189-196, McGinn (1988) 3-50, Rydstrøm-Poulsen (1992) 307-343. 
148 The most extensive study of Augustine’s influence on Bernard’s early treatise is Faust (1962).  
149 McGinn (2006) 7-11. 
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Certain scholars viewed the De gratia et libero arbitrio as Bernard’s De anima 
treatise150, an opinion which was contested by others who considered it rather to be 
Bernard’s commentary on Romans due to the fact that the Epistle to the Romans provides 
the main scriptural material for this work151. If it proved difficult to determine the literary 
genre to which this work belongs, it is perhaps safe to say that this treatise is more 
dogmatic152 in character than mystical; nevertheless “it is essential in understanding the 
place of mysticism in his theology”153. 
Already the title of Bernard’s early work points in the direction of Augustine, who 
entitled identically a work he wrote late in life (426-427), dealing with problems raised 
by monks in Africa and Southern Gaul, who believed that Augustine’s teaching on grace 
destroyed free choice. The issue at stake in these two works separated by almost eight 
centuries is also identical: both authors write with the declared intention of explaining 
that one must not deny free choice in defending grace. Their methods are, however, 
different. Augustine opts for a demonstration based on scriptural evidence that proves the 
existence of free choice and the necessity of grace. Bernard, concerned not to repeat 
unnecessarily what has been treated by others154, takes for granted the existence of free 
choice and focuses on the way in which free choice and grace act together, attributing the 
initiative to divine grace. Bernard relies more on one of Augustine’s works occasioned by 
the reception of his De gratia et libero arbitrio, the De correptione et gratia (426-427), 
which is Augustine’s answer to the objection that his doctrine of grace renders any 
rebuke meaningless. Bernard borrowed from this work Augustine’s distinction between 
the grace that Adam had in paradise (posse non peccare) and the grace that human beings 
will enjoy in heaven, but to whom some are already entitled after having been redeemed 
from the fall through the coming of Christ (non posse peccare) and loosely structured his 
                                                 
150 Le Bail (1937) 1472; Venuta (1953) 17, n. 1; Schaffner (1950) 45. 
151 Bernard makes use of the Epistles to the Corinthians and to the Galatians as well, but the Epistle to the 
Romans is most extensively referred to. McGinn (1988) 5 identified fifteen explicit quotations in this early 
work and twenty-five implicit references. His point of view that the De gratia et libero arbitrio should be 
rather seen as Bernard’s commentary on Romans seems also to be more appropriate, if we look at this work 
in the light of Bernard’s theological dialogue with his friend William. The latter started writing his own 
Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos roughly at the same time when Bernard sent him his own account 
on grace and free choice. 
152 McGinn (1988) 3 refers to the treatise as “the most profound and influential of the Abbot of Clairvaux’s 
dogmatic works”. 
153 McGinn (2006) 8.  
154 Gra. Prologus. 
 42
treatise around the figures of Christ and Adam. The larger context of Bernard’s 
discussion of these two types of grace is represented by Augustine’s teaching on the 
creation of human beings in the image and likeness of God. In speaking of the roles of 
free choice and divine grace in the history of salvation, both Augustine and Bernard 
depend on the Pauline Epistles, especially the Epistle to the Romans. Finally, Bernard 
adopts Augustine’s emphasis on the human being’s impossibility to perform any good in 
his fallen state without the intervention of divine grace. However, in spite of the 
significant similarities existing between the two authors, there are no direct quotations 
from Augustine in Bernard’s treatise. Moreover, Augustine’s ideas are not merely 
repeated but integrated as old bricks in a totally new edifice.  
In order to understand the way in which Bernard uses Augustine’s ideas in 
articulating his own anthropology with mystical accents and innovative developments, it 
is also necessary to deal with Augustine’s ideas in somewhat more detail regarding his 
teaching on the creation of humanity ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Augustine’s 
treatment of the imago - similitudo theme had a great impact on the subsequent medieval 
theologians who extracted and developed especially three elements of Augustine’s 
influential teaching based on the biblical verse155: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et 
similitudinem nostram (Gn 1:26). The first element, deriving from Augustine’s attempt to 
explain the use of the plural verb faciamus and the plural pronoun nostram, is represented 
by the trinitarian aspect of the image156. According to Augustine’s great theological work 
De Trinitate, the three facets of the image which mirror in the human being the three 
persons of the Trinity are memoria, intelligentia and voluntas157. A second influential 
element of his teaching is related to the way in which he understood the relation between 
the terms imago and similitudo, presented as referring to two distinct yet connected 
features of human life. In Augustine’s view, only the similitudo Dei is lost as a result of 
the fall, while the imago Dei is permanent in the human being, despite being deformed 
                                                 
155 Michael Casey noticed the presence of these three elements in the theological reflection of the twelfth 
century but he did not connect them directly with Augustine’s teaching on the image and likeness. The 
following references to Augustine’s works enable us to claim that these elements of patristic anthropology 
popular among twelfth century theologians are primarily based on Augustine’s thought. See Casey (1988) 
136-137.  
156 Trin. 7.6.12; Trin. 12.6.7. 
157 Trin. 14.10.13; Trin. 14.19.20, here memoria, intellectus, amor. 
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and obscured as a consequence of the lost likeness158. The image is gradually reformed 
and the likeness restored only by means of Christ’s grace. The third element is the 
dichotomy developed by Augustine especially in the first half of his career as a Christian 
writer, between Christ representing the perfect imago et similitudo Dei and the human 
being created merely ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei159. As a consequence of this 
emphasis on the creation ad imaginem, the human being was perceived as possessing a 
sort of innate tendency toward the image, that is the Word. This tendency towards the 
Creator transpires in the famous introductory phrase of the Confessiones: Fecisti nos ad 
te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te160. 
While all these three elements of Augustine’s anthropological teaching are 
exploited in various degrees by Bernard throughout his works, in his treatise De gratia et 
libero arbitrio, it is that of the endurance of the imago Dei and of the loss of similitudo as 
a result of the fall that provides the framework for Bernard’s discussion of human 
freedom and allows him to concentrate on the dynamic aspect of the restoration of the 
likeness to God by means of Christ’s grace.  
The most important contribution of Bernard’s treatise161 is a threefold distinction 
of the states of freedom in their historical dimension, on which he relies in his 
explanation of how the fallen human being is unable to perform good by his own will. 
Locating the freedom at the level of voluntas, Bernard refers to the first type of freedom 
                                                 
158 On the indestructible character of imago Dei see Trin. 14.2.4; Trin. 14.4.6; civ. Dei 22.24; spir.et litt. 
28.49. On how the permanence of the imago Dei is an aspect developed especially in Augustine’s mature 
works see Sullivan (1963) 42-44. 
159 R. A. Markus (1964) 132-135 observes that after Augustine’s rereading of the Pauline Epistles around 
390’s, he is no longer reluctant in considering the human being the image of God based on Col 1:15 and 1 
Cor 2:7. However, Augustine struggles to maintain an underlying distinction between the Word as the 
perfect image of God and the human being created ad imaginem Dei. Bernard also dealt with the theme of 
the human being as being created ad imaginem in the SC. 80-83.  
160 conf. 1.1.1. Commenting on SC.  80, Javelet (1967) 1:192 notices the dynamism attached to the human 
condition by the stress placed on the preposition ad. The natural orientation of the human being is toward 
the Word, the real image of God. For Bernard’s reading of this famous line from Augustine see below, p. 
73. 
161 Bernard’s originality in operating this threefold distinction has been subject to scholarly debate O. Lottin 
discovered in 1940 a text coming from the school of Laon, entitled Sententia de triplici libertate. If the text 
belongs to Anselm of Laon who died in 1117, Bernard might have borrowed it from him. However, 
Bernard’s dependence on this text cannot be confirmed since the text does not appear in any of the early 
Sentence collections which can be connected to Anselm. Moreover, the fact that the texts contain striking 
verbal similarities is another argument against Bernard’s dependence on the Sententia de triplici libertate, 
since he always transformed his sources and never quoted verbatim, without indicating the source. For a 
larger discussion see McGinn (1988) 20 and Rydstrøm-Poulsen (1992) 133-134 and 329. 
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by coining the expression freedom from necessity (libertas a necessitate) and he 
attributes it to our nature. A superior type of freedom is the freedom from sin (libertas a 
peccato) corresponding to the state of grace. On the highest level, the freedom from 
sorrow (libertas a miseria) is reserved for the life in glory162. For Bernard, the freedom 
from necessity, by which the will can judge itself as good or bad, defines in the best way 
the essence of free choice (liberum arbitrium)163. The freedom from sin and the freedom 
from sorrow more fittingly can be called liberum consilium and liberum complacitum164. 
In chapters 9-10, Bernard connects these three types of freedom with the traditional 
anthropology of the human being’s creation in the image and likeness of God, based on 
Augustine:  
 
I believe that in these three freedoms there is contained the image and likeness of 
the Creator in which we were made; that in the freedom of choice lies the image 
and in the other two is contained a twofold likeness165. 
 
Bernard agrees with Augustine regarding the permanence of the image of God in the 
human nature after the fall and this leads him to the conclusion that the freedom of choice 
(liberum arbitrium) is the only unalterable faculty of the human soul preserved after the 
fall: 
 
Maybe, therefore, the reason why free choice alone suffers no lessening or falling 
away, is that in it, more than in the others, there seems to be imprinted some 
substantial image of the eternal and immutable deity166.  
 
He observes that in contrast to the lasting character of the liberum arbitrium the two 
higher types of freedom, which form the likeness are not only subject to diminution but 
also to total loss. They were totally lost as a result of the original sin, but through the 
coming of Christ they can be restored by Christ’s saving grace167.   
                                                 
162 Gra. 3.6-7. 
163 Gra. 4.11. 
164 Gra. 4.11. 
165 Gra. 9.28. 
166 Gra. 9.28. 
167 Gra. 9.28. 
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Both Augustine and Bernard situated the image of God in the spiritual nature of 
the human being168. While Augustine situated the image of God in the finest part of the 
soul, which most often he identifies with mens, Bernard designates the liberum arbitrium 
located at the level of voluntas as the precise site of God’s image. However, one should 
not interpret this difference as a disagreement with Augustine as some scholars were 
inclined to argue169, by examining only this early text without any attempt to consider 
Bernard’s other anthropological statements scattered throughout his works. In Sermo 
super Cantica Canticorum 81, the site of the image of God which is again identified with 
liberum arbitrium is mens170. Some of Bernard’s works clearly testify that he was 
familiar with the “official” view of the three-fold affinity of the human soul to the triune 
God based on Augustine171. Bernard’s emphasis on voluntas172, at the level of which he 
locates the image of God, at the expense of memory and intellect, needs to be understood 
within the larger picture of his mystical agenda. In Bernard’s view, the image of God 
consisting of the liberum arbitrium endows the human being with the capacity to will. 
The preservation of the image after the fall shows clearly that he retains this capacity 
even in this fallen state. In fact, as a result of his creation, the human being is not only 
able to will, he is unable not to will. As Gilson has pointed out that by suppressing the 
will one suppresses the human being too173. Due to understanding will as a rational 
                                                 
168 Augustine places the image of God in intellectus in ep. Jo. 8.6; Jo. ev. tr.3. 4; en. Ps. 48 s. 2.11; homo 
interior in ep. Jo. 8.6; ratio in en. Ps. 42.6; en. Ps. 48 s. 2. 11; Gn. litt. 3.20.30; Trin. 15.1.1; spiritus in div. 
qu. 51.4; spiritus mentis in Trin. 12.7.12; intelligentia in Gn. litt. 3.20.30; Trin. 15.1.1; animus in Trin. 
15.1.1. For more references on Augustine’s site of the image see Sullivan (1963) 44-49 and 73, note 26. In 
SC. 24.5 Bernard speaks generally of the site of the image of God as being in spirituali portione tui.  
169 Simonetti (1984) 353-356 speaks of a “silent disagreement” between the two authors. 
170 SC. 81.6. 
171 Conv. 6.11: Denique tota ipsa [i.e. anima] nihil est aliud quam ratio, memoria, et voluntas. Div. 45: Est 
Trinitas creatrix: Pater Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ex qua cecidit creata trinitas: memoria, ratio et voluntas. 
Pent. 1.5: Monet memoriam, rationem docet, movet voluntatem: In his enim tribus tota consistit anima 
nostra. In SC. 11.5 Bernard contrasts the beatificans Trinitas with mea misera trinitas and mentions again 
the three functions of the soul memoria, ratio and voluntas.  
172 This emphasis on voluntas led modern scholars to speak of Bernard’s “voluntaristic anthropology” like 
Boquet (2003) 191, or of Bernard’s “anthropology of desire” like Casey (1988) 131, or to define the 
Cistercian spirituality in general as “une spiritualité volontariste” like Javelet (1971) 1431-1434, 
differentiating it from the “spiritualité noétique” of which Bernard’s contemporaries, the Victorines, are an 
example. However, Bernard’s main focus on voluntas does not lead to a total neglect of the other two 
components of the image of God. For a discussion on the need to have a “blanched” memory so that the 
soul may return to God see Coleman (1992) 180-184. 
173 Gilson (1940) 49-50. 
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movement174, for Bernard the image has a dynamic character. In the act of willing the 
human being moves either away from or towards God. It is this dynamism that led 
Bernard to focus specifically on voluntas in his understanding of the ascent of the soul to 
God. The dynamic character of the image is usually neglected by scholars, who content 
themselves with observing the relevance of the dynamism of the process of restoring the 
likeness for Bernard’s mysticism175.  
While the liberum arbitrium is responsible for the ability to will, it is not 
sufficient for willing the good: 
Let no one imagine therefore that free choice is so called because it concerns itself 
with good and evil with equal power or facility. It was indeed able to fall of itself; 
but could rise up again only through the Spirit of the Lord176.  
 
This passage is clearly inspired by Augustine’s standard answer directed not only against 
Pelagius and his followers, but also against those “who so defend God’s grace as to deny 
free choice”177.  According to Augustine “the human being when he sins must impute the 
fault to himself” and a “work is then good when a person does it voluntarily”178, meaning 
that freedom of choice is not totally abolished by the work of grace. In the same work, 
Augustine’s final reconciliation between human freedom and divine grace is expressed in 
the distinction between operating and co-operating grace: “He [i.e. God] operates without 
us in order that we may will, but when we will, and so we will that we may act, he 
cooperates with us. We can however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety 
without him either working that we may will, or co-working when we will”179. Although 
Bernard does not quote this passage, the gap indicated by Augustine between will and 
performance occurs in Bernard’s treatise as well. Bernard attributes the ability to will 
which resides in free choice to what he labels as creative grace (gratia creans) while the 
achievement of will, or the ability to will the good belongs to the saving grace (gratia 
salvans)180. These two are so connected that without the free choice providing the ability 
to will, the saving grace has nothing to act upon, on the other hand the free choice alone 
                                                 
174 Gra. 2.3: motus rationalis. 
175 Boquet (2003) 190. 
176 Gra. 10.35. For Augustine see conf. 7.21.27; corrept. 3.  
177 gr. et lib. arb. 1. 
178 gr. et lib. arb. 4. 
179 gr. et lib. arb. 33. 
180 These technical terms do not occur in Augustine, although they reflect Augustine’s teaching. 
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without the help of the saving grace can only fail181. The textual parallels proved not very 
helpful in revealing a clear dependence on Augustine’s text, but the fact that these ideas 
are present in the latter’s treatise which provided the title and the rationale for Bernard’s 
own work, might constitute an important argument for Bernard’s direct reading of 
Augustine.  
Having been created in the image and likeness of God, Adam was endowed 
initially not only with liberum arbitrium, but also with the two other higher types of 
freedom: liberum consilium or the freedom from sin and liberum complacitum or the 
freedom from sorrow, which formed his likeness with God. As a consequence of the 
original sin, he lost these freedoms and found himself and the entire humanity in the 
region of unlikeness (regio dissimilitudinis)182. Étienne Gilson first noticed Bernard’s use 
of this expression and connected it to Augustine’s Confessiones 7.10.16183. The 
expression occurs several times in Bernard’s works184 and Pierre Courcelle put to rest 
scholarly speculations185 regarding the likely sources for the presence of this expression 
in Bernard’s works. He demonstrated persuasively that at least in Sermo super Cantica 
Canticorum 36.5 it was possible to provide clear evidence indicating Bernard’s direct 
textual dependence on Augustine186. As usual, Bernard does not quote Augustine ad 
litteram, instead he manifests an impressive synthetic skill, by merging several 
paragraphs from the Confessiones in one single phrase187. As for Augustine, the regio 
dissimilitudinis applies simply to the human being’s existence in this present world. 
However, for Bernard the expression is void of the philosophical connotations, which are 
contained in Augustine’s text, and refers only to the human being’s sinful condition. 
                                                 
181 Gra. 1.2. This passage seems to have been inspired by a few paragraphs from Augustine’s s. 156.11-13.  
182 Gra. 10.32. 
183 Gilson (1940) 45, 115-117 and 224-225; Gilson (1947) 108-130. For a discussion of the regio 
dissimilitudinis in Augustine and adjacent scholarly literature, see O’Donnell (1992) 2:443-444. For 
Bernard’s treatment of the regio dissimilitudinis theme and an extensive literature see Casey (1988) 171-
182. 
184 Gra. 10.32; SC. 72.6; Div. 40.4; Div. 42.2-3; Sent. 3.21; Par. 1.2; Ep. 8.2; Ep. 42.8.  
185 Déchanet indicated William of St. Thierry’s De natura corporis et animae as the most likely source for 
Bernard’s use of regio dissimilitudinis. See Déchanet (1953) 72, note 5. Gilson himself after having 
connected the expression with the Confessiones, considered that Bernard borrowed it from an intermediary 
text, a book of service, not directly from Augustine’s autobiographical work. See Gilson (1951) 233-234.  
186 Courcelle (1963) 279-283. 
187 The passages identified by Courcelle appear to have been used in the following order: conf. 7.20.26; 
8.7.16; 7.10.16 and 7.17.23. 
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The way out of the regio dissimilitudinis to the restoration of likeness and to 
regaining the freedom from sin and the freedom from misery lost by Adam is ensured as 
for Augustine only by means of Christ’s grace188. Although in the region of unlikeness 
the human being preserves his freedom of choice, his capacity to will is held captive189 
and finds itself in need of a liberator not from necessity but from sin and from the penalty 
of sin190. Bernard emphasises the central role of Christ in liberating the human will, since 
apart from Adam, he alone enjoyed all three types of freedom: the freedom of choice in 
virtue of his human and divine nature combined and the freedom from sin and the 
freedom from misery by reason of his divine power191. However, the likeness restored 
through the activity of Christ, is not the likeness that was bestowed on Adam at his 
creation, but is much greater. Adopting Augustine’s idea that the renewal of the image 
which entails the restoration of the likeness is not a renovatio in pristinum, but a 
renovatio in melius192, Bernard attempts to give an explanation for Adam’s fall. He relies 
in his demonstration on Augustine’s De correptione et gratia, where this idea is 
contained in Augustine’s account of the historical stages of the freedom of choice 
(liberum arbitrium). According to Augustine, Adam was created with free choice193 and 
the ability not to sin (posse non peccare)194. His fall from Paradise was caused by his own 
free choosing and resulted in the loss of this ability both for himself and for the rest of 
humanity195. In the new fallen state he preserved the free choice which is “sufficient for 
evil, but not sufficient for good”196 and without God’s help to do good became enslaved 
to sin. By Christ’s grace however, the human being does not only recover his lost 
freedom, but this second grace being greater than that bestowed on Adam, enables the 
                                                 
188 Gra. 10.32-33; quant. 28.55; Trin. 7.3.5.  
189 Gra. 6.16. 
190 Gra. 3.7. 
191 Gra. 3.8. 
192 G. Ladner showed that Augustine developed his view on the reformation and renovation of the image of 
God in the human being differently from the Greek patristic authors. The latter’s view was deeply rooted in 
the doctrine of Incarnation and envisaged the possibility of the human being’s return to a condition 
corresponding to that of Adam in Paradise, characterised by the total recovery of the original likeness of the 
human being to God. The emphasis on Christ’s passion and crucifixion in Augustine’s theology determined 
him to develop a view on the renovation of the image of God in the human being, which does not entail 
merely the recovery of the paradisiacal condition, but it involves more than that. In Augustine’s own words 
it is a renovatio in melius. See Gn. litt. 6.20.31. See also Ladner (1954) 2:867-871 and Ladner (1959) 154. 
193 corrept. 28. 
194 corrept. 33. 
195 corrept. 28. 
196 corrept. 31. 
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human being not only to attain the good but to persevere in good197. Christ’s grace does 
not restore merely the paradisiacal ability not to sin (posse non peccare), but makes the 
human being unable to sin (non posse peccare)198. 
Augustine’s ideas regarding the difference between the grace of Adam and the 
much greater grace of Christ are used by Bernard in order to show the levels existing in 
the liberum consilium and liberum complacitum: 
Each of them has two degrees, a higher and a lower: The higher freedom of 
counsel consists in not being able to sin, the lower in being able not to sin. Again, 
the higher freedom of pleasure lies in not being able to be disturbed, the lower in 
being able not to be disturbed199. 
 
At his creation, Adam received apart from the full freedom of choice the lower degrees of 
each of these freedoms, namely the ability not to sin and not to be disturbed. By his free 
choosing he lost them both and he fell from the state of being able not to sin and being 
able not to be disturbed into that of not being able not to sin (non posse non peccare) and 
not being able not to be disturbed (non posse non turbari)200. This state of the inability 
not to sin and not to be disturbed does not put an end to free choice. However, free choice 
is not sufficient for the human being to escape from this state in which he is bound to sin. 
Only Christ who possesses fully and perfectly the three freedoms, is able to perform the 
restoration of the freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure. By Christ’s grace the lost 
freedoms are going to be restored to an extent that surpasses the level of freedoms 
possessed by Adam in paradise201. However, their perfect restoration is reserved for the 
next life. In the present life, a few spiritual souls who have battled the passions and 
desires through a life of virtue and who are overcoming sin with the help of grace may 
regain partially freedom of counsel. Since sin cannot be totally eradicated in this life the 
freedom of counsel cannot be perfectly achieved in this worldly existence. This is the 
reason for praying “Thy kingdom come”. The kingdom of God comes closer and closer 
every day through the restoration of the likeness in the souls that struggle toward 
                                                 
197 corrept. 31. 
198 corrept. 33. 
199 Gra. 7.21. The pair of expressions posse non turbari/non posse turbari does not occur in Augustine.  
Apart from posse non peccare/non posse peccare, Augustine speaks of posse non mori/non posse mori, 
meaning the possibility and impossibility to die and bonum posse non deserere/ bonum non posse deserere 
referring to the possibility and impossibility to forsake the good. See corrept. 33. 
200 Gra. 7.21. 
201 Gra. 8.26. 
 50
perfection202. What Bernard McGinn names “mystical consciousness”203 needs to be 
discussed in the context of the restoration of the highest form of freedom, the freedom of 
pleasure (liberum complacitum). While freedom of counsel is possessed in some degree 
by all righteous human beings, freedom of pleasure is attainable only by a few perfect 
souls on the rarest occasion:  
 
Even in this present life, those who with Mary have chosen the better part, which 
shall not be taken away from them, enjoy freedom of pleasure; rarely however 
and fleetingly. This is undeniable. For those who now possess that which shall 
never be taken away, plainly experience what is to come: in a word, happiness. 
And since happiness and sorrow are incompatible, through the Spirit they 
participate in the former, as often as they cease to feel the latter. Hence, on this 
earth, contemplatives alone can in some way enjoy freedom of pleasure, though 
only in part, in very small part and on the rarest occasion204. 
 
Bernard’s description of what takes place when the human being experiences true 
happiness is in total conformity with the way in which Augustine refers to the immediate 
contact with God. Like Augustine, Bernard distinguishes between the momentary 
experience of heavenly bliss attainable in the present life and the enduring experience of 
the kingdom of heaven, which is possible only in the life to come. The “excess of 
contemplation” is a foretaste of the eternal felicity to be found in heaven, granted scarcely 
to a few perfect human beings who enjoy it occasionally and only for a fleeting moment. 
Augustine would have agreed with Bernard’s use of the term happiness (felicitas) in order 
to refer to the highest state available to human beings on earth205. The verb used by 
Bernard in order to define the experience of the freedom of pleasure is frui, which 
according to Augustine means to love something for its own sake and is applied properly 
                                                 
202 Gra. 4.11-12. 
203 McGinn (2006) 10. 
204 Gra. 5.15. 
205 The term for happiness used by Bernard in this passage is felicitas, a term which occurs much more 
frequently than beatitudo, which is used nevertheless in order to designate the vision of God like in the 
following passage from Mart. 1: Semper enim vident faciem Patris, quem videre perfecta beatitudo, 
aeterna Gloria, summa voluptas est. A brief look at Augustine’s use of the terms felicitas and beatitudo, 
shows that the former occurs more frequently in his preaching where apart from being used with a negative 
connotation, namely transitory happiness, it can also refer to the highest state of the soul such as in s. 19.4: 
Res enim bona et magna est felicitas, sed habet regionem suam; s. 32.22: terrena felicitas spernenda, 
superna desideranda; s. 396.1: felicitas quae non habet finem; s. 213.5: aeterna felicitas; ench. 5: summa 
felicitas; ep. 18.3:  sine fine felicitas. 
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to God alone206. It is sure that Bernard knew at least one of Augustine’s accounts of his 
mystical encounter with God, as presented in the Confessiones, since the expression regio 
dissimilitudinis which we discussed above occurs in one of these accounts of the mystical 
episodes. However, he retained only some general traits for his description of the highest 
form of contact with God, without a particular interest in following more closely the texts 
from the Confessiones.  This makes clear that Bernard resembles more the late Augustine, 
who speaks of the contemplation from a more objective perspective and not longer in the 
first person as the Augustine of the Confessiones.  
Bernard situates the mystical encounter with God within an anthropology heavily 
influenced by Augustine’s dynamic view of the gradual restoration of the likeness of 
God, based on what has been called the “radical principles”207 of the image and likeness, 
namely Christ’s grace and free choice. Bernard’s approach resembles that of the late 
Augustine, especially from the treatises De gratia et libero arbitrio and De correptione et 
gratia. In his way of operating with Augustine’s ideas Bernard is far from copying or 
merely repeating what his predecessor had taught. His three-fold distinction of the human 
freedom is adapted to the traditional anthropology of image and likeness and also 
matches Augustine’s historical stages of free choice found in the De correptione et 
gratia. Although Bernard’s formulation is original, content wise he does not cross the 
boundaries set by Augustine. The essence of Bernard’s teaching is clearly based on 
Augustine although he does not follow Augustine ad litteram.  
                                                 
206 doc. Chr. 1.4.4.  
207 Sullivan (1963) 59-61. 
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Chapter 2: Love 
 
One of the areas of Bernard’s mystical thought, where Étienne Gilson admitted 
that Augustine’s influence is conspicuous, is that of the abbot’s teaching on love208. Far 
from being an aspect of secondary importance, the doctrine of love lies at the very heart 
of Bernard’s mysticism, which is usually defined as a Liebesmystik209. Both Augustine 
and Bernard wrote extensively on the theme of love, without any attempt to present in a 
systematic way their teaching, which is nevertheless coherent as a whole. However, some 
of their writings are more relevant for the discussion of this subject than others. Thus, 
Bernard’s most important treatment of love occurs in the treatise De diligendo Deo and in 
the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum 83-85. Augustine focused more on love in his 
treatises on the Gospel of St John and in his homilies on the first Epistle of St John. The 
aims of this chapter are to identify what elements from Augustine’s rich and elusive 
doctrine on love were used by Bernard and how he incorporated them to his own teaching 
on the subject.  
 
1. A few considerations on Bernard’s terminology on love 
  
From the outset, it should be accentuated that the set of terms forming Bernard’s 
vocabulary on love, such as: affectus, affectio, amor, dilectio, caritas, desiderium, are by 
no means specific to him, rather they are part of a long terminological tradition shaped by 
the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great210.  
It is difficult to find an appropriate correspondent in the modern languages able to 
convey the exact meaning of the terms affectus and affectio. Affectus denotes the state 
produced in the soul as a result of an exterior influence. Affectio denotes the active 
process of influencing and by extension it began to be applied to the effect of the 
                                                 
208 Gilson (1940) 220-221. 
209 Ruh (1990) 229. For the central place of love in Bernard’s mystical thought see also Bouyer (1958) 41 
and McGinn (1994) 193. 
210 Casey (1988) 63-64. I will deal here only with those aspects of Bernard’s terminology on love, which 
can be traced back to Augustine. For a detailed study of Bernard’s vocabulary of desire, see Casey (1988) 
63-130. 
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influence on the soul211. For pragmatic reasons, in what follows, whenever I choose to 
translate the terms in English I will refer to affectus as affective state and I will translate 
affectio with affection. Bernard usually treats the terms affectus and affectio as partial 
synonyms, using them frequently interchangeably. Like for Augustine, their partial 
synonymy is based on the fact that both terms can be defined in terms of voluntas212. 
Thus, Bernard asserts that “affectus is the will”213 and describes affectio in a more precise 
manner as “the intention of the will”214. Since the human beings are endowed with the 
ability to will as a result of their creation in the image and likeness of God, they are also 
created with affectus and affectio, without which, says Bernard the soul cannot subsist215. 
It is important to stress that for Bernard and the Augustinian spirituality these terms have 
an ontological dimension indicating “fundamental dynamisms of the soul and not our 
perception of them, though, of course they are often experienced in a sensible way”216. 
The traditional division of the four affective states of the soul in cupiditas, laetitia, timor 
and tristitia coming from the Stoics and discussed by Augustine in the De civitate Dei217 
is mentioned by Bernard in several occasions. While Augustine termed the four affective 
states affectus, Bernard applies to them the term affectio218. Most often he enumerates the 
affective states as being amor, laetitia, timor and tristitia219. In another occasion the list is 
slightly different: amor, timor, gaudium and tristitia220. While these affective states are 
all good in themselves, their moral quality derives from the object towards which they 
tend. Thus, an affectus becomes vitiated and inordinate if it turns toward an inappropriate 
object221. On the contrary, if the affectiones are oriented with the help of divine grace 
toward good and preferably toward the supreme good, which is God, they are ordered and 
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become virtues222. These ideas are entirely based on Augustine, who trying to counter the 
Stoic ideal of apatheia (the absence of all affectus), argued that cupiditas, laetitia, timor 
and tristitia can be good if the will is directed towards a good object223. The necessity of 
divine grace in orienting the soul’s affects toward good is also a fundamental aspect of 
Augustine’s thought.  
The principle of ordination of the fundamental affective states of the soul, 
inspired by Augustine’s ideas, is paramount for the understanding of Bernard’s mystical 
thought224. He explains that, as the whole heart is contained in these four affectiones, one 
needs to understand the scriptural commandment of turning with the whole heart to God, 
as including all these affective states225. According to Bernard, it is primarily in affectus 
that God can be experienced. The presence of God in the human soul is indicated by the 
movement of the heart (ex motu cordis)226 and the Bridegroom in his visit to the soul 
speaks to the affect not to the intellect227. This is the reason why, in order to prepare for 
the visit of the Word to the soul, the affective states must be cleansed and ordered228. 
Finally, Bernard famously formulated his definition of deification in affective terms: Sic 
affici, deificari est229. 
Since the term affectus is passive in form, while affectio is active, Bernard 
attempted at times to distinguish between them. The main difference is that affectus 
cannot be attributed to God: Non est affectus Deo, affectio est230. This is another idea 
whose roots are partly to be found in Augustine who said that God cannot be disturbed by 
any affectus231. However, although at least theoretically, Bernard acknowledges the 
distinction between affectus and affectio, in practice, he seems to employ these terms 
guided by the laws of assonance. Thus, as it was observed by J. Châtillon, Bernard is 
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inclined to use rather affectio when the word ratio occurs in the same context, and he 
tends to use affectus, when the word intellectus appears somewhere in the same phrase232.  
Bernard’s primary focus on affectus and affectio (and of the all affective states on amor 
in particular) in the search of the soul for God and in the soul’s highest experience of 
God, led certain modern scholars to label Bernard’s mysticism as “affective” and thus, to 
a certain extent different from the intellectual mysticism, whose main exponent is 
considered to be Augustine233. However, although Bernard does not enter into a detailed 
discussion about how love and knowledge are related in the fleeting moment of the union 
of the soul with God, he insists nevertheless that the ascent to unitas spiritus involves 
both the affective and knowing powers of the soul. Quoting Gregory’s phrase “love itself 
is a form of knowing” (amor ipse notitia est)234 Bernard intends to show that both love 
and knowledge are fulfilled in the embrace of the Word and the soul235. In the Sermo 
super Cantica Canticorum 49, Bernard speaks of the ecstasy as taking place not only in 
affectu, but also in intellectu236. These aspects of Bernard’s mystical thought where the 
knowing powers are involved together with the affects in the experience of God, made 
other scholars to regard with circumspection the label “affective mysticism” applied to 
Bernard237. At the same time, the view that Augustine must be read as an intellectualist, 
has been challenged by a multitude of studies, which highlight the centrality of love in 
Augustine’s thought238. 
Bernard’s use of the terms amor, dilectio and caritas is also consonant with that 
of Augustine239. Bernard does not operate rigorous distinctions between amor, dilectio 
and caritas and the few nuances that slightly differentiate these terms should be 
considered “rather as preferences or tendencies in language than an inflexible semantic 
rule”240. Thus, caritas has exclusively a spiritual meaning, given the fact that it is related 
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always with noble objects, such as the neighbour or God. It is more difficult to grasp the 
differentiating nuance between amor and dilectio, which in the twelfth century were used 
indiscriminately, as well as sometimes in Augustine241. Bernard prefers to speak of the 
mystical love as amor, as this term has a note of greater warmth and intensity than 
dilectio. The latter term is free from the potential sexual connotations which the term 
amor can have, which at first glance might have recommended it as more appropriate for 
being applied to the mystical love, but the fact that dilectio also possessed a rational and 
calculated dimension limited its use in mystical contexts242. Bernard differs from 
Augustine, however, when he uses the term amor in order to refer to both the Word of 
God and the Holy Spirit243. Augustine has never spoken of the Word of God as amor and 
the terms he applies to the Holy Spirit are only caritas and dilectio.  
Finally, one of the key concepts of Bernard’s mysticism is that of desire 
(desiderium). Like Augustine who defined desire as the longing of the soul for things, 
which are absent desiderium est rerum absentium concupiscentia244, Bernard understands 
desire as an experience of absence or privation which makes the soul feel restless245. The 
dynamism denoted by the desiderium led Bernard to understand this term as love-in-
progress as differentiated from fulfilled love: “Just as faith leads to understanding, so 
desire leads to perfect love”246. However, Casey observed that most often Bernard tended 
to use the term desiderium interchangeably with amor, while dilectio was far less used in 
such way247.  
 
2. The stages of the love’s progress towards God 
 
Like many other Christian mystical thinkers, Bernard manifested a strong 
penchant for charting various itineraries and descriptions of the soul’s journey to God. 
The various gradational schemes containing Bernard’s mystical thought had largely a 
pedagogical function in assisting the memory of his disciples. At the same time they had 
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the role of offering them a general sense of what they might encounter in their spiritual 
journey. However, these itineraries and descriptions must not be confused with the 
journey itself, which remains a unique experience for each soul248. We have already 
discussed in the previous chapter Bernard’s threefold distinction of the human freedoms, 
each corresponding to different stages of the soul’s progress to God. We find various 
other numerical patterns when Bernard develops the theme of love. Thus, in the 
Sermones de Diversis Bernard speaks of a fourfold division of the modes of love: amor 
carnalis carnaliter, amor carnalis spiritualiter, amor spiritualis carnaliter and amor 
spiritualis spiritualiter249. This fourfold scheme presents certain similarities with 
Bernard’s most famous description of the four stages of love from the De diligendo Deo: 
the love of self for the sake of self, the love of God for the sake of self, the love of God 
for God’s sake, the love of self for God’s sake250. Concomitantly with this fourfold 
distinction, Bernard presents in the same work a threefold division of love, as love of 
slave, love of mercenary and love of son251. He returns to this distinction in the Sermones 
super Cantica Canticorum and alters it by placing the marital love as the higher degree of 
love to be enjoyed in this life252.   
As it is difficult in this maze of classifications to find any pertinent hints of 
Bernard’s dependence on Augustine, it is necessary to go beyond the various distinctions 
of love and unravel the theological foundation of Bernard’s teaching on love, which 
remains constant independently of the various patterns in which it is presented.   
Let us begin our discussion with one of the most important aspects of Bernard’s 
mysticism: his understanding of the relationship between the devout soul and God in the 
highest kind of mystical encounter as a “spiritual marriage”253. The idea is also present in 
Augustine and Gregory the Great, but they did not develop it254. Augustine’s approach to 
the Song of Songs, which he considered a difficult book, was mainly theological and 
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ecclesiological255. Therefore, in the majority of his interpretations the Bridegroom is 
Christ, while the bride is the Church. This interpretation is the prevailing one in Bernard 
as well256, although scholarship has hitherto not paid sufficient attention to this aspect. 
However, following Origen, and especially in mystical contexts, he uses a different 
allegorical interpretation, according to which the Bridegroom is the Word and the bride is 
the human soul.  
In the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, Bernard stresses the idea that only by 
love human beings may deal reciprocally with God and that marital love expresses this 
mutuality in the best way257. Only by loving God back with a disinterested love like the 
bride, the soul can respond to God’s love “even if not on an equal basis”258. Although 
Bernard emphasises the mutuality and the reciprocity of the Word and the soul united in 
‘marital’ love, he nevertheless maintains the difference between the Creator and the finite 
creature by mentioning two important aspects. One refers to the measure of love: “the 
creature loves less because it is less, still if the Bride loves from her whole self, nothing is 
lacking where everything is given. Loving in this way I said is being married”259. The 
other important aspect of this ‘marital’ love is that in spite of the reciprocity existing 
between the Bridegroom, Word, and the bride, soul, the divine love is prior to the human 
love. Bernard’s development of this theme is based on elements of Augustine’s theology. 
3. The priority of God’s love 
 
The priority of divine love over human love developed from the idea that love 
cannot have its beginning in the human beings. The Bible teaches that the “love comes 
from God” (1 Jn 4:7) and that “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8). Having solid biblical roots this 
theme of the priority of divine love is common to many Christian thinkers, but in both 
Augustine and Bernard there is a special emphasis on God’s prior love for the 
humankind. Three biblical passages are mainly used by both thinkers to underline this 
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idea: Deus Caritas est (1 Jn 4:8), Ipse prior dilexit nos (1 Jn 4:10) and Caritas Dei diffusa 
est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum (Rom 5:5). They encapsulate the essence of 
Augustine and Bernard’s views on the priority of God’s love and at the same time 
underline three important aspects of this theme:  
 
3.1. Deus caritas est (1 Jn 4:8) 
 
 Augustine does not cease to repeat throughout his works that because God is 
charity, human love has no other source than the charity which is God260. Being bestowed 
gratuitously on the human beings by divine grace, the charity is also a gift of God (donum 
Dei), which enables the human beings to love God in return261. This theme is famously 
formulated in a memorable phrase of the Confessiones: Sagittaveras tu cor nostrum 
caritate tua262, long before he began his series of biblical commentaries and long before 
he developed his theology of love. Augustine elaborated his views on God’s prior love 
especially in his commentaries on the Gospel and the First Epistle of St. John and 
touched upon it frequently in his De Trinitate. In his later works the priority of divine 
love became a significant topic for refuting the Pelagian claims according to which love 
has its beginning in human beings and only its perfection comes from God263.  
In the De Trinitate, the verse Deus caritas est (1 Jn 4:8) enabled Augustine, to 
define the relations between the three divine persons and to elaborate his doctrine on the 
Trinity, thus, establishing the basis on which he then developed his view on how God 
loves the human beings first. Augustine uses 1 Jn 4:8 in order to argue that God’s 
substance is charity264. As such, charity does not apply to one person of the Holy Trinity 
but to all of them indiscriminately265. The important identification of the Holy Spirit with 
charity in Book VI of the De Trinitate266 takes place in the context of Augustine’s 
endeavours to demonstrate the unity and equality of the divine persons of the Holy 
Trinity. Therefore, although he makes clear that the Holy Spirit must not be confused 
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with the other two persons, in this passage the emphasis falls on the Holy Spirit’s equality 
with the Father and the Son and his sharing in the same divine substance. The Holy Spirit 
may be understood as the unity (unitas), holiness (sanctitas) or love (caritas) of the two 
other divine Persons, but this love is consubstantial, belonging to the essential nature of 
the Father and the Son. As undoubting testimony for his claims he quotes 1 Jn 4:8. The 
understanding of the Holy Spirit as unitas has also biblical roots, signaled by Augustine’s 
quotation of Eph 4:3 unitas spiritus in vinculo pacis (“the unity of Spirit in the bond of 
peace”). While human beings are capable of loving God and their neighbour, as the two 
precepts of the law command, only by divine grace and by a gratuitous gift from God 
(ipsius munere), the divine unity is not the result of participation or of a gift of some 
superior (dono superioris), but consubstantial love267, because of 1 Jn 4:8 Deus caritas 
est.  
Augustine returns to the exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8 in the last book of the De Trinitate. 
His intention is this time slightly different. He begins by stressing the charity as the 
substance of the Holy Trinity268, but he continues by defining the Holy Spirit in relation 
with the other divine persons as being distinctively called charity269. The line of the 
argument in this paragraph is strikingly similar with some passages from Augustine’s In 
Iohannis epistulam tractatus, written probably earlier than the Book XV of the De 
Trinitate270. He interprets 1 Jn 4:8: Deus dilectio est in the light of 1 Jn 4:7: Dilectio ex 
Deo est, 1 Jn 4:10: Ipse prior dilexit nos and 1 Jn 4:13: Cognoscimus quia in ipso 
manemus et ipse in nobis quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis. The contextual reading of 1 Jn 
4:8 with 1 Jn 4:7 and 1 Jn 4:13 enables him to maintain that, among the three divine 
persons, it is the Holy Spirit the one particularly called love. 1 Jn 4:7 indicates that the 
biblical text cannot refer here to God the Father since it is not possible to say of him 
alone that he is God from God. 1 Jn 4:13 makes it clear that 1 Jn 4:8 does not refer to the 
Son of God but the Holy Spirit who is given to human beings as the gift of love. Next, 
Augustine quotes 1 Jn 4:10 in order to underline the priority of divine love and concludes 
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the paragraph with Rom 5:5: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum 
sanctum qui datus est nobis which confirms entirely his interpretation. 
In discussing briefly these passages from Augustine’s De Trinitate, my intention 
was to underline the significant link existing between Augustine’s doctrine of Trinity and 
the priority of divine love. Being aware of this link will help us understand why 
Augustine defended so fiercely the priority of divine love against the Pelagians. As 
Mandouze has well observed: «C’est en définitive la nature même de l’Amour de Dieu 
qui se trouvait mise en question par Pélage: et non point seulement l’amour que les 
hommes lui rendent, mais L’Amour qu’Il leur donne et qu’Il est»271. 
Bernard’s exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8 follows that of Augustine, insofar as he used it in 
order to apply it both to the doctrine of the Trinity and the priority of love. Although in 
his writings Bernard did not show a particular interest for speculation on the divine nature 
and on analyzing the divine attributes, in an important passage from his treatise De 
diligendo Deo one reads the following: 
 
What else maintains that supreme and unutterable unity in the highest and most 
blessed Trinity, if not charity? Hence it is a law, the law of the Lord, that charity 
which somehow holds and brings together the Trinity in the bond of peace. At the 
same time, let nobody think I hold charity to be a quality or a kind of accident in 
God. Otherwise I would be saying and be it far from me, that there is something 
in God which is not God. Charity is the divine substance. I am saying nothing 
new or unusual, just what St. John says: God is love. It is rightly said that charity 
is both God and the gift of God. Thus, charity gives charity; substantial charity 
produces the quality of charity. Where it signifies the giver, it takes the name of 
substance; where it means the gift, it is called a quality272.  
 
Notwithstanding the almost scholastic distinction drawn by Bernard between love as 
substance and as quality, this passage shares more than one similarity with Augustine’s 
treatment of the essential nature of charity in the Holy Spirit from Book VI of the De 
Trinitate273. Bernard does not mention the Holy Spirit either274, but as shown above, in 
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Augustine’s passage the emphasis falls rather on the essential nature of charity in the 
divine being and hence on the unity and equality of the divine persons. Bernard speaks of 
charity as the unity of the Trinity, quoting exactly like Augustine Eph 4:3, as a biblical 
confirmation of the unity existing within the Trinity. The central part of Bernard’s 
passage speaks of the substantial nature of charity in God, quoting 1 Jn 4:8. And he 
immediately adds a phrase which although not to be encountered in Augustine is very 
Augustinian in character: Caritas dat caritatem, emphasizing God as the source for 
human love. He then goes further to make a distinction which exists in Augustine’s 
passage but which is not formulated in the same words: charity as God and charity as the 
gift of God.  
Due to the similarities that were signaled in both authors, it is likely that 
Bernard’s passage from the De diligendo Deo was inspired by Augustine’s passage 
speaking of charity as the unity and substance of the divine Trinity, from Book VI of the 
De Trinitate275. An additional argument for Bernard’s knowledge of Augustine’s text is 
provided by his interpretation of another Pauline verse: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus 
est (1 Cor 6:17) where without any doubt he relies on the same Book VI of Augustine’s 
De Trinitate276.  
 
3.2. Ipse prior dilexit nos (1 Jn 4:10) 
 
Both Augustine and Bernard fully agree when they insist that God loved us first: 
Ipse prior dilexit nos (1 Jn 4:10). This Johannine verse is always quoted by Bernard with 
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the adjective prior although this adjective appears only in the late versions of the 
Vulgate. The Vetus Latina does not have it nor the Greek New Testament has protos, but 
the patristic authors, and especially Augustine, interpret 1 Jn 4:10 in the light of 1 Jn 4:19 
where the Vetus Latina version of the Bible says Ergo diligamus Deum quoniam Ipse 
prior dilexit nos. It is very likely that Bernard does not quote here the text of the Vulgate 
but follows the patristic sources, primarily Augustine (since other Latin authors did not 
quote this verse extensively) and he also introduces prior when quoting 1 Jn 4:10. 
According to Augustine there are two aspects of the priority of the divine love. 
The love manifested in creation and the love manifested in redemption. God loved human 
beings before the creation of the world and he did not cease to love them after the fall 
when as a proof of his great love for humankind he sent his only begotten son in order to 
redeem the world: 
The love of God is incomprehensible, but it is unchangeable. He has not begun to 
love us since we have been reconciled to him through the blood of his Son. He 
loved us before the foundation of the world, so that we too might share sonship 
with the Only begotten son, before we were anything at all. We should not 
understand our reconciliation to God through the death of his Son, as though the 
Son has enabled Him to begin to love those whom, he hated. God never hated the 
human, his love for his creatures is unchangeable, rather the human beings were 
at enmity with God because of the sin277.  
 
Thus the human beings were created from the beginning with a noble purpose to share 
sonship with the only begotten Son or as Augustine put it in the first paragraph of the 
Confessions: Fecisti nos ad te. God created human beings towards himself, for himself. 
After the fall humans were deviated from their noble goal and instead of aiming toward 
God, they turned towards created things and became the slaves of sin and the enemies of 
God. They were in need of a redeemer, who would return the creature to the correct path 
to God, as by their own powers human beings were not able of this conversion. This is 
another manifestation of God’s prior love for humankind, since he has sent his own Son 
and delivered him up for all human beings. In Augustine’s view, the reason for God 
loving human beings is to make them godly, to make them righteous, to make them 
whole, to enable them to achieve the noble purpose for which they were created in the 
first place, and the coming of Christ is the equivalent of a new creation. God is the maker 
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and the remaker (Qui fecit refecit) Augustine states frequently throughout his writings278, 
and the second creation is no less important than the first.    
Both aspects of God’s love for human beings before the creation of the world and 
God’s love expressed in the deliverance of his Son to death in order to save humankind 
are present in Bernard’s teaching. Thus, in Sermo super Canticum Canticorum 71, he 
states that: “the human being truly abides in God from all eternity, for he is loved from all 
eternity, if he is one of those who say that God loved us and accepted us in his beloved 
Son before the foundation of the world”279. In the introductory chapters from the treatise 
De diligendo Deo, Bernard argues that the reason for loving God is God. Developing this 
answer he makes use of the Johannine text: Ipse prior dilexit nos, and asserts that “when 
seeking why God should be loved, if one asks what right he has to be loved, the answer is 
that the main reason for loving him is “He loved us first”280. The divine love is 
manifested in the redemption work, says Bernard, following Paul, when God did not 
spare his only son but sacrificed him for us281. And later in the same work when he 
speaks of the human being who lost the initial glory he was created for, Bernard reworks 
the Augustinian idea of Qui fecit, refecit, saying: “It was less easy to remake me than to 
make me”282. We have here the same idea existing in Augustine that he who makes, 
remakes, but with a special emphasis on the difficulty of the latter and Bernard continues 
in his own way: “It is written not only about me but of every created being He spoke and 
they were made. But he who made me by a single word, in remaking me had to speak 
many words, work miracles suffer hardships”283.  
 
3.3. Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis 
(Rom 5:5) 
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In an article on Rom 5:5, Anne-Marie La Bonnardière284 counted more than two 
hundred occurrences of this Pauline verse in the works of Augustine. She observed that 
while the biblical verse appears often in Augustine’s early works, its frequency increases 
substantially after 411 reaching its greatest intensity in Augustine’s writings directed 
against Pelagians and continues being quoted until Augustine’s last works. The French 
scholar has identified eleven contexts in which Augustine used Rom 5:5. Among these, 
the themes of the divine initiative in offering gratuitous gifts to humanity and the human 
love for God as a gift of the Holy Spirit are mentioned as being developed by Augustine 
after 411. Very often these two themes are interconnected, as the following passage from 
the De trinitate shows, by linking the priority of God’s love with the reason for the 
human love of God: “the human being has not whence to love God unless from God; and 
therefore he [i.e. the evangelist] says ‘Let us love him, because he first loved us’. The 
Apostle Paul too says: ‘The love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy 
Spirit which has been given to us’”285.  
Burnaby286 observed that Augustine’s exegesis of Rom 5:5 by which he interprets 
caritas Dei not as a possessive genitive meaning “the love of God for human beings”, but 
as an objective genitive with the sense “the human love for God” is erroneous. According 
to Burnaby, the immediate biblical context of Rom 5:5 does not support such an 
interpretation of caritas Dei. He suggests that in the Epistle to the Romans caritas Dei 
may be understood as a genitive of origin, “the love from God”, indicating the source 
from where the love springs. However, because Rom 5:5 represented the chief biblical 
argument against the Pelagians, Augustine preferred to interpret caritas Dei not as the 
love by which God loves humankind, but as the love by which human beings love God. 
In comparison with Augustine’s wide use of Rom 5:5, Bernard quotes the Pauline verse 
less frequently. However, perusing the Bernardine contexts where Rom 5:5 occurs, it 
seems that, like Augustine, Bernard reads caritas Dei as referring to the human love for 
God. Thus, in Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 8, Bernard quotes Rom 5:5 as a biblical 
argument for his claim that “the revelation which is made through the Holy Spirit, not 
only conveys the light of knowledge, but also lights the fire of love, as the Apostle says: 
                                                 
284 La Bonnardière (1954) 657-663. 
285 Trin. 15.17.31. See also ep. Jo. 7.6-7; s. 34.2; gr.et pecc.or. 1.27. 
286 Burnaby (1938) 99. 
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The love that has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to 
us”287. As Bernard terms the love in his own text as amor and moreover equates it with 
knowledge (agnitio) it is clear that he refers here to nothing else than the human love for 
God.  
This is not an isolated passage in Bernard’s works; similar interpretations of the 
Pauline verse occur in Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 19 and in Epistula 107. In the 
first text, Rom 5:5 is quoted in an allegorical passage and refers to the love of the Bride 
and her maidens for the Bridegroom288. In the second text, Bernard discusses in parallel 
the roles of Christ and the Holy Spirit in shaping human love: 
 
Readily the love of God for us precedes our love for him and it also follows it 
(…) Oh double and irrefutable argument of God’s love for us! Christ dies and so 
deserves our love. The Holy Spirit works upon us and makes us love him. Christ 
gives us a reason for loving him, the Spirit the power to love him. The one 
commends his great love to us, the other gives it. In the one we see the object of 
our love, by the other we have the power to love. The former provides the 
occasion for our love, the latter provides the actual love itself. How shameful it 
would be to look with ungrateful eyes upon the Son of God dying! But this easily 
happens if the Spirit should be lacking. Now, however, because ‘The charity of 
God has been poured fourth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given 
to us’, being loved we love in return and loving we deserve to be still more 
loved289.  
 
It is surprising that Bernard quotes Rom 5:5 in such contexts in which he explicitly 
speaks of the human love for God rather than God’s love for us. His exclusive reading of 
the biblical text must have restricted the sense of caritas Dei, to either a genitive of 
possession or to a genitive of origin. However, by understanding caritas Dei as the 
human love for God, Bernard’s exegesis of Rom 5:5 indicates another source than that of 
the Bible, and most likely this source is Augustine. As many other mystics, Bernard was 
more concerned with exploring the human love for God than with inquiring about the 
nature of God’s love. Thus, he might have found Augustine’s interpretation of Rom 5:5 
more appropriate for his mystical interests.  
                                                 
287 SC. 8.9: …revelatio quae per Spiritum Sanctum fit, non solum illustrat ad agnitionem, sed etiam 
accendit ad amorem, dicente Apostolo: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui 
datus est nobis.  
288 SC. 19.1. 
289 Ep. 107.8. The same ideas are repeated in Dil. 7.22. 
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In the light of the analysis of the three biblical passages used both by Augustine 
and Bernard to sustain their teaching on the priority of divine love, it is possible to argue 
that Bernard’s view on how God loves human beings first, is shaped by Augustine’s 
interpretation of the biblical material.  
4. The Paradox of the Search for God  
 
A theme closely related to that of the priority of divine love in Bernard’s works is 
that of the search of the soul for God. In a passage from the De diligendo Deo which 
begins by emphasising the priority of God’s love for human beings in words similar to 
what he had said in Epistula 107.8290, Bernard concludes his argumentation in the 
following way: 
  
No one has the strength to seek you unless he has first already found you. For you 
wish to be found in order that you may be sought, and you wish to be sought in 
order that you may be found291.   
 
These concluding sentences do not belong to Bernard. They derive from Augustine’s In 
Johannis evangelium tractatus. Referring to the search of God, Augustine said “we seek 
you because we were sought”292 and later in the treatise he added “let us search for that 
which has to be found, let us search for what has been found”293. The first sentence 
occurs during the discussion of the episode of Nathanael, who has been seen first by 
Christ under the fig-tree. The second sentence appears in a passage where Augustine 
speaks of the difficult task of the soul engaged in searching for the knowledge of an 
infinite God. The same idea is repeated in the De Trinitate, with the sole exception that in 
this text it is rather the incomprehensibility of God which represents the object of the 
soul’s quest294. It is interesting to observe that Augustine develops the theme of ‘seek and 
find’ in relation to the object of this search which is not so much the love of God, as it is 
                                                 
290 See below, p. 66. 
291 Dil. 7.22: …nemo quaerere te valet, nisi qui prius invenerit. Vis igitur inveniri ut quaeraris, quaeri ut 
inveniaris.. 
292 Jo. ev. tr. 7.21: quaerimus quia quaesiti sumus.  
293 Jo. ev. tr. 63.1: quaeramus inveniendum, quaeramus inventum.  
294 Trin. 15.2.2. 
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the knowledge of God295. Although Augustine does not link explicitly the theme of ‘seek 
and find’ with that of the priority of divine love, it is without doubt that he would have 
agreed with Bernard’s interpretation based on Augustine’s own idea of the necessity of 
divine grace for the soul’s progress towards God.  
Bernard’s most developed treatment of this theme occurs in Sermo super Cantica 
Canticorum 84. Bernard begins his sermon asserting that it is a great good to search God. 
The quest for God is the first gift to the soul, but among all the goods that the soul has 
received, it remains the last to be perfected296. The starting point of Bernard’s exegesis of 
the biblical verse “In my little bed nightlong I sought him whom my soul loves” (Sg 3:1) 
may be seen as a meditation on Augustine’s quaerimus, quia quaesiti sumus: “The soul 
seeks the Word, but only that soul which has been first sought by the Word”297. This 
means that in Bernard’s interpretation the soul has been granted the will to seek God, on 
the condition of having first been visited and sought by God. As a result of this first 
divine visit, the soul possesses the will to seek God, but still lacks the power to act in 
accordance with its own will. Bernard speaks of a second grace, by which the soul seeks 
God according to its own powers, “provided it remembers that it was first sought, as it 
was first loved, and provided it remembers that it is because of this that it both seeks and 
loves”298. The soul’s search and love for God are both the result of God’s seeking and 
loving human beings first. The love and the quest of the soul for God are not considered 
by Bernard as being identical, however they are closely connected inasmuch as “the love 
is the reason for the search and the search is the fruit of love”299. He concludes his 
reflections on how God sought human beings first by saying: “From this [i.e. love] comes 
the zeal and ardor to seek him whom your soul loves, because assuredly you were not 
                                                 
295 The search for God retains however for Augustine a strong affective element being used often as a 
synonym for desiderare. As Isabelle Bochet has observed, quaerere Deum represents the positive 
dimension of the desire for God, which is usually understood as the experience of something absent. See 
Bochet (1982) 143.  
296 SC. 84.1.  
297 SC. 84.4: Quaerit anima Verbum, sed quae a Verbo prius quaesita sit. 
298 SC. 84.4: tantum se meminerit quaesitam prius, sicut et prius dilectam; atque inde esse, et quod quaerit, 
et quod diligit. 
299 SC. 84.5: dilectio causa quaesitionis; quaestio fructus dilectionis est.  
 69
able to seek unless you had been sought and also now when sought you cannot but 
seek”300. 
Although Bernard mentions in passing the soul’s search for the vision of God, it is 
primarily the love of God that the soul seeks301. The love of God is both at the beginning 
and at the end of the soul’s quest. The love of God as the primary object of soul’s quest is 
probably the most important aspect that distinguishes Bernard’s treatment of the theme of 
‘seek and find’ from that of Augustine.  
However, both Bernard and Augustine would agree that God’s initiative in both 
loving and seeking human beings, has the role of grounding ontologically the human 





Together with amor and dilectio, Bernard employed the term desiderium in order 
to designate the human response to God’s prior love for humanity. The love, which has 
been planted in human nature by divine initiative, when turned towards God, propels the 
soul on an ascending path whose final stage can never be fully enjoyed in this life303. 
Since the soul cannot experience fully the love for God during its earthly existence, 
Bernard’s predominant conception of Christian love is that of desiderium understood as 
“that spark of unfulfilled love which divine grace causes to exist in the human heart”304. 
As usual with Bernard, he found support for developing his own view on human desire in 
the wealth of scriptural and theological reflection on this subject. 
                                                 
300 SC. 84.5: hinc [sc. a dilectione] zelus, hinc ardor iste quaerendi quem diligit anima tua, quia profecto 
nec non quaesita quaerere poteras, nec non quaerere quaesita nunc potes. 
301 SC. 84.4. 
302 SC. 84.5. 
303 McGinn (1994) 196-197 remarks on the existence of a progression in Bernard’s works regarding his 
view on the possibility of attainment of the highest degree of love in this life. His view changes from the 
early letter to the Carthusians where he reserves the highest stage of love for the future life to the numerous 
passages in the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum which seem to affirm the possibility of enjoying the 
highest state of love in this life, if only during rare fleeting ecstatic experiences.   
304 Casey (1988) 59. 
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By the twelfth century the concept of desiderium had already a venerable history, 
grounded both in the biblical books (especially the Psalms and the Pauline epistles305) 
and the works of the ancient philosophers306. It was subsequently developed in monastic 
texts such as Cassian’s Conferentiae and came to a climax in the writings of Augustine 
and Gregory the Great. Augustine especially played a major role in shaping the medieval 
views on desiderium and his influence is conspicuous at the level of vocabulary, imagery 
and theology of the concept. His great impact may be explained not only through a direct 
knowledge of his works, but also through the massive incorporation and absorption of his 
ideas on this matter in other influential texts, such as the Regula Sancti Benedicti and the 
writings of pope Gregory the Great307.  
Augustine’s most substantial texts on desiderium, discussing the concept 
especially in a biblical context, derive from the major works of his mature period, such as 
the Confessiones, the De Trinitate, the Enarrationes in Psalmos, the In Johannis 
evangelium tractatus and the In epistulam Johannis ad Parthos tractatus308.  
Intimately intertwined with the theme of the soul’s quest for God and with that of 
the Christian life as pilgrimage, desiderium helped Augustine to emphasise the inherent 
dynamism of the human soul towards God.  According to Augustine, the human soul is 
created with a tendency towards its Creator, which cannot be fulfilled with anything less 
than God himself: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until its rests in 
you”309. Apart from being a simple choice of the will, desiderium is an ontological reality 
designating the soul’s imperative movement towards what is both its source and goal, 
namely God.  
For Augustine, desiderium is a particular form of voluntas310 being defined as 
longing for absent objects (rerum absentium concupiscentia)311. He compares it with 
                                                 
305 The Pauline expressions desideria carnis (Gal 5:16; Eph 2:3), desiderium cordis (Rom 1:24) and 
desideria saecularia (Tit 2:12) are recurrent in Augustine’s and Bernard’s writings. 
306 Cicero, Plotinus, Porphyry, to mention at least those who might have influenced Augustine in his 
treatment of desiderium. 
307 Casey (1992) 610. 
308 Isabelle Bochet’s admirable study on Augustine’s concept of desire is based mainly on the same works. 
For a compelling argument regarding the reason for selecting these particular works, see Bochet (1982) 18-
21.  
309 conf. 1.1.1: …fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. 
310 Speaking of desire in general (cupiditas), joy (laetitia), fear (metus) and sadness (tristitia), Augustine 
defines them all in terms of will, see civ. Dei 14.6: Voluntas quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud 
quam voluntates sunt. 
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hunger312 and thirst313, suggesting that by desiderium the soul experiences an essential 
lack. This longing is neither good nor bad in itself. As with voluntas it is the object of 
longing, which determines the moral quality of desiderium314.  While the soul preserves 
its inherent tendency after the fall, in the earthly region of unlikeness the soul is incapable 
of directing its longing towards something good or towards the supreme good which is 
God except through the redeeming grace of Christ315. When through Christ’s grace the 
object of the soul’s longing is God, “the whole life of the good Christian is a holy 
desire”316. As such, the Christian life is one of unsatisfied longing for something one does 
not possess yet, but believes and hopes to possess in the future.  
Augustine had recourse to the metaphor of pilgrimage in order to describe the 
condition of the homesick Christian. As long as the soul is a pilgrim in this world, far 
away from its homeland, the desire cannot be fulfilled. Following Plotinus317, Augustine 
insists that the return of the pilgrim soul to its homeland must not be understood in spatial 
terms: “we go not by walking but by loving”318 or “we do not run by feet but by 
desire”319. While in this life the soul may be granted a momentary glimpse of the 
homeland320, the pilgrim and homesick soul attains its destination in the afterlife, in the 
face to face vision of God, in the perfect restoration of God’s image and likeness and in 
the fulfilment of the soul’s love for God. By situating the consummation of desire in the 
future, after death, Augustine’s treatment of desiderium is profoundly eschatological.  
                                                                                                                                                 
311 en. Ps. 118 s. 8.4.  
312 Jo. ev. tr. 15.1. 
313 en. Ps. 41.3. 
314 When desiderium is directed towards unworthy objects, Augustine speaks of desideria carnalia: en. Ps. 
26.2; 7.5; 76.1; 102.5; 103.16; 136.9; Jo. ev. tr. 30.5; desideria illicita: en. Ps. 136.9; 147.10; desideria 
vitiosa: civ. Dei 14.3; desideria mala: c. Jul. 6.60; desideria saecularia: en. Ps. 53.5. When the object of 
desire is, on the contrary, a noble one, Augustine speaks of desideria bona: en. Ps. 83.3; desideria 
caelestia: s. 221.3; sanctum desiderium: ep. Jo. 4.6.  
315 This is exactly the main point of Augustine’s Confessiones, which may be read as the quasi-
autobiographical story of his renouncement to the various tempting desires of this world for the only 
worthy desire which is God, through his discovery of Christ’s role as a mediator. 
316 ep. Jo. 4.6: Tota vita christiani boni sanctum desiderium est. 
317 Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; conf. 1.18.28. See also Clark (2004) 149-151. 
318 ep. 155.4.13: Imus non ambulando sed amando. 
319 en. Ps. 83.4: …non enim pedibus sed desiderio currimus. Various formulations of the same idea occur 
in Jo. ev. tr. 26.3; 32.1; 36.8; 48.3. 
320 In en. Ps. 41. 9 the theme of the pilgrimage provides the context for the human soul enflamed with 
desire to ascend to God. The encounter with God although fuelled by desire takes place at the level of the 
mind or intellect. 
 72
Finally, an additional aspect of desiderium should be mentioned although 
Augustine did not develop it fully in his works: the idea that even in the highest stage of 
the soul’s ascension to God, reserved usually for the afterlife321, love and desire will 
continue to grow322. This idea is already present in his early work Soliloquies, where 
distinguishing between three stages in the ascent of the soul to God, namely to have eyes 
(habere oculos), to look (aspicere) and to see (videre), Augustine mentions the role of 
faith, hope and love for the soul’s vision of God. During this life all three theological 
virtues are needed so that the soul might see God. However, in the life to come love alone 
will persist and will grow greater and greater323. The same idea is repeated in the De 
doctrina Christiana together with an explanation regarding the continual growth of love. 
According to Augustine the reason for the incessant growth of love lies in the difference 
between temporal and eternal things. Temporal things are desired more before they are 
reached, but once they are attained their value proves worthless. On the other hand, 
eternal things are loved with greater ardour when they are in possession, than when they 
are still an object of desire, for “however high the value any human being may set upon it 
when he is on his way to posses it, he will find it when it comes into his possession, of 
higher value still”324.  
In his homiletic works speaking of the transformation of desire to enjoyment 
(delectatio) when the longing soul finally possesses the object of its desire, Augustine 
observes that this is not a state of satiety, rather “such will be the enjoyment of that 
beauty that it will ever be present to you and you shall never be satisfied, indeed you shall 
be always satisfied and yet never satisfied”325. A similar idea is present in one of his 
sermons where he describes the life of the resurrected souls. In the presence of God who 
will then be seen face to face they will sing praise to God, not by means of sounds, but by 
                                                 
321 Augustine’s constant teaching is that only very few souls are granted to experience the divine being in 
this life, very rarely and only for a fleeting moment.  
322 With very few exceptions, modern scholars regularly overlook this aspect of Augustine’s understanding 
of desire. A brief discussion of this aspect occurs in Bochet (1982) 193-194, while Casey (1988) 69 simply 
acknowledges the presence of this element in Augustine. In the East, the idea of the unending desire for 
God termed as epektasis features in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa.  See Daniélou (1944) 291-307. 
323 sol. 1.6.12-7.14. 
324 doc. Chr. 1.38.42. See in Pollmann (1996) her chapter on caritas. 
325 Jo. ev. tr. 3.21: talis erit illa delectatio pulchritudinis, ut semper praesens sit et nunquam satieris; immo 
semper satieris, et nunquam satieris. 
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affection326 and in doing this they will experience an insatiable satiety (insatiabili 
satietate)327.  
The texts dealing with the unending growth of desiderium are not numerous, 
however it appears clearly that Augustine maintained the existence of desire in the future 
life, although not as a longing for absent objects, since the soul finally finds itself in the 
presence of God, but simply as the expression of an ardent love.  
Turning our attention to Bernard now, it is important to note that in spite of the 
disconcerting absence of direct quotations deriving from Augustine’s writings, Bernard’s 
view on desiderium presents striking similarities with that of his predecessor. This 
situation may be explained, as Michael Casey suggested, through Bernard’s drawing on a 
“diffuse Augustinianism” rather than on the works of the master himself328. While this 
presumption is absolutely plausible, one should keep in mind, however, that Augustine 
deals at length with the concept of desiderium in his homiletic works, which in Bernard’s 
time were extremely popular among monks329 and which were read on a regular basis 
during the liturgical services330. Therefore, it is highly likely that Bernard’s familiarity 
with Augustine’s view on desiderium is also based on the former’s immediate exposure 
to Augustine’s ideas, not so much through solitary reading perhaps, as through direct 
aural contact in a liturgical context.  
Bernard follows Augustine in his insistence on the ontological dimension of 
human desire. The concept of desiderium cannot be understood separately from God’s 
prior love for humankind: “It is his desire that creates yours”331. God is the source and the 
object of human desire: “he makes you desire, he is what you desire”332. Or in a 
formulation that echoes an expression from the letter of Severus, bishop of Milevis, 
                                                 
326 s. 369.29: Non sonibus transeuntibus dicemus Amen et Alleluia, sed affectu animi. 
327 s. 369.29. 
328 Casey (1992) 610. 
329 Leclercq (1982) 97; Casey (1988) 27. 
330 Benedict, the Father of Western monasticism recommended in his rule the reading of the patristic 
authors during the Divine Office. See RB. 9. In the secondary literature this aspect is briefly dealt with by 
Lackner (1971) 30 and Waddell (1985) 105-106 
331 Dil. 7.19: Illius desiderium tuum creat. 
332 Dil. 7.21: Ipse facit ut desideres, ipse est quod desideras. 
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addressed to Augustine: “The reason for loving God is God and the measure of loving 
him is without measure”333.  
The great love that God had for humankind before the creation of the world334 
determined him to create the human being in his image and likeness and therefore with an 
inherent capacity for God himself335. As the image of God is preserved after the fall, the 
human being retains his capacity for God, consisting in his ability to will, to love, to fear 
and in his endowment with the affectiones naturales. However, without the essential 
grace of Christ, the soul is unable to will the good, to love and fear God and to order its 
affections336. Having been created from the beginning with a capacity for God the human 
soul tends restlessly towards its goal and no other object can satisfy it than God himself: 
“For God is love and there is nothing in all created things which is able to fill the creature 
which has been made to God’s image except the love which is God”337. The same idea of 
the inability of the soul to be satisfied with anything else than God is developed in a 
passage clearly inspired by Augustine’s famous phrase from the Confessiones: “our heart 
is restless until it rests in you”338:  
By that law of his own cupidity according to which in all other things a person 
thirsts for what he does not have more than for what he has, and feels distaste 
more for what he has than for what he does not, so that everything in heaven and 
earth is no sooner obtained than disdained, finally, beyond, the shadow of a doubt, 
he should run up against him whom alone of all things he is still lacking, namely 
God. There he should rest, for just as no rest calls him back on this side of 
eternity, so no restlessness in the hereafter troubles him anymore339. 
 
The first part of this passage also makes clear the fact that Bernard, like Augustine, 
understood desire primarily as a longing of the soul for things it does not possess.  
Bernard also shares with Augustine an inclination for the use of the imagery of 
the pilgrimage and of the soul’s quest for God in order to designate the soul’s tendency 
                                                 
333 Dil. 1.1: Causa diligendi Deum, Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere. Emero Stiegman compares the 
first part of the Bernardine sentence with en. Ps. 72.32: Praemium Dei ipse Deus est. See Stiegman (1995) 
164, n. 81. In ep.109.2 writing to Augustine, Severus refers to the way of loving God “without measure” 
(sine modo). 
334 See above, pp. 63-64. 
335 Gra. 1.2. 
336 Gra. 6.17. 
337 SC. 18.6: denique Deus caritas est, et nihil est in rebus quod posit replere creaturam factam ad 
imaginem Dei, nisi caritas Deus. 
338 conf. 1.1.1. 
339 Dil. 7.19.   
 75
towards God. Following in the footsteps of Augustine, the term peregrinatio is used in 
the sense of being away from home, being also associated with the idea of exile. During 
this period of absence the soul longs for its homeland and its ultimate desire is to return 
there. Identifying the soul’s destination with the life of the saints in heaven340 and 
claiming that the soul will perfect its love for God after resurrection341, Bernard adds a 
strong eschatological element to his understanding of desire.  
The return to the homeland or the search of the soul for God needs however to 
start in this life and the way suggested by Bernard is reminiscent of Augustine: “God is 
not sought by the movement of the feet but by desires”342. It is not by movement in space 
that the soul looses the likeness with which it was created but by means of affections, 
which, when oriented in an inappropriate way, may better be called defections: 
The soul does not make itself degenerate when it strays by wandering from place 
to place or by walking, but when it strays as it is the nature of a spiritual substance 
to stray when it departs for the worse in its affections or rather in its defections 
away from itself somehow and when it makes itself dissimilar to itself through the 
depravity of its life and morals343.  
 
The idea that the proximity or distance from God does not refer to the soul’s location in 
space, but needs to be understood in terms of likeness and unlikeness also has its roots in 
a wealth of examples deriving from Augustine344. Surprisingly, in spite of Augustine’s 
insistence that it is through love that the image and likeness of God in the human soul is 
restored and that the soul draws near to God, he did not refer to the ascent of the soul to 
God as an ascent of love. The main accounts of Augustine’s ascent of the soul to God 
present mainly in the works from the first half of his creative period describe an 
intellectual ascent of the soul to God345, deeply influenced by his discovery of the books 
                                                 
340 SC. 62.1. 
341 Dil. 10.33. 
342 SC. 84.1: Non pedum passibus, sed desideriis quaeritur Deus. For Augustine see above, p. 70, n. 319. 
343 SC. 83.2. 
344 en. Ps. 34 s. 2.6; en. Ps. 94.2; Trin. 7.6.12; civ. Dei 9.17. 
345 sol. 1.6.12-7.14; quant. 33. 70-76; conf. 7.10.16; conf. 7.17.23; conf. 9.10.23-24. The famous ascension 
narratives from the Confessiones are based on a threefold Plotinian pattern, which begins with a withdrawal 
from corporeal reality, continues with the entry into the depth of the soul and culminates with the ecstatic 
movement beyond the mind to the divine level. There are also a few examples of the same threefold 
Plotinian pattern of the soul’s ascent to God present in Augustine’s homiletic works, see s. 52.6.16-17; en. 
Ps. 41.7-10; Jo. ev. tr. 20.2.11-12.   
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of the Neoplatonic philosophers346. Bernard differs from Augustine in the particular 
interest he shows for the various stages of the love’s progress towards God and in the 
way in which he understands the return of the soul to God fundamentally as a loving 
ascent347. It is essentially due to this difference that Bernard’s mysticism has been 
labelled as “affective” and contrasted with Augustine’s “intellectual mysticism”348. 
Finally, as Bernard mentions occasionally in his works that the desire has no 
end349, some scholars thought to have discovered an element of epektasis in his treatment 
of the concept, which they attributed to the abbot’s reading of Gregory of Nyssa350. In 
Bernard’s time the only work of the Greek author available in Latin due to the translation 
of Eriugena was his anthropological treatise De opificio hominis, known in the West 
under the title De imagine. According to A. Wilmart, the library of Clairvaux possessed 
this translation at the time of Bernard’s abbacy351. However, references to the concept of 
epektasis352 as well as discussions of the unending aspect of human desire are totally 
absent in this text. Daniélou’s analysis of the concept in Gregory of Nyssa is based on the 
Cappadocian’s In Canticum Canticorum homiliae 15, De Vita Mosis and Dialogus de 
anima et resurrectione353.  Needless to say, none of these texts were translated into Latin 
in the twelfth century. Furthermore, in Gregory of Nyssa’s treatment of the subject, the 
theme of unending desire is inextricably intertwined with that of the increasingly deeper 
penetration into divine darkness, expressing the fact that the soul can never experience a 
total knowledge of God354. There is no evidence to support the idea that Bernard might 
                                                 
346 conf. 7.9.14 narrates Augustine’s discovery of the libri Platonicorum, which is followed by two mystical 
experiences in Milan which help Augustine to come to grips with a transcendental and spiritual 
understanding of divinity. 
347 In SC. 49.4 Bernard speaks of two types of ecstasy, one taking place in intellectu, the other in affectu. 
However, it is the ascent of love that received overwhelming attention from the part of Bernard.  
348 Louth (1976) 1-11. 
349 The major text where Bernard speaks explicitely of undending desire is SC. 84.1. He also speaks of 
growing desire in SC. 31.1, of imperfecta perfectio in QH 10.1, or referring to the life after the resurrection 
he speaks of satietas sine fastidio “satiey without disgust” and desiderium nesciens egestatem “desire 
knowing no want” in Dil. 33.  
350 McGinn (1994) 217 speaks as if Bernard was familiar with Gregory’s understanding of the notion of 
epektasis. Casey (1988) 69 on the other hand is more cautious and suggests Augustine and Gregory the 
Great as Bernard’s more likely sources. 
351 Wilmart (1949) 302. 
352 The term epektasis occurs only once in Gregory of Nyssa, De creatione hominis sermo alter. GNO, 
suppl. 47.3. 
353 Daniélou (1944) 291-307. 
354 Louth (2006) 86-88. 
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have known any of Gregory’s works, which discuss the aspect of the unending desire355. 
Additionally, nowhere in his works does Bernard refer to divine darkness or to God’s 
unknowability, the main elements closely related with the idea of unending desire in 
Gregory. Against this background it is highly likely that in touching upon the aspect of 
desire’s unending growth Bernard follows other sources. A careful look at Bernard’s 
most relevant text dealing with this subject leads us again to Augustine: 
What boundary can be set for anyone who does seek him? The Psalmist says 
“Seek his face always”. Nor, I think, will a soul cease to seek him even when it 
has found him. It is not with the steps of the feet that God is sought but with the 
heart’s desires; and when the soul happily finds him its holy desire is not 
quenched but kindled. Does the consummation of joy bring about the 
consumption of desire? Rather is the joy oil for the desire; for desire itself is the 
flame. So it is. Joy will be fulfilled, but there will be no end to desire and 
therefore there will be no end to the search. But consider, if you can, this zeal for 
searching, without wanting and this desire without anxiety: the former is indeed 
excluded by his presence, the latter by his abundance356. 
 
Extracted from a sermon dealing with a number of themes which can be traced back to 
Augustine357, this passage presents some intriguing similarities with a text from the 
latter’s commentary on the Gospel of St. John358. Like Augustine, Bernard uses the 
biblical verse Quaerite faciem eius semper (Ps 104:4) as scriptural basis for the 
development of his ideas on the soul’s quest for God. To the idea of seeking God even 
when he was found corresponds Augustine’s famous phrase quaeramus inveniendum 
quaeramus inventum “let us search for what has to be found, let us search for what has 
been found”359. In addition, Augustine himself insists that since God is infinite the soul’s 
search for him will be without end. The main difference between the two texts is that 
while Bernard speaks clearly of the unending desire being preserved in the life to come, 
in this text Augustine confines the endless search of God to this life. However, Bernard’s 
understanding of the unending desire as no longer being a yearning for something absent 
is in accordance with Augustine’s reflections on this aspect.  
                                                 
355 On Bernard’s reading of Gregory see below p. 12, n. 8.  
356 SC. 84.1. 
357 The theme of seeking and finding God and that of approaching God be desire rather than by moving in 
space.  
358 Jo. ev. tr. 63.1. 
359 Jo. ev. tr. 63.1. See the discussion on the paradoxical search for God above pp. 67-69. 
 78
The presence of these similarities seems to indicate that in articulating his own 
thoughts Bernard might have been inspired by a text he probably did not have in front of 
him and whose content he attempted to reconstruct relying on memory alone.  
What is particularly striking about Bernard’s treatment of desiderium is that he 
does not borrow simply some disparate elements from his main source on this subject. In 
making use of the most important aspects related to desiderium in Augustine, Bernard 
gives the impression of having a comprehensive knowledge of his predecessor’s general 
treatment of the problem. This comprehensive knowledge enables him not only to follow 
closely Augustine but also to spot the existing disruptions in Augustine’s dealing with 
this concept and to discreetly attempt to fill these gaps.  
 
6. Ordinate in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 Vl) 
 
The ontological restlessness existing in the human being (his velle, affectio, amor 
or desiderium) as a result of his creation must be channelled towards God with the help of 
divine grace, so that the lost likeness is restored by the union of human and divine will in 
what Bernard names unitas spiritus. Bernard refers to the proper orientation of desire 
towards God employing an expression with biblical roots: ordinatio caritatis360. P. 
Delfgaauw361 notes that in Bernard’s thought ordinatio caritatis involves two aspects: 
first, it represents the turning of the carnal love from its fallen state where it was reduced 
by original sin to spiritual love, which is the love of God; second, it refers to the ordering 
of love in affectu in relation to love in actu362, or in other words, to the complex relation 
between one aspect of contemplation and action. As Bernard’s development of the latter 
aspect of ordinatio caritatis does not make substantial use of material which can be 
traced back to Augustine, in what follows the discussion will be limited to the former 
aspect, namely that of the turning of the inherent dynamism of the human soul towards 
God by means of divine grace. Moreover, this is the aspect of ordinatio caritatis that 
                                                 
360 The expression ordinatio caritatis derives from the biblical verse Ordinate in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 Vl) 
or Ordinavit in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 Vg). Bernard quotes most often the Vulgate, but in Gra. 6.17 he 
quotes the biblical passage according to the Vetus Latina. The Sources Chrétiennes edition of Bernard’s 
treatise indicates in this case a patristic source for Sg 2:4.   
361 Delfgaauw (1953) 235-6. 
362 SC. 50.2: Est caritas in actu, est in affectu. 
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Bernard deals with most extensively and most frequently at the same time. He defines 
ordinatio as “every kind of conversion of the will to God and its total voluntary and 
devout subjection”363. According to Bernard, this conversion is a process that lasts for the 
whole life364. Delfgaauw365 has also pointed out that at times Bernard tackles this subject 
from a metaphysical perspective and then he speaks of love’s return to its beginning, its 
origin, its source366. On other occasions, Bernard accentuates the psychological side of 
the process by speaking of the purification and ordering of the affections367. However, the 
fundamental underlying idea of all these different approaches is that of the perfecting of 
the will after having been turned properly toward God by divine grace368.  
More than Augustine, Bernard manifested a special interest in mapping the 
unfolding of human desire in its progress towards God. In Bernard’s view “love is a great 
reality. But there are degrees to it”369. The manifold enumerations of the stages of love in 
its ascent or return to God abound in Bernard’s works370 and this prolific diversity must 
not be seen as “the result of inconsistency or confusion, but rather [as the result of] the 
richness of the subject and the insight of the enumerator”371. Among Bernard’s various 
maps of the degrees of love, the one briefly outlined in a letter sent to the Carthusian 
monks of Mont-Dieu372 and developed subsequently in the treatise De diligendo Deo, 
dedicated to Cardinal Haimeric, seems to have been inspired by some of Augustine’s 
ideas. In this treatise, Bernard discusses four degrees of loving God: the human being 
loves himself for his own sake (homo diligit se propter se), the human being loves God 
for his own sake (homo diligit Deum propter se), the human being loves God for God’s 
sake (homo diligit Deum propter seipsum) and the human being loves himself for the 
sake of God (homo diligit se propter Deum). In order to understand how Bernard in 
articulating his fourfold division of the stages of love depended on elements that can be 
                                                 
363 Gra. 6.19: Est autem ordinatio, omnimoda conversio voluntatis ad Deum, et ex tota se voluntaria 
devotaque subiectio. 
364 Quadr. 2.4: Spiritualis conversio non una die perficitur: utinam vel in omni vita qua degimus in hoc 
corpore, valeat consummari.  
365 Delfgaauw (1953) 236. 
366 SC. 7.2; SC. 83.4. 
367 Div. 50.2: purgatae et ordinatae affectiones; Gra. 6.17. 
368 For a similar idea but a different approach to the order of love see below, pp. 175-181. 
369 SC. 83.5: Magna res amor; sed sunt in eo gradus. 
370 See above, pp. 56-57. 
371 Sommerfeldt (1991) 98. 
372 Ep. 11. 
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traced back to Augustine, it is necessary to have a brief look at Augustine’s main ideas 
concerning the ordered love373.  
In spite of Augustine’s rather sparing use of the Song of Songs, he did shape one 
of the important themes of the Song of Songs tradition in Western mysticism, namely the 
non-erotic theme of the order of love (ordo caritatis) based on the biblical verse Ordinate 
in me caritatem (Sg 2:4)374. Apart from ordo caritatis375, Augustine refers to this theme 
employing various other expressions such as ordo amoris376, ordinata dilectio377, caritas 
ordinata378, amor ordinatus379. He summed up his teaching in De civitate Dei: “So it 
seems to me that a short and true definition of virtue is the order of love. This is why in 
the holy Song of Songs, the bride of Christ, the city of God, sings ‘Order charity in 
me’”380.  
Some of Augustine’s most influential ideas on the order of love are contained in the 
first book of De doctrina Christiana, where he differentiates between “things which are 
to be enjoyed” (res…quibus fruendum est) and “things which are to be used” (quibus 
utendum)381. The verb frui (“to enjoy”) is defined as “clinging to something in love for its 
own sake”382. The sense of uti (“ to use”) is “to apply whatever it may be to the purpose 
of obtaining what you love - if indeed it is something that ought to be loved”383. In the 
light of this distinction, for Augustine fruitio designates a type of love according to which 
something is loved on its own account (propter se), while usus denotes a form of love 
according to which the object of love is loved on account of something else (propter 
aliud). In addition to the basic distinction between things which are to be enjoyed and 
those which are to be used, Augustine differentiates four possible objects of love, which 
he enumerates in the following order:  
                                                 
373 There is a large secondary literature on this aspect of Augustine’s teaching of love, see especially 
Burnaby (1938) 113-141; Holte (1962) 275-281; O’Donovan (1982) 361-397. 
374 McGinn (1992) 261. 
375 b. conjug. 3. 
376 civ. Dei. 15.22. 
377 doc. Chr. 1.2.28; c. Faust. 22.28. 
378 ep. 140.4; ep. 243.12. 
379 mend. 41. 
380 civ. Dei. 15.22: …unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis ordo est amoris; propter quod 
in sancto cantico canticorum cantat sponsa Christi, civitas Dei: ordinate in me caritatem. 
381 doc. Chr. 1.3.3. 
382 doc. Chr. 1.4.4: frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui re propter se. 
383 doc. Chr. 1.4.4: uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen 
amandum est. 
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 that which is above us (quod supra nos est) 
 that which we are (quod nos sumus)  
 that which is close to us (quod iuxta nos est) 
 that which is below us (quod infra nos est) 384. 
Augustine stresses the idea that the human beings need no commandment (praeceptum) 
for loving themselves and for loving what is beneath them (i.e. their bodies) since they do 
this in accordance with the unshakeable law of nature (inconcussa naturae lege)385. 
Nevertheless they need a commandment for that which is above them (i.e God) and for 
that which is at the same level with them (i.e. neighbour) and to this purpose they 
received the commandment contained in the biblical quotation: Diliges Dominum tuum ex 
toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua, et diliges proximum tuum 
tamquam teipsum. In his duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et omnes Prophetae (Mt 
22:37-40)386. According to Augustine, God alone is the proper object of enjoyment 
(fruitio) or of love for his own sake (propter se)387, whereas the neighbour and the self 
ought to be loved only for the sake of God (propter Deum)388. The love of neighbour and 
self not on account of God is termed by Augustine cupiditas389. In contrast to cupiditas, 
he defines caritas as “the movement of the soul which aims at enjoying God for his own 
sake and the enjoyment of self and neighbour for God’s sake”390. The human being who 
loves with an adequate love God, the neighbour and the self neither enjoying what ought 
to be used nor using what ought to be enjoyed is said to possess ordinata dilectio391. 
Additionally, the ordered love also requires an adequate measure. Therefore “the human 
being who loves orderly neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he 
                                                 
384 doc. Chr. 1.23.22. 
385 Augustine mentions this idea three times, see doc. Chr. 1.23.22; 1.26.27 and 1.35.39. 
386 doc. Chr. 1.26.27. See Pollmann (1996) 143-146. 
387 doc. Chr. 1.5.5. 
388 doc. Chr. 1.22.21. 
389 doc. Chr. 3.10.16: cupiditatem [voco] autem motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet 
corpore, non propter Deum. 
390 doc. Chr. 3.10.16: caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deum propter ipsum et se atque proximum 
propter Deum. For the same understanding of caritas and cupiditas see Trin. 9.8.13 and s.164.6 
O’Donovan has observed that in this definition of love written many years after launching the famous 
distinction between frui and uti, Augustine uses solely the verb frui both in relation to God and in relation 
to the self and the neighbour. He argues that the strong instrumental sense of the verb uti made Augustine 
avoid it in his later writings, although he continued to differentiate between love propter se and love 
propter aliud. See O’Donovan (1982) 361-397.  
391 doc. Chr. 1.27.28. 
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ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally 
which ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves that more or less which ought to be 
loved equally”392.  
The same teaching on the order of love is succinctly presented in a passage from 
the De Trinitate where Augustine speaks again of the measure and the type of love due to 
God, neighbour and self: “Now we do not need let that question worry us about how 
much love we should expend on our brother, how much on God. On our brother as much 
as on ourselves; and we love ourselves all the more, the more we love God. So with one 
and the same charity we love God and neighbour; but God on God’s account, ourselves 
and neighbour also on God’s account”393. It is abundantly clear that for Augustine a 
perfectly ordered love of self derives solely from the love for God. Only by loving God, 
the human being is able to love himself and his neighbour properly and orderly. To love 
one’s self in any different way than with a love for God is rather to hate one’s self394. On 
the other hand to love one’s self with a love for God means to love less what is one’s own 
(proprium) and in this way to cleave more to God395.  
Finally, in one of his letters Augustine speaks of the Christian perfection as 
transference of weight from cupiditas to caritas396. If we replace these concepts, which 
represent the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of the perfection process, in 
accordance with the definitions given to them by Augustine in the third book of the De 
doctrina Christiana397, it is possible to describe the evolution of the Christian soul 
towards perfection as the transition from love of self not on account of God to love for 
God on account of God and love of self and neighbour on account of God. But this 
simple replacement provides us already with three out of four degrees of love outlined by 
Bernard in the De diligendo Deo, as the following schema clearly indicates: 
 
 
                                                 
392 doc. Chr. 1.27.28. 
393 Trin. 8.8.12. 
394 ep. 155.15; also see Jo.ev.tr. 87.1. Burnaby (1938) 121 has pointed out that from the De moribus 
ecclesiae onwards the idea stating that the proper love of self is the love of God becomes a constant of 
Augustine’s teaching.  
395 Trin. 12.11.16: Tanto magis inhaeretur Deo, quanto magis minus diligitur proprium. 
396 ep. 157.9. 




1. homo diligit se propter se                  
 




3. homo diligit Deum propter seipsum  
 
4. homo diligit se propter Deum            
doc. Chr. 3.10.16: 
 
1. Cupiditas - motus animi ad fruendum se et 
proximo non propter Deum 
2. _____ (There is no explicit equivalent for 
Bernard’s second stage in Augustine, 
nevertheless it corresponds to what Augustine 
might have called uti Deo) 
3. Caritas - motus animi ad fruendum Deo 
propter ipsum 
         - et se atque proximo propter Deum 
 
Although Bernard does not use explicitly Augustine’s pair of terms frui/uti in his treatise, 
the above layout shows clearly that the main principle of Bernard’s enumeration is based 
on Augustine’s definition of these terms as love of an object on its own account (propter 
se) and love of an object on account of something else (propter aliud). In fact, this claim 
is confirmed by Bernard himself who sums up the difference between a superior and a 
subordinate form of love in a way that echoes Augustine’s distinction between fruitio and 
usus: “Whatever you seem to love because of something else, you do not really love; you 
really love the end pursued and not that by which it is pursued”398. Furthermore, the 
above schema enables us to recognise that Bernard’s first degree of love of self for the 
sake of self corresponds to Augustine’s understanding of cupiditas, while the last two 
stages of love totally coincide with the two aspects which Augustine’s definition of 
caritas involves, namely love of God for the sake of God and love of self for the sake of 
God399.  
Other significant similarities with various aspects of Augustine’s doctrine on love 
present in the description of Bernard’s stages of love may be brought as supplementary 
                                                 
398 Dil. 7.17: Nam quidquid propter aliud amare videaris, id plane amas, quo amoris finis pertendit, non 
per quod tendit. 
399 Stiegman (1995) 183, n. 298 suggests himself Augustine’s Jo. ev. tr. 12.13: Oportet ut oderis in te opus 
tuum et ames in te opus Dei as the source for Bernard’s fourth degree of loving God. However, in my 
opinion, Bernard’s use of an almost identical terminology as in doc. Chr. 3.10.16 and Trin. 8.8.12  
recommends rather these texts as more likely sources for Bernard.  
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evidence in favour of a conspicuous dependence of the abbot of Clairvaux on his 
predecessor. Thus, in Bernard’s first account of the stages of love sketched out in the 
letter to the Carthusian monks, he explicitly mentions cupiditas as the love of self for its 
own sake400. According to Bernard this is the beginning of love: “since we are carnal and 
born of concupiscence of the flesh, our cupidity or love must begin with the flesh”401. 
Some commentators402 reading Bernard from a scholastic perspective on nature and 
grace403 and totally neglecting his links with the previous theological tradition (i.e. 
Augustine) have reproached him for beginning the ascent to God from carnal love (amor 
carnalis)404 or self love, which in their opinion belongs to nature alone. Delfgaauw has 
convincingly refuted these positions pointing out that for Bernard there is not such a thing 
as “pure nature” and that nature includes necessarily grace405. The inability of these 
scholars to perceive how the carnal love of the human being for himself may ever turn 
recto ordine406 toward God is also due to the narrow meaning they attributed to self-love, 
which is defined solely in terms of egoistic love. However, exactly like Augustine, 
Bernard has a more nuanced understanding of the concept of self-love, whose sense is not 
limited to one single meaning. With regard to Augustine, Burnaby singled out three main 
meanings of the term self-love: “the first natural and morally neutral, the second morally 
wrong and the third morally right”407. The first sense corresponds to what Burnaby names 
the instinct of self-preservation, according to which the human being does not need any 
commandment in order to love himself408. The human being loves himself in the second 
sense when he incorrectly assumes to be pursuing his own advantage409. Finally, the 
proper self-love that merits to be so called in Augustine’s view is the love of God410.  
                                                 
400 Dil. 15.39. 
401 Dil. 15.39: …quia carnales sumus et de carnis concupiscentia nascimur, necesse est cupiditas vel amor 
noster a carne incipiat. 
402 Pourrat (1928) 2:47-48; Rousselot (1908) 52. 
403 Delfgaauw (1953) 238 points out that the metaphysical distinction between nature and grace in terms of 
natural and supernatural virtue is not present in the twelfth century, being developed only a century later by 
scholastic theologians. 
404 Dil. 8.23.  
405 Delfgaauw (1953) 238. 
406 The expression belongs to Bernard, see Dil. 15.39. 
407 Burnaby (1938) 118.  
408 doc. Chr. 1.26.27; civ. Dei 10.3; 19.4; en. Ps. 99.5; Trin. 14.14.18. See Burnaby (1938) 118 
409 s. 96.2; ep.118.15; Gn. litt. 11.18. See Burnaby (1938) 118-121. 
410 ep.155.15; Trin. 8.8.12; 12.11.16. See Burnaby (1938) 121-126. 
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It is not difficult to discern the same meanings of self-love in Bernard. In his 
description of the first degree of love, Bernard speaks of the carnal love (amor carnalis) 
by which the human being loves himself ante omnia, for his own sake (propter se) and 
observes that this love is not given by any commandment, but it is planted in the human 
nature411. Bernard’s terminology may easily mislead the readers, but the larger context 
makes it clear that he refers here to self-love in a neutral sense. As such, self-love 
represents the beginning of love and it may be said that it is already ordered, since it 
constitutes the first degree of loving God. Gilson412 found a text in Augustine, which may 
have helped Bernard in his understanding of self-love as the norm of every other love: 
“Therefore the love of each one begins with love of one’s self and it cannot begin in any 
different way but with love of self, for nobody is reminded to love the self”413. A last 
important aspect of the self-love understood in a natural and neutral sense, is that it is the 
result of that grace which is, as Bernard puts it, “inserted into nature”414. 
Bernard warns that self-love should not turn towards sensual delights and that it 
should guard itself from carnal desires which war against the soul415. Failure to do so 
would result in a disordered love, which would also be deprived of the assistance of grace 
and which would find it impossible to turn in any way towards God. This is self-love 
understood in what Burnaby calls “the morally wrong sense”. Those commentators who 
have reproached Bernard for having placed the carnal love at the beginning of the ascent 
towards God have also failed to see the difference between the ordered self-love which is 
the result of gratia creans and the disordered self-love which is the result of the soul’s 
own will, supposing that he started his ascent to God from the latter rather than the first.  
Finally, at the highest level of the loving ascent towards God, Bernard places the 
love of self for the sake of God. By claiming that this is a stage which is largely reserved 
for the hereafter and that in this life only a few privileged souls are rarely and briefly 
granted the experience of this type of love, Bernard takes the discussion to a level which 
                                                 
411 Dil. 8.23: Nec praecepto indicitur, sed naturae inseritur.  
412 Gilson (1940) 221, n. 24. Although Gilson doubts the authenticity of this sermon, he supposes that 
Bernard would have read it as having been written by Augustine. 
413 s. 368.4: Ergo dilectio unicuique a se incipit et non potest nisi a se incipere, et nemo monetur ut se 
diligat. 
414 Dil. 8.23: quae [sc. gratia] naturae insita est. See above the important distinction between gratia creans 
and gratia salvans, p. 46. 
415 Dil. 8.23. 
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is not present in Augustine. While there is agreement between Augustine and Bernard 
that the perfect love of self is solely the one on account of God (propter Deum)416, 
Augustine deals with this concept predominantly at a moral level417, but also at an 
eschatological level418. Bernard on the other hand discusses the realisation of the love of 
self on account of God in a clearly developed mystical context where he also adopts 
Augustine’s eschatological ideas.  
Turning our attention to other passages from Bernard’s works where he deals with 
ordinatio caritatis, it is possible to discern further similarities with Augustine’s ideas on 
the order of love presented in the De doctrina Christiana. Thus, in one of his Sermones 
de Diversis, Bernard provides a brief definition of the ordered love (amor purgatus) 
which seems directly inspired by Augustine’s view on ordinata dilectio: “If we love the 
things that should be loved, if we love more the things that should be loved more, and if 
we do not love the things that should not be loved, love will be purged”419. 
Bernard also makes use of the pair uti / frui in a passage from another sermon 
where he speaks of the ordered love (amor ordinatus) as the discernment between the 
things which are to be used (utenda) and those which are to be enjoyed (fruenda)420, 
which shows clearly that he was familiar with Augustine’s distinction. 
Before concluding this section it is worth mentioning Bernard’s original use of 
Augustine’s quadripartite division of the objects of love421, although, unlike his 
predecessor, he does not discuss it in the context of ordinatio caritatis. As this division 
was popular among medieval authors, it is thought that Bernard did not borrow it directly 
from Augustine, but from an intermediary source, namely a ninth-century commentator 
of the Rule of Saint Benedict named Hildemar422. However, Bernard’s use of Augustine’s 
scheme remains unique in the Middle Ages, since he does not merely quote it like the 
other authors, but structures his entire treatise De consideratione around it. While the 
                                                 
416 Dil. 10.33; For Augustine see doc. Chr. 3.10.16; Trin. 8.8.12. 
417 doc. Chr. 1.22.21. See also Burnaby (1938) 118. 
418 doc. Chr. 1.39.43. See Pollmann (1996) 128-135. 
419 Div. 50.2: Si amamus quae amanda sunt, si magis amamus quae magis amanda sunt, si non amamus 
quae amanda non sunt, amor purgatus erit. 
420 SC. 50.8. 
421 doc. Chr. 1.23.22. 
422 Leclercq (1969) 133-134. See Hildemar, Expositio regulae ab Hildemaro tradita. Mittermüller (1880) 
70. 
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other medieval authors continue to speak, like Augustine, of four types of objects of love, 
Bernard speaks of objects in general and transfers the whole discussion to an 
epistemological context. Moreover, he alters the order of the objects enumerated by 
Augustine so that they match his contemplative method. Thus, while Augustine’s 
classification begins with the objects which are above the self and finishes with those 




quod sub te est 
quod circa te est 
quod supra te est 
Augustine: 
quod supra nos est 
quod nos sumus 
quod iuxta nos est 
quod infra nos est 
 
This ascending order suggested by Bernard corresponds to his view of the mystical life, 
which has its beginnings in self-knowledge and ends with the knowledge of what is 
above, that is contemplatio.  
On the basis of the evidence presented and discussed so far, it is possible to 
conclude that Bernard developed his view on ordinatio caritatis by drawing inspiration 
from a multitude of aspects involved in Augustine’s discussion on the crucial distinction 
between uti and frui. Most importantly, the starting point for Bernard’s best-known map 
of the stages of the order of love is represented by the definitions of cupiditas and caritas 
given by Augustine in the De doctrina Christiana. Stiegman referred to Bernard’s 
fourfold loving ascent as the result of “an intensely analytic effort”423. In my opinion, it is 
rather the result of an intensely synthetic effort, since most of the elements of the edifice 
already exist in Augustine, but it is Bernard’s merit to have brought them together and 
presented them in a way, which does not merely repeat but harmoniously complement 
and enrich what his predecessor has taught. 
                                                 
423 Stiegman (1995) 88. 
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./5%(! +5&(! ,-! ;5)5,&=! 4/53/! /$! '1),! 3'11)! 0&5,&=! #$%&'%(! 4'%&)! ./'.! 5.! :0).! &,.! 8$!
3,&310($(!./'.!5.!5)!*,))581$!.,!)$$!),:$./5&7!3,%*,%$'1!,%!*$%3$*.581$!.,!./$!)$&)$)?!D.!5)!'!
3,:*1$.$1<! )*5%5.0'1!;5)5,&! 5&!'33,%('&3$!45./! ./$!4,%()!,-! ./$! '*,).1$!Z'01P! GS/$!,&$!
4/,!31$';$)!.,!./$!W,%(!8$3,:$)!,&$!)*5%5.!45./!/5:HIN!O,%!EPNKJA""?!!
2. Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est (1 Cor 6 :17)489 
!
T*'%.! -%,:! 0)5&7! )$;$%'1! .$%:)! *$%.'5&5&7! .,! ./$! .%'(5.5,&'1! 3,&.$:*1'.5;$!
;,3'801'%<=!#$%&'%(!'1),!($)3%58$(!./$!(5%$3.!$&3,0&.$%!,-!./$!),01!45./!6,(!5&!.$%:)!,-!
0&5,&?!S/$!Z'015&$!;$%)$!N!O,%!EPNK!Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est! IGS/$!,&$!
4/,!31$';$)! .,! ./$!W,%(! 5)!,&$!)*5%5.! d45./!/5:fHJ!)$%;$(!')! ./$!)3%5*.0%'1!8')5)! -,%! ./$!
($;$1,*:$&.!,-!#$%&'%(2)!;5$4)!,&!./$!)089$3.ALR?!D.!/')!8$$&!,8)$%;$(!./'.!./$!3,&3$*.!
,-!0&5,&! 5)!'!&$4!$1$:$&.! 5&! .4$1-./!3$&.0%<!F$).$%&!:<).535):=!&,.!/';5&7!8$$&!0)$(!








KBPB"!Mihi, autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est?!@$$!O')$<!INL""J!BRN=!&?!BQ?!
ALN![365&&!INL"KJ!"?!
! LE












'((5.5,&! ,-! ./$! &$4! 3,&3$*.! ,-! 0&5,&! .,! ./$! 15).! ,-! .%'(5.5,&'1! .$%:)! -,%:5&7! ./$!W'.5&!
3,&.$:*1'.5;$! ;,3'801'%<=! ./$<! /'(! '! %'./$%! 5&)57&5-53'&.! 5:*'3.! ,&! ./$! 3,&.$&.! ,-!
#$%&'%(2)!.$'3/5&7!,&!./$!0&5,&!,-!./$!),01!45./!6,(ALC?!O,&)$X0$&.1<=!5&!$>':5&5&7!./$!
4'<!5&!4/53/!#$%&'%(!($'1)!45./!./5)!&,.5,&=!,&$!3'&&,.!.,.'11<!(5)%$7'%(!./$!%,1$!*1'<$(!




,-! ,330%%$&3$)! 5.! 5)! 3,0*1$(!45./! ./$!*%$3$($&.!Z'015&$!;$%)$!N!O,%!EPNE!Qui adhaeret 
meretrici unum corpus efficitur!IG]$!4/,!5)!9,5&$(!.,!./$!/'%1,.!8$3,:$)!,&$!8,(<HJ!5&!
,%($%!.,!0&($%15&$!./$!3,&.%').!8$.4$$&!./$!15-$!,-!;5%.0$!,&!./$!,&$!/'&(!'&(!-,%&53'.5,&!
'&(!10).!,&!./$!,./$%?!],4$;$%=!'!)57&5-53'&.!&0:8$%!,-!.5:$)!N!O,%!EPNK!5)!<,+$(!45./!b&!


















M'./$%! '%$!,&$H! Ib&!NRPQRJ?! D&!T070).5&$2)!;5$4! .4,! ./5&7)!'%$!G,&$H!,&1<!G8<!4'<!,-!
8$5&7=! &,.! 8<!4'<! ,-! %$1'.5,&)/5*HALE?![,%$,;$%=! 4/$&! )$;$%'1! ./5&7)! '%$! ($)3%58$(! 5&!
@3%5*.0%$! ')! G,&$H! 45./,0.! -0%./$%! )*$35-53'.5,&=! ./$! G,&$H! %$-$%)! .,! ./$! G)':$&$))! ,-!
&'.0%$!'&(!8$5&7!45./,0.!;'%5'&3$!,%!(5)'7%$$:$&.HALK?!F/$&!'!)*$35-53'.5,&!5)!'(($(!.,!
G,&$H=! ./$! 0&5.$(! ./5&7)! :0).! 8$! 0&($%).,,(! ')! /';5&7! (5--$%$&.! &'.0%$)AL"?! F/$&! /$!
)*$'+)!,-!&'.0%$!,%!)08).'&3$=!T070).5&$!(,$)!&,.!/';$!'!-5>$(!.$%:5&,1,7<?!]$!0)$)!')!
)<&,&<:)! ./$! .$%:)!natura, essentia! '&(!substantia=!45./,0.!'&<! 5&.$&.5,&!,-!:'+5&7!'!
%57,%,0)!(5).5&3.5,&!8$.4$$&!./$)$!3,&3$*.)?!
S/$&! /$! 5110).%'.$)! ./$! (5).5&3.5,&! 8$.4$$&! unum! '&(! unus spiritus! 45./! .4,!
858153'1! *'))'7$)?!F/$&! Z'01! )'<)! ./'.! G]$! 4/,! 5)! 9,5&$(! .,! ./$! /'%1,.! 8$3,:$)! ,&$!
8,(<H!IN!O,%!EPNEJ=!'33,%(5&7!.,!T070).5&$=!Z'01!'(()!./$!4,%(!corpus!),!')!.,!:'+$!5.!
31$'%! ./'.! ./$<! '%$! &,.! G,&$H=!4/53/!4,01(! 5:*1<! ./$! )':$!&'.0%$! ,%! )08).'&3$?!Unum 
corpus %$&($%)! ./$! 5($'! ./'.! 5.! 5)! G,&$!8,(<!3,:*,)$(!8<!8$5&7! 9,5&$(! .,7$./$%!,-! .4,!
(5--$%$&.!8,(5$)=!:')3015&$!'&(!-$:5&5&$HALL?!T070).5&$!31'5:)!./'.!./$!Z'015&$!;$%)$!./'.!
-,11,4)=!./'.!5)!Qui adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est,!:0).!8$!0&($%).,,(!5&!./$!)':$!
4'<. T7'5&!./$!'*,).1$!(,$)!&,.!)'<!unum=!'&!$>*%$))5,&!%$)$%;$(!,&1<!-,%!./$!0&5,&!,-!
./$! )':$! &'.0%$)=! 8$3'0)$! G./$! )*5%5.! ,-! 6,(! '&(! ./$! )*5%5.! ,-! ./$! /0:'&! 8$5&7! '%$!
(5--$%$&.! 5&!&'.0%$=!80.!8<!8$5&7!9,5&$(!IinhaerendoJ!./$<!8$3,:$!IfitJ!,&$!)*5%5.!,-!.4,!
(5--$%$&.!)*5%5.)=!),!./'.!./$!)*5%5.!,-!6,(!5)!81$))$(!'&(!*$%-$3.!45./,0.!./$!/0:'&!)*5%5.=!




ALE!Trin.!E?B?QP!Secundum essentiam, non secundum relativum?!










6,(2=!unus DeusCRB=! ./0)!:'+5&7! 5.! *1'5&! ./'.! /$! 5)! '((%$))5&7! *,.$&.5'1!T%5'&! %$'($%)=!
4/,!0&($%).,,(! ./$! $>*%$))5,&!unus Deus! ')! %$-$%%5&7! .,! ./$!M'./$%! '1,&$?!S/$!T%5'&)!
4$%$!:$&.5,&$(!'.! ./$!8$75&&5&7!,-!#,,+!iD=! '&(! 5.! 5)! 3$%.'5&! ./'.!T070).5&$!($;$1,*)!
./5)! 5&.$%*%$.'.5,&! /';5&7! ./$:! 5&!:5&(CRQ?! D&! -'3.=!T070).5&$! %$.0%&)! .,! ./$! (5).5&3.5,&!
8$.4$$&!unum! '&(!unus spiritus! 8')$(! ,&! b&! NRPQR! '&(! N!O,%! EPNK! 5&! .4,! ,-! /5)! 1'.$!
4,%+)!(5%$3.$(!'7'5&).!./$!T%5'&!85)/,*!['>5:5&0)=!&':$1<!./$!Conlatio cum Maximino 
episcopo ArianorumCRA! '&(! ./$!Contra Maximinum ArianumCRC. S/$)$! .$>.)! 3,&.'5&! &,!
)57&5-53'&.!3/'&7$)!,-!./$!$>$7$)5)!*%$)$&.$(!5&!./$!De Trinitate. S/$<!,&1<!:'+$!:,%$!
$>*1535.!./$!-'3.!./'.!./$!T%5'&)!(5(!&,.!5&.$%*%$.!(5--$%$&.1<!b&!NRPQR!'&(!N!O,%!EPNK=!'&(!




.<*$! ,-! 0&5,&! $>5).5&7! 45./5&! ./$! S%5&5.<?! T070).5&$2)! 5&.$&.5,&! .,! %$-0.$! ./$! T%5'&!
*,)5.5,&!'1),!$>*1'5&)!4/<!/$!(5)30))$)!./$!0&5.<!,-!$))$&3$!5&!:,%$!($*./=!4/51$!*'<5&7!
&,!*'%.5301'%!'..$&.5,&!.,!./$!0&5,&!8$.4$$&!./$!),01!'&(!6,(?!!





CRQ! D.! /')!8$$&! 31'5:$(! ./'.!T070).5&$2)! %$-$%$&3$)! .,!T%5'&)! 5&!/5)!De Trinitate! '%$!&,./5&7! $1)$! ./'&! '!
15.$%'%<! '%.5-53$?! ],4$;$%! [?! c?! #'%&$)! '&(! W$45)! T<%$)! 3,&;5&35&71<! ($:,&).%'.$(! ./$! '0./$&.53!
*,1$:53'1! (5:$&)5,&!,-! ./$! .%$'.5)$=! )/,45&7! ./'.! ./$!85)/,*!,-!]5**,!4%,.$! '7'5&).! '! )*$35-53!7%,0*!,-!
T%5'&)=!&':$(!],:,5'&)?!@$$!#'%&$)!INLLQJ!N"CVNLCU! INLLLJ!AQVCBU!T<%$)! IBRRRJ!EQVQK?!S/$!],:,5'&!











T*'%.! -%,:!N!O,%!EPNK=!T070).5&$!X0,.$)! ./$!Z)'1:!EBPL! 5&! '! -,%:!4/53/! 5)!0&5X0$! .,!
/5:=! 0)5&7! ./$! ;$%8!agglutinare! 5&).$'(! ,-!adhaerereCR"? T070).5&$! 0)$(! ./5)! *)'1:! ')!
858153'1!)0**,%.!-,%!./$!($;$1,*:$&.!,-!'!:5&,%!80.!&,.!5&)57&5-53'&.!./$:$!5&!/5)!./,07/.=!
./'.!,-!gluten caritatis!IG./$!710$!,-!1,;$HJCRL=!'&(!/$!'1),!'**15$(!5.!.,!./$!),012)!<$'%&5&7!
-,%! 6,(CNR?! S/$! 1').! 858153'1! X0,.'.5,&! 5)! '! -%'7:$&.! ,-! ,&$! ,-! T070).5&$2)! -';,0%5.$!
Z)'1:!.$>.)P!Mihi, autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est!IZ)?!KBPB"J?!k0,.$(!,-.$&!5&!3,&.$>.)!





T7'5&).! ./5)! 8'3+7%,0&(=! 5.! 5)! ,8;5,0)! ./'.! T070).5&$2)! 5&.$%*%$.'.5,&! ,-! N! O,%!
EPNK!4')!)/'*$(!8<!/5)!*,1$:53!45./! ./$!T%5'&)=!4/$%$!/$! ).%,&71<!'--5%:)! ./$!\53$&$!
,%./,(,>!*,)5.5,&!,-!./$!3,&)08).'&.5'15.<!,-!./$!M'./$%!'&(!./$!@,&=!'&(!./$!-'3.!./'.!./$!
S%5&5.<! 5)!unus Deus?!F5./! %$7'%(! .,! ./$!&,.5,&!,-! ./$!0&5,&!,-! ./$! ),01!45./!6,(=! ./$!
*'))'7$)!(5)30))$(!),! -'%! )$$:! .,!3,&.%'(53.! ./,)$! )3/,1'%1<!;5$4)!4/53/!:'5&.'5&! ./'.!
T070).5&$!(5(!&,.!+&,4!./5)!3,&3$*.?!T1./,07/!/$!(,$)!&,.!0)$!15+$!./$!1'.$%!:<).53)!./$!
.$%:!unio! ,%! ./$! 1'&70'7$!,-! 0&5,&=! ./$! &,.5,&!,-! ./$! ),012)! 0&5,&!45./!6,(! 5)! 31$'%1<!
$>*%$))$(!5&!./$)$!*'))'7$)=!8$5&7!.$%:$(!858153'11<!unus spiritus.!T070).5&$!%$-$%)!.,!5.!
')!'!0&5,&!,-!(5--$%$&.!)08).'&3$)=!./0)!3'%$-011<!*%$)$%;5&7!./$!,&.,1,753'1!7'*!8$.4$$&!
./$! /0:'&! &'.0%$! '&(! ./$! (5;5&$! &'.0%$! '&(! 0&($%15&5&7! ./$5%! (5).5&3.5,&! $;$&! 5&! ./$5%!
0&5,&?!]$!($;$1,*$(!./$!(5).5&3.5,&!8$.4$$&!unum!'&(!unus spiritus!&,.!5&!,%($%!.,!1,,+!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






CNN!en. Ps?!AQ?BU!en. Ps.!KB?!QAU!en. Ps.!NRA?Q?!
CNB!en. Ps.!NN"?NE?!
! NRR
5&! '! )<).$:'.53!4'<! '.! ./$! (5--$%$&3$! 8$.4$$&! ./$! .4,! .<*$)! ,-! 0&5,&=! 80.! 5&! ,%($%! .,!
%$-0.$! ./$! T%5'&! /$%$.53'1! 31'5:)! ./'.! ./$! M'./$%! '&(! ./$! @,&! (,! &,.! )/'%$! ./$! )':$!
$))$&3$! '&(! ./'.! ./$<! '%$! &,.! ,&$! 6,(?! S/$%$-,%$=! T070).5&$2)! :'5&! 5&.$%$).! 5&!
$1'8,%'.5&7! ./5)! 5&.$%*%$.'.5,&!4')! .,! ($-5&$! ./$! 5&.$%VS%5&5.'%5'&! %$1'.5,&)/5*)!4/53/! '.!
./'.!.5:$!3,&).5.0.$(!./$!%$'),&!-,%!:'&<!/$%$.53'1!(5;5)5,&)!5&!./$!8,(<!,-!./$!3/0%3/.   
S0%&5&7!,0%!'..$&.5,&!.,!#$%&'%(=!1$.!0)!8$75&!8<!,8)$%;5&7!./'.!N!O,%!EPNK!5)!,&$!
,-!./$!:,).!)57&5-53'&.!858153'1!.$>.)!5&!#$%&'%(2)!:<).53'1!./$,1,7<=!/5)!j)57&'.0%$!.$>.2CNQ!
-,%! ($)3%585&7! ./$! 0&5,&! 8$.4$$&! ./$! /0:'&! ),01! '&(! 6,(?! [<! $>':5&'.5,&! ,-! ./5)!
858153'1! ;$%)$! 3,&-5&$)! 5.)$1-! .,! )$;$%'1! *'))'7$)! -%,:! 4/'.! 5)! 0)0'11<! 3,&)5($%$(!
#$%&'%(2)!:,).! 5:*,%.'&.! .$>.! ,&! 0&5,&=!Sermo super Cantica Canticorum! KN=!4%5..$&!
),:$4/$%$! '%,0&(!NNA".!h>*1'5&5&7!/,4!$'.5&7! 5)! .,!8$!0&($%).,,(! ')! '!:$.'*/,%! -,%!
0&5.5&7!45./!,%!8$5&7!5&!6,(=!#$%&'%(!*'0)$)!5&!,%($%!.,!:'+$!'!3,:*'%'.5;$!(57%$))5,&!
'8,0.!./$!4'<!5&!4/53/!./$!M'./$%!'&(!./$!@,&!'%$!5&!$'3/!,./$%!5&!*$%-$3.!:0.0'15.<?!D&!
./$! )':$!4'<=! ./$! ),01! G4/,)$!7,,(! 5)! .,! 31$';$! .,!6,(H! IZ)!KBPB"J!4511! &,.! 3,&)5($%!
5.)$1-! 0&5.$(! 45./! /5:! 0&1$))! 5.! *$%3$5;$)! ./'.! 5.! 5)! 5&! 6,(! '&(! 6,(! 5&! 5.?! #0.! 15+$!
T070).5&$=! #$%&'%(! 5)! 3'%$-01! .,! 0&($%15&$! ./'.! ./$! 0&5.<! ,-! ./$! M'./$%! '&(! ./$! @,&=!
$>*%$))$(!5&!./$!.$>.!Ego et Pater unum sumus!Ib&!NRPQRJ!5)!&,.!5($&.53'1!45./!./$!0&5,&!




S/$! M'./$%! '&(! ./$! @,&! /';$! ./$! )':$! &'.0%$! ,%! )08).'&3$! '&(! ./$! )':$!4511CNC?! W5+$!
T070).5&$=! #$%&'%(! 5)! &,.! *%$,330*5$(! 45./! (5--$%$&.5'.5&7! 8$.4$$&! natura=! substantia!




/';5&7!,&$!4511! 5.! 5)!*,))581$!.,!%$-$%!.,!./$5%!0&5.<!')!'!0&5.<!,-!4511!Iunitas voluntatisJ!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
CNQ![365&&!INLLAJ!BNQ?!
CNA!SC. KN?LP!Unitas plurium et unius?!
CNC!SC.!KN?"P!Est Patri Filioque natura, essentia voluntas, non modo una sed unum?!
CNE!SC. KN?LP!Non unitione constat, sed exstat aeternitate. !
CNK!SC. KN?KP!Non solum ineffabili sed etiam incomprehensibili modo.!
! NRN
80.! &,.! ')! 0&5.<! ,-! 4511)! Iunitas voluntatumJCN"?! S/$! .$%:! ./'.! ($)57&'.$)! ./5)! 0&5.<! 5)!
unum. W5+$!T070).5&$!4/,!'%70$(!'7'5&).!./$!T%5'&)!./'.!./$!M'./$%!'&(!./$!@,&!5)!unus 
Deus, #$%&'%(!31'5:)!./'.!./%,07/!'&!$>.$&)5,&!,-!:$'&5&7!5.!5)!*,))581$!.,!)'<!./'.!./$!






&,! 3,&-0)5,&!,-! ./$!(5;5&$! '&(! ./$! /0:'&! )08).'&3$CBN?!#$%&'%(!0&($%).'&()! ./$!0&5,&!
8$.4$$&!./$!/0:'&!),01!'&(!6,(!')!./$!*$%-$3.!'7%$$:$&.!,-!./$!4511)CBB=!4/,)$!5&.$&.5,&!





,%! &'.0%$! '&(! 5.! 3'&&,.! 8$! )'5(! ./'.! ./$<! '%$! Y&$=! '18$5.! 5.! :'<! 8$! )'5(! 45./!



















CBE! D&!T070).5&$2)!4%5.5&7)! ./5)! $>*%$))5,&! 5)!:'5&1<!0)$(! 5&! ./$! '81'.5;$! )03/! ')!glutino! ,%!glutine.! @$$!
Trin. NR?"?NNU!en. Ps. EB?NKVN"?! 
! NRB
4$11! 8$! '! %$:5&5)3$&3$! ,-! ./$! 858153'1! .$>.! X0,.$(! 8<!T070).5&$=! ,%=! $;$&! '! ($158$%'.$!
%$*1'3$:$&.!45./!'&!$>*%$))5,&! ./'.!$>*153'.$)! ./$!:$'&5&7!,-! ./$!858153'1! .$>.!'&(! ./'.!
#$%&'%(! :57/.! /';$! 3,&)5($%$(! :,%$! '**%,*%5'.$! -,%! ./$! )*5%5.0'1! $(5-53'.5,&! ,-! /5)!
8%$./%$&!:,&+)?! D&! -'3.=!T070).5&$!/5:)$1-! $>*153'.$)! $>'3.1<! ./$! )':$!858153'1! 15&$!8<!
'%705&7!./'.! ./5)!710$!5)!3/'%5.<!5.)$1-! 5&!/5)!Enarratio in Psalmum 62CBK, '!3,::$&.'%<!
./'.!#$%&'%(!4')!15+$1<!.,!/$'%!$5./$%!%$'(!(0%5&7!./$!15.0%753'1!)$%;53$)!,%!%$'(!(0%5&7!./$!





')! *'.%5).53! )0**,%.! 5&! ./$! '%.5301'.5,&! ,-! /5)! ;5$4! ,-! ./$!:<).53'1! 0&5,&?! h>$7$)5)! '&(!
:<).53'1!./$,1,7<!'%$!31,)$1<!3,&&$3.$(?!!
M5&'11<=! ./$! ./5%(! *)'1:! X0,.$(! 8<!T070).5&$! 5&! /5)! )0335&3.! $&0:$%'.5,&!Mihi, 
autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est!IZ)!KBPB"J!-570%$)!'1),!5&!#$%&'%(2)!.$>.?![53/'$1!O')$<!
,8)$%;$(!./'.!#$%&'%(!%$701'%1<!9,5&$(!N!O,%!EPNK!45./!Z)!KBPB"!'&(!,33')5,&'11<!'(($(!
Z)!EBPL=!'1./,07/!5&!X0,.5&7!./$!1'..$%!/$!%$*1'3$(!./$!;$%8!agglutinare!45./!adhaerere528?!
S/0)=!G'(/$)5,&H!8$3,:$)! ./$! ./$:$!3,&&$3.5&7!'11! ./$)$!858153'1!X0,.'.5,&)?!Z)!KBPB"=!
'*'%.! -%,:!8$5&7!'**15$(=! 15+$!N!O,%!EPNK=! .,! ./$!0&5,&!,-! ./$! ),01!45./!6,(=! )$%;$)! .,!
$:*/')5^$!./$!'3.0'1!$>*$%5$&3$!,-!./$!:<).53'1!0&5,&?!
!
]'**<! 5)! ./5)! 0&5,&! 5-! <,0! $>*$%5$&3$! 5.! Isi experiarisJ=! 80.! 3,:*'%$(!45./! ./$!
,./$%! 5.! 5)! &,.! 0&5,&! '.! '11?! S/$%$! 5)! '! )'<5&7! 8<! ,&$! 4/,! $>*$%5$&3$(! 5.! Ivox 
expertiJP!M,%!:$! 5.! 5)!7,,(! .,!31$';$! .,!6,(!Imihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum 
estJCBL?!
!
S/$! $:*/')5)! ,&! ./$! $>*$%5$&.5'1! (5:$&)5,&! ,-! ./$! :<).53'1! 0&5,&! 5)! ./$! (5).5&3.5;$!
/'11:'%+! ,-! #$%&'%(2)! :<).535):! '&(! 5&! '! 3$%.'5&! 4'<! :'%+)! '! &$4! ($*'%.0%$! 5&! ./$!
/5).,%<!,-!F$).$%&!:<).535):CQR?!T1./,07/!'33,0&.)!,-!:<).53'1!$>*$%5$&3$!4$%$!*%$)$&.!
5&! ./$! W'.5&! *'.%5).53! 15.$%'.0%$! 8$75&&5&7! 45./! ./$! -':,0)! T070).5&5'&! *'))'7$)! -%,:!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





Confessiones! #,,+)! iDD! '&(! Dm=! #$%&'%(! '33$&.0'.$(! :03/! :,%$! ./'&! T070).5&$! ./$!
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It seems that Adolph von Harnack did not exaggerate when he named Bernard 
Augustinus redivivus. From all that has been discussed so far in the previous pages, there 
can be no doubt that Bernard’s mystical thought is deeply inspired by Augustine on many 
levels. The direct quotations deriving from Augustine are scarce indeed, but this does not 
mean that Bernard was not directly acquainted with the works of his predecessor either 
through solitary study or through aural exposure to his texts during the liturgical office. 
Large collections of Augustine’s works were available for Bernard’s perusal both at 
Cîteaux in his first years as a monk and later at Clairvaux during his abbacy. Among the 
patristic authors, it is Augustine that Bernard mentions by name most frequently.   
The scholars who investigated Bernard’s sources normally spoke of a diffuse 
Augustinianism present in his works and limited Bernard’s knowledge of Augustine to 
the homiletic texts read during the liturgy. Although it is still difficult to estimate the 
extent of Bernard’s personal reading of Augustine, as a result of our investigation it is 
safe to claim that Bernard’s interest in Augustine’s texts is fairly broad and cannot be 
reduced to a particular period or to a particular genre. Augustine’s late Pelagian works De 
gratia et libero arbitrio and the De correptione et gratia provide the chief material for 
Bernard’s treatment of grace and free choice. In addition, they provide the terminology 
that helps Bernard to refer to the direct and momentary encounter with God in this life 
and to the human condition after the resurrection as a state of non posse peccare. The De 
Trinitate inspires Bernard’s views on the image and likeness, the primacy of divine love, 
and his understanding of the unitas spiritus. The De civitate Dei offers the ground for 
Bernard’s understanding of the main affectus. Augustine’s commentaries on the Epistle 
of St. John, the Gospel of St. John and Psalms shape Bernard’s themes of the search for 
God and of desiderium. The De doctrina Christiana helps Bernard developing his 
teaching on the ordinatio caritatis. Finally it is most likely as a result of his direct reading 
of the Confessiones that Bernard borrows the important notion of regio dissimilitudinis. It 
is also the reading of this work that made him understand the direct encounter of the soul 
with God as a fleeting moment of happiness, which is nothing else than a foretaste of the 
life after the resurrection. Overall it is because of his dependence on Augustine’s thought 
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that Bernard is cautious to preserve the ontological gap between the human being and 
God in the highest union of the soul with the divine being.  
Apart from this thematic reception of Augustine, Bernard also structures some of 
his treatises on ideas that can be traced back to his predecessor. Thus, Augustine’s 
definition of cupiditas and caritas coupled with the distinction between uti and frui from 
the De doctrina Christiana inspires Bernard’s fourfold division of the stages of love from 
the De diligendo Deo. Augustine’s quadripartite division of the objects of love from the 
same work inspires the structure of Bernard’s treatise De consideratione. Augustine’s 
ideas on the loss of likeness with God as a result of the fall and of the preservation of the 
image of God in the human soul coupled with his understanding of Adam and Christ as 
representing two stages of the human condition posse non peccare and non posse peccare 
are the main structural principles of Bernard’s treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio.   
The examination of key scriptural quotations such as 1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10, Rom 5:5, 
1 Cor 6:17, Ps 62:9 and Ps 72:28 has demonstrated that Bernard does not read the Bible 
without patristic support and in this case without Augustine’s support. Bernard’s 
emphasis on the priority of divine love is not only the result of his reading of the First 
Epistle of St. John, but also of his reliance on Augustine’s exegesis of the quotations 
deriving from this biblical text. In the same way, he develops his view on the unitas 
spiritus primarily on the basis of Augustine’s interpretation of 1 Cor 6:17. 
Gilson’s attempt to pin down Bernard’s rich and elusive mystical thought by 
speaking of the interplay of three doctrinal blocks, allegedly represented by Bernard’s 
main sources, namely the First Epistle of St. John, The Rule of St. Bendict and St. 
Maximus’s doctrine of deification, needs to be dealt with in a circumspect way. It has 
been demonstrated that in reading the First Epistle of St. John Bernard relies on 
Augustine’s interpretation, which particularly emphasizes the priority of divine love. The 
Rule of St. Benedict, undoubtedly an important source for Bernard, does not deal with the 
soul’s search for direct contact with God and cannot account for Bernard’s particular 
interest in the subject. Finally, it is possible that Bernard knew some of Maximus’s texts, 
but one cannot speak of a significant influence of this Greek author on his thought. The 
notion of deification is mentioned once or twice in Bernard and the term might very well 
come from Augustine’s works.  
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In order to seize upon the essence of Bernard’s mystical thought, like Gilson I also 
suggest speaking of the interplay of three “doctrinal” blocks represented, in my opinion, 
by a) his teaching on image and likeness; b) his doctrine on love; c) his view on the direct 
contact of the soul with God (which apart from the bridal imagery is also referred to as 
contemplatio, ecstasis, excessus, visio Dei, unitas spiritus). One main source is 
discernable behind all these doctrinal blocks and that is Augustine. Moreover some 
modern scholars have spoken of an “optimistic” and “dynamic” aspect of Augustine’s 
thought, which is grounded in his doctrine of the image and likeness that has as its 
ultimate goal the direct contemplation of God534. This aspect may be summed up in the 
famous phrase of the Confessiones: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless 
until its rests in you”535. It is the contention of this study that this is the principle that 
inspired Bernard’s mystical theology. Contemplation is the true end of the human being, 
which has been created with the capacity and the tendency for God.  
                                                 
534 Bonner (1987) 1:210. 
535 conf. 1.1.1. 
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Chapter 1: Image and Likeness: The Anthropological Grounds of 
William’s mysticism 
 
In order to understand William’s mysticism, it is not sufficient to examine solely 
the accounts relating the immediate encounter of the human soul with God. William’s 
treatment of the mystical experience is deeply anchored in his anthropology, especially in 
his teaching of the humanity created in the image and likeness of God. In addition, the 
mystical experience cannot be understood in the absence of a discussion of the correct 
way that leads to it. This is the way of love, revealed to the humanity fallen in the regio 
dissimilitudinis through Christ Incarnate. Therefore, before any attempt is made to 
consider William’s treatment of the union of the soul with God, it is necessary to 
scrutinize these two crucial aspects attached to the mystical experience, the image and 
likeness and the love of God. 
William did not deal with the theme of humanity created in the image and 
likeness in a systematic way, in spite of writing, probably during his time at Signy, an 
anthropological treatise, entitled De natura corporis et animae. For this reason, we need 
to collect evidence for his doctrine on image and likeness from passages scattered 
throughout all William’s works. 
 
1. The general notion of image  
 
In his treatment of the notions of imago and similitudo, William follows a 
direction initiated by Augustine in the patristic tradition, which sees a connection 
between the two terms53. While especially in the East, following the example of Irenaeus, 
there was a tendency to differentiate between the two terms, Augustine developed his 
own view on imago and similitudo under the constraints of the Latin language, which 
made it almost impossible for him not to see a link between these two notions54. In 
advancing his understanding of the image and likeness he was not content to argue solely 
                                                 
53 Markus (1964) 126; Sullivan (1963) 11. 
54 Markus (1964) 127. 
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on linguistic grounds, but he verified his arguments against the scriptural text55. However, 
since in the biblical verse of Gn 1:26 the term similitudo is added as if imago was not 
sufficient, Augustine found a solution which complies both with the Latin usage of the 
two terms and with the biblical context. According to Augustine all images are likenesses 
but not all likenesses are images56. This principle makes the likeness the broader term. 
Although William does not feel the need for a re-evaluation of the relation between 
imago and similitudo from a philosophical point of view, he places himself in the 
tradition that can be traced back to Augustine by his choice to understand the likeness of 
the human being with God as a consequence deriving from the quality of image. As with 
Augustine, there cannot be images which at the same time are not also likenesses. 
However, the reverse is not possible, for William sees many likenesses or similarities to 
God in creation which cannot be called images of God57.  
Apart from the linguistic insights and biblical support for his understanding of the 
relation between image and likeness, Augustine also reflected on these two terms in a 
philosophical context, where the key concept was participation. According to Augustine 
the corporeal world is organized after the model of divine ideas which exist in the mind 
of God and as a result of this, there is a necessary likeness to God in every department 
and category of nature that renders this world intelligible58. Everything that exists in the 
universe participates in God in different degrees and therefore each creature is like God 
to a certain extent, but not all of these creatures can be considered images of God.   
Although William does not develop an explicit theology of participation, it has 
been demonstrated that this notion plays a crucial role for the understanding of his views 
on image and likeness59. In his anthropological treatise De natura corporis et animae, 
William makes use of a fourfold participatory ladder following Claudianus Mamertus, 
who in turn was inspired by Augustine: 
 
 
                                                 
55 qu. Deut. 4. 
56 Gn. litt. imp. 16.57. 
57 William counts several such similarities of the soul to God: unity, ubiquity, dignity, royalty, liberty, 
incomprehensibility. 
58 div. qu. 46.2 
59 Bell (1984) 89-98. 
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 Nat. corp. 58:  
 
 
Gratias tamen creatori suo 
non quantas debet sed 
quantas potest totus homo 
referat, qui in ipsis suis 
primordiis omnis creaturae 
ei confert perfectionem, 
omnipotenti virtute dans ei 
esse cum lapidibus, dans ei 
vitam seminalem cum 
herbis et arboribus, dans 
vitam sensualem sive 
animalem cum pecudibus, 
additurus etiam vitam 
rationalem cum angelis 
De statu animae 1.21. 
CSEL 11:71-72: 
 
Gratias ergo si non quantas 
debet, at quantas potest, 
creatori suo totus homo 
referat, qui illi ineffabilis 
benignitatis largitate 
essentiam cum lapidibus, 
vitam seminalem cum 
herbis et arboribus, vitam 
sensualem eamdemque 
animalem cum pecudibus, 
vitam rationalem cum 
angelis dedit 
 civ. Dei. 5.11: 
  
 
qui fecit hominem rationale 
animal ex anima et corpore, 
qui eum peccantem nec 
inpunitum esse permisit nec 
sine misericordia 
dereliquit; qui bonis et 
malis essentiam etiam cum 
lapidibus, vitam seminalem 
etiam cum arboribus, vitam 
sensualem etiam cum 
pecoribus, vitam 




Anything in order to exist must participate in esse, therefore there are vestiges of 
God in all things. But this is the lowest stage of participation corresponding to the stones. 
Vita seminalis designates a higher degree of participation than esse and is characteristic 
of the life of plants. Vita sensualis defines the life of animals while on the highest level 
vita rationalis corresponds to the human beings and represents a more comprehensive 
participation in God. On this ontological ladder everything exists by participation in God, 
and as a consequence of this everything in creation reflects God, and therefore the 
Trinity60. But for Augustine and William it is only the human being alone who 
participates in vita rationalis or intellectualis, and therefore the human being alone can be 
called the image of God. Consequently, the image represents the highest level of 
participation and brings more resemblance with God.  
William also embraced some of the remarks of Gregory of Nyssa in the 
translation of Eriugena on the relation between image, likeness and participation, which 
he probably saw as complementing what he could read on this subject in the West: 
 
For in this, that man is said to be made to the image of God, it is as if it were said 
that God made human nature sharer in every good. For God is the fullness of all 
                                                 
60 Nat. corp. 104: Sicut nihil sine creatore Deo, ipsa scilicet sancta Trinitatate existit, ita nihil omnino esse 
potest, quod non et unum sit et trifarium consistit.  
 119
goods and man is the image of God. Therefore, in that he is capable of the fullness 
of every good, the image is like unto his exemplar61. 
 
Reflecting on the relationship between imago and similitudo, Bernard McGinn has 
pointed out that they refer to slightly different types of participation. Thus, the image 
“emphasizes the essential or original share in the divine nature that makes each human 
person open to God, while the similitude primarily concerns the participative or 
perfecting activity by which we do or we do not resemble God in how we love and act”62.  
There are a few conditions that Augustine has isolated in order to attribute to a 
likeness the status of image: a) as a general rule an image is normally imperfect and 
unequal with its prototype, although there can be some images equal with the prototype63, 
such as Christ64, b) it must exist a relation of origin between the image and the prototype, 
which Augustine calls “generation” or “expression”65, c) there should be no creature 
interposed between the image and the prototype66. William does not discuss these 
conditions from a theoretical point of view but he appears to have known them, since he 
uses them in practice. In his reflections on the notion of image in general William argues 
that the image needs to be different from its prototype, in order not to be identical to the 
prototype67. He has probably encountered this idea reading the Greek authors, Origen and 
Gregory of Nyssa. Augustine does not mention it68. According to the Greek tradition, an 
image must not be like its archetype, because “if the image resembles its archetype it 
would no longer be an image”69. In spite of adopting this eastern idea in his 
understanding of the difference between image and its archetype, William shapes this 
distinction also by introducing the term aequalitas, which is reminiscent of Augustine’s 
innovative treatment of the image, which stands in sharp contrast with that of the 
philosophers, who could have not understood the concept of “equal image”. Augustine 
introduced the term aequalitas in order to distinguish between Christ as the real image of 
                                                 
61 Nat. corp. 86. William quotes almost verbatim Gregory of Nyssa De imagine 17. Cappuyns (1965) 234.   
62 McGinn (1994) 229.  
63 div. qu.  74. 
64 Trin. 6.10.11. 
65 Gn. litt. imp. 16.57. 
66 Trin. 11.5.8. 
67 Nat. corp. 72. 
68 Bell (1984) 100, n. 54. 
69 Lossky (1957) 119. 
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the Father and the human soul70. The latter is also said to be the image of God, although 
very imperfect and remote, or to have been created ad imaginem Dei. Especially in his 
later works, Augustine overcame his fears and began to speak more boldly of the human 
soul as imago Dei71. The term aequalitas helped him in this situation since he claimed 
that only the Son is considered to be the equal image of the Father, while the human soul 
is an unequal image of its creator. William seems to have known this distinction since in 
one of his early treatises he refers to the human being as being created ad imaginem Dei 
and as such being different from Christ who is imago Dei72. In another work he claims 
that the human soul is an image unequal to its prototype73. He continues with what seems 
to be the reason for this inequality: although “the soul has its beginning from God, it is 
not out of him”74. This vague phrase can be understood better in the light of another text 
from the same work, where the same idea is presented in a slightly altered form:   
 
You, rational mind, with your thought and your love are one human being, made 
to the image of your Creator, though not created his equal. You have not been 
begotten, you have been formed75.  
 
In this passage, apart from the term aequalitas, the term genitus is of great significance 
for the distinction between Christ and the soul as images of God. It is a term that 
Augustine also used in his description of Christ as imago genita. Therefore, the human 
soul is not equal with the real image, since it is not begotten (genitus) as the Son is, but 
created (formatus)76. These passages from De natura corporis et animae, do not come 
directly from Augustine, but as the index of the critical edition of this work from Corpus 
Christianorum Latinorum Continuatio Medievalis indicates, they were drawn from 
Claudianus Mamertus. One of the reasons that may have prompted William to follow this 
source was that preparing a work on the body and the soul, he relied on the existent 
works dealing with this subject. Augustine wrote several works on the soul, but nothing 
too systematic, hence the difficulty in adopting a coherent and all-encompassing 
                                                 
70 Trin. 7.6.12. 
71 Markus (1964) 132-135. For more details, see above, p. 43, n. 160. 
72 Nat. am. 34. 
73 Nat. corp. 99. 
74 Nat. corp. 99: quia etsi ab illo coeperit, ex ipso tamen vel de ipso non est 
75 Nat. corp. 102: Tu vero mens rationalis, cogitatio, dilectio tua, unus es homo, ad similitudinem auctoris 
tui factus, non ad aequalitatem creatus, nempe non genitus. Formatus es. 
76 Augustine’s terms are imago genita and imago facta, see qu. Deut. 4. 
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Augustinian view on the soul for the later writers who used his works. However, it is 
recognized that Claudianus Mamertus follows Augustine in his work De statu animae, 
simplifying him77.  
Finally, the last condition indicated by Augustine in order to speak of an image 
consists in the necessity not to have any intermediaries between the image and the 
prototype. In the case of the soul, God alone must be superior to the image. Augustine’s 
terminology concerning this matter, such as nulla natura interiecta78, or nulla interposita 
creatura79 is not to be found in William, but he does mention that the only thing which is 
superior to the mind is God alone80.  
2. The site of the image 
 
Adopting the Augustinian participatory scheme, William is led to the conclusion 
that only the human soul participates in vita rationalis and therefore it is the image of 
God. The rational element distinguishes it from the other creatures on the ontological 
ladder and then it is no surprise that like Augustine81, William does not place the image 
of God in the body, but naturally sees the site of the image in the rational soul (rationalis 
animus)82, or in the spirit (spiritus)83 or in the mind (mens)84. In addition to this, William 
applies to mens the same metaphors like Augustine, referring to it as “the head of the 
soul” (caput animae)85, as well as “the eye of the soul” (oculus animae)86. Basing his 
argumentation on the etymology of mens, which he saw as deriving from memini, 
William identifies mens with memoria, for “what is called mind is ‘that which 
remembers’”87. For William, memoria is one of the privileged places for the presence of 
God88 and this shows again how close he follows Augustine, who in the Confessiones, 
                                                 
77 McGinn (1977) 44. 
78 Trin. 11.5.8. 
79 vera rel. 113; div. qu. 51.4. 
80 Ep. frat. 206. 
81 For the site of the image in Augustine, see above, p. 45, n. 169. 
82 Ep. frat. 208-209. 
83 Sacr. alt. II: Nam et spiritus noster, in quo ad imaginem Dei conditi sumus.  
84 Cant. 22; 64-65. 
85 Nat. am. 20. For Augustine see en. Ps. 3.4. 
86 Spec. 3. For Augustine see sol. 1.6.12; Gn. litt. 12.7.18; Jo. ev. tr. 35.3. 
87 Nat. am. 28: quae cum ideo mens dicatur, quod meminit. 
88 Cant. 55; 64. 
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Book X, was searching for God in his memory89. For both Augustine and William, 
memoria acts as a force driving the soul toward its Creator due to the fact that it carries 
the memory of God90.  
In an article on the Cistercian spirituality of William of St. Thierry, Andrew Louth 
places William in the tradition of intellectualist mysticism as initiated by Augustine, 
because of William’s understanding of mens as the privileged place where the soul meets 
its Creator. In Louth’s opinion, William differs from other Cistercian mystics and 
especially from Bernard, who broke with an intellectualist form of mysticism, to 
inaugurate an affective mysticism claiming that love and feeling unite us with God91. 
While it is entirely correct that William, following Augustine, pays more attention than 
Bernard to the mystical role of mens, the distinction “intellectualist” vs. “affective” 
mysticism is too narrow to do justice to the rich and complex thought of these authors92. 
Thus, in William’s view the function of mens is not restricted to remembering God. As it 
contains in its highest part (principale mentis) the seat of love93, mens represents that 
power of the soul by which the human beings cleave to God94, or the secret place where 
the bride soul is looking for the divine Bridegroom and unites herself with him95.  
 
3. The Image of Trinity 
 
3.1. Memory, Intellect, Will 
 
Augustine contended that the human being was not only the image of the Son 
alone, for being created ad imaginem or only of one God but also of the whole Trinity, 
according to Gn 1:26 which says: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
                                                 
89 For a discussion of Augustine’s views on memory as the place where God dwells, see Gilson (1955) 594. 
90 Nat. am. 5; For Augustine see Trin. 14.15.21. 
91 Louth (1984) 262-270. 
92 For a critique of what is often called Bernard’s “affective” mysticism, see above, pp. 89-91. 
93 Nat. am. 20. 
94 Nat. am. 28: Est enim mens vis quaedam animae, qua Deo inhaeremus et Deo fruimur.  
95 Cant. 64; 188. 
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nostram96. Augustine’s innovative approach to image, understood as an illustration of the 
Trinity, proved to be very influential in the West. 
The Trinitarian aspect of the image is a significant Augustinian element imported 
by William in his teaching. Like Augustine he sees the divine image in the human soul as 
being formed most often from memoria, intellectus and amor97. Since we have seen that 
in certain situations William identified mens with memoria, in some cases the first term 
of the triad is mens98. Sometimes intellectus is replaced with ratio99, intelligentia100, 
cogitatio101 or consilium102, but the terminological variations do not cause dramatic 
changes to his doctrine. Sometimes instead of amor, William uses voluntas103 or 
dilectio104 as the third term of the created trinity. This terminological variation is not 
caused by an attempt to discover which faculties of the soul form a more accurate image 
of God in the soul, as Augustine might have done. The latter started by looking at 
Trinitarian images in the outer human being, then he turned his attention toward the inner 
human being and he advanced from the trinity of faith to mens, notitia sui, amor sui105, 
and later to memoria, intelligentia, voluntas sui106 until memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, 
voluntas Dei107 in his search for a more accurate image of God. There is no trace of such 
a search in William, although he alludes to it in his Expositio super Cantica Canticorum 
where he claims that in this life the soul ascends to God by means of images which 
gradually become closer and more faithful to God108. In this respect, Odo Brooke was 
correct to remark that for Augustine “the created image” was the center of attention, 
whereas for William it was the point of departure for the final resemblance109. However, 
he was not right in assuming that this description of Augustine’s thought as centered 
                                                 
96 Trin. 12.6.7. 
97 Cant. 76; 89; 122. 
98 Nat. corp. 102. 
99 Nat. am. 3. 
100 Ep. frat. 210. 
101 Nat. corp. 102. 
102 Nat. corp. 105. 
103 Ep. frat. 242; 251. 
104 Aenig. 26.  
105 Trin. 9.4.4: Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius, tria quaedam sunt et haec tria unum sunt; et cum 
perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt. 
106 Trin. 14.8.11: Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem; 
nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei. 
107 Trin. 15.20.39. 
108 Cant. 22. 
109 Brooke (1959) 97. 
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round the Trinity in creation can be generalized and that it can be applied in an absolute 
way to the entire Augustinian doctrine of image. Even in De Trinitate, to which Brooke’s 
observation refers in particular, one can find abundant evidence for the restoration of the 
image and likeness which underlines the dynamic tendency of the image towards the 
Trinity110. Mary T. Clark commenting in general on the De Trinitate, pointed out 
extremely accurately that: “Although Augustine seeks the image of God in the human 
person as an analogy of the divine processions, he cannot forget what scripture has 
revealed of the historical course of the human image from its beauty and defacement in 
Adam to its renovation through the grace of Christ. These discussions are not 
digressions”111. 
In addition to the material available in Augustine’s doctrinal treatise there is 
plenty of evidence for the historical evolution of the image in Augustine’s preaching or 
other spiritual writings. William does not follow Augustine in his search for a better 
image of Trinity in the human soul, because that was a direction that helped Augustine to 
formulate his doctrinal position on the Trinitarian image. William accepts without 
bringing into question the results of Augustine’s search for a Trinitarian image in the 
human soul. Since he was addressing a monastic audience who was familiar with the 
elements of Christian doctrine he did probably not need to argue why the image consists 
of memory, intellect and love. Their theological education would have taught them that 
already. William did, however, write for the spiritual edification of his brethren monks 
and for a community concerned with Christian perfection and it is highly likely that this 
aim made him select among Augustine’s two aspects of the doctrine of the image, i.e. the 
search for traces of the Trinity in the soul and the restoration of the Image, the latter 
aspect which accentuates the goal of the image and likeness in God. 
Returning to our analysis of the way the two authors dealt with the Trinitarian 
image it is important to notice that Augustine emphasizes the inadequacy of even the best 
created image to represent the simple and eternal triune God. Augustine looked into the 
human person to “show that there are three things which can both be separately presented 
                                                 
110 Sullivan (1963) 17-25 highlighted the dynamic aspect of Augustine’s notion of image. McGinn (1994) 
230-231 remarks that the dynamism of Augustine’s views on image and likeness is particularly manifest in 
his presentation of the Trinitarian anagogies from the last book of De Trinitate. For a critique of Brooke’s 
claims see Bell (1984) 102, n. 67.  
111 Clark (2001) 97. 
 125
and also operate inseparably”112. While indicating memory, intellect and will as the three 
activities of the soul that fulfill this condition, which also defines the way in which the 
three persons of the Trinity are interrelated, Augustine warns against a direct association 
between the terms of the created image and the Persons of the divine Trinity: “I do not 
say the Father is memory, the Son is intellect, the Spirit is will; I do not say it- understand 
it as you will- I do not venture to assert it”113. The reason why Augustine is reluctant to 
make such straightforward associations is that they might suggest that what corresponds 
to one divine person does not correspond to another, thus damaging the principle of 
Trinity114. Augustine conceives all these three factors as something that all the divine 
Persons possess, so that what can be said of one can be applied to the other two. 
However, after insisting on this commune share of the three factors, he concedes that it is 
not incorrect to say that The Holy Spirit principaliter or proprie corresponds to love and 
so on115.  
William has no such hesitations in his dealing with the Trinitarian image. Already 
in his early treatise on love, he does exactly what Augustine seemed reluctant to do: 
associating directly the persons of the divine Trinity and the factors of the created image. 
The memory that corresponds to the Father begets reason “immediately and without 
delay”116, then the will proceeds from both memory and reason. The relations between 
the three members of the created image are described in the same language that is 
characteristic of the relations between the divine Persons. Memory, reason and will “are 
one yet effectively three, just as in the supreme trinity there is one substance and three 
persons”117. William is more preoccupied with emphasising that the Trinitarian image 
enables the human soul to ascend to a union with God because of the capacity of the 
image “to act as a means toward union with the Trinity”118. However, one must not 
                                                 
112 s. 52.10.23: …ostendimus tria quaedam separabiliter demonstrari, inseparabiliter operari. 
113 s. 52.10.23: Non dico, Pater memoria est, Filius intellectus est, Spiritus voluntas est: non dico, quomodo 
libet intellegatur, non audeo. 
114 Bell (1984) 105. 
115 Trin. 15.13.22- 19.37. 
116 Nat. am. 3. 
117 Nat. am. 3: Et haec tria unum quiddam sunt, sed tres efficaciae; sicut in illa summa Trinitate una est 
substantia, tres personae. 
118 Brooke (1959) 89. 
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believe that the human soul can adhere to God by its own powers, the initiative lies with 
God:   
In order for the rational soul created in the human person to adhere to God, the 
Father claims memory to himself, the Son the reason and the Holy Spirit, who 
proceeds from both, claims the will proceeding from both119.  
 
In his anthropological treatise De natura corporis et animae, William summarises 
Augustine’s doctrine of the presence of the triune God in creation. He progresses from 
the traces of Trinity, “since nothing can be which is not both one and threefold”, to the 
Trinitarian image in the body, or what Augustine would call the “outer man”, formed by 
measure, number and weight, and finally he arrives at the soul which subsists in memory, 
deliberation and will120. This outline of the Augustinian pattern just as the theme of the 
image imprint that follows comes to William through a different source, Claudianus 
Mamertus121. Dom Déchanet122 and Odo Brooke123 attributed the theme of the image 
imprint to the Greek Fathers and indicated Gregory of Nyssa through Eriugena’s 
translation as the source of this idea in William. Although William could not have 
remained unaffected by his reading of Gregory of Nyssa, through Eriugena’s translation, 
a closer look at the text where this idea appears may point to other sources too. As it was 
already noticed, Claudianus Mamertus, whom William follows in these lines, suffered the 
heavy Augustinian influence124. The whole passage pulsates with Augustine’s ideas: the 
traces of the trinity in creation, a Trinitarian image in the outer man, the image of the 
Trinity in the inner person. The theme of the image imprint itself is expressed in pure 
Augustinian fashion, caritatis pondere impresseris125. It is true that Augustine does not 
mention the image as imprint, but there is a line in the De Trinitate, which refers to the 
likeness as being impressed by God in the human person: “For the true honor of the 
human being is to be the image and likeness of God, which likeness is preserved only by 
                                                 
119 Nat. am. 3. 
120 Nat. corp. 104 -105. 
121 Claudianus Mamertus De statu animae 2.6. CSEL 11:119. 
122 Déchanet (1940) 15. 
123 Brooke (1959) 89, n. 16. 
124 See above, p. 121, n. 77. 
125 conf. 13.9.10: pondus meum amor meus; civ. Dei 9.16 : pondus voluntatis et amoris.  
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relation to Him from whom it is imprinted”126. Although I anticipate the discussion on 
likeness it worth mentioning that for William, the borders between the image and likeness 
blur as his terminology attached to these terms appears to be confused. Thus, Augustine 
speaks only about a likeness of beasts (similitudo pecorum), whereas William also 
employs the expressions imago pecudalis or bestialis as well as imago pecudum127. At the 
same time he applies the consecrated imagery to likeness as well when saying per omnia 
bestiae et pecudi similis128. 
While in this summary of Augustine’s teaching William is content to follow the 
account of Claudianus Mamertus, he speaks with his own voice when he reflects on the 
relation between the created image and its prototype:  
 
As the soul contemplates all these things by discernment, it is no longer delighted 
in its own beauty alone, but also in the Form that gives form. By contemplation of 
that Form it becomes more beautiful; for to aim at that Form is to be formed. 
Whatever is drawn toward God is not its own, but his by whom it is drawn129.   
 
There is an element of passivity existent in this relation between the soul and God. The 
soul is the object of formation, it is “affected” by God, meaning etymologically that it is 
stricken, wounded, united with God. William uses here the untranslatable verb affici, 
which expresses both the idea of union and the idea of blow or wounding130. It is 
according to this principle that the soul is joined to the Trinity and it was possible to see 
this principle at work in William’s first treatise on love, where the Father claims the 
memory for himself, the Son the reason and the Holy Spirit the will. In spite of his all-
encompassing notion of grace it is difficult to find a passage where Augustine speaks 
emphatically of the soul’s passivity in its encounter with God; however the prayer that 
concludes the De Trinitate implies that the help comes from the divinity: “May I 
remember you, understand you and love you. Increase these gifts in me until you have 
                                                 
126 Trin. 12.11.16: Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo dei quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum 
a quo imprimitur. 
127 Nat. corp. 74. 
128 Nat. corp. 119. 
129 Nat. corp. 105-106. 
130 McGinn (1977) 147, n. 33.  
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reformed me completely”131. And Augustine insists that the image must not be concerned 
with itself, that it must not have as finality to remember itself, understand itself and love 
itself, since this is foolishness.  Its wisdom and its only goal must be to remember God, to 
understand God and to love God132.   
Along these lines, there is without doubt in both authors a dynamic aspect of the 
image whose natural tendency is to return to its exemplar. William states that by the 
divine image present in the summit of the mind, the human beings were created to be like 
God: 
For to this end alone were we created and do we live, to be like God, for we were 
created in his image133.   
 
The same idea is expressed in the Meditativae orationes: 
 
We were created for you and to you is our return134.  
 
As Odo Brooke has observed135 the concept of image in William is less philosophical and 
essentially historical, being usually placed in a context that recounts the history of the 
soul from creation through the fall to redemption. The human being was created in the 
image and likeness so that “by this image…had he chosen to do so, might have adhered 
indissolubly to God, his creator, as like reverts to like”136. However through sin the 
human beings lost the natural endowment that enabled him to return to his creator and 
saw himself separated from God, exiled in the region of unlikeness: 
 
Created in the image and likeness of the Creator, through sin we fell from God 
into ourselves, below ourselves into such an abyss of unlikeness that there was no 
hope137.  
 
The sin that expelled the human being from paradise was caused by an inordinate desire 
for the Image and Likeness itself138, says William. In other words, the human being 
                                                 
131 Trin. 15.28.51: Meminerim tui, intellegam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec me reformes ad 
integrum .  
132 Trin. 14.12.15. 
133 Ep. frat. 259: Propter hoc enim solum et creati sumus et vivimus, ut Deo similes simus. Ad imaginem 
enim Dei creati sumus. 
134 Med. 1.3: Ad te creati sumus et ad te conversio nostra. 
135 Brooke (1959) 91. 
136 Nat. am. 3. 
137 Cant. 83: Conditi sane ad imaginem et similitudinem Creatoris, cecideramus a Deo in nos per 
peccatum, et a nobis infra nos, in tantum profundum dissimilitudinis ut nulla spes esset. 
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aspired proudly to the status of god reserved only for the perfect Image and Likeness. The 
consequence of this sin was the fall without hope into the region of unlikeness, from 
where the human being cannot return to God relying on his own powers. The only way 
out from misery is through Christ, the Son of God who in order to redeem the humanity 
became a human being himself, showing thus that the way back to God is through 
humility. William discusses at length the role of Christ as the mediator between God and 
the human person:  
 
So the Son of God girded himself in this certain way and drew near through 
humility to save him who was to be saved and has perished through pride. Making 
himself the medium between God and man, he who came from God was seized 
and bound by the devil and in this way he put on the person and deed of the good 
mediator. He was made man139. 
 
There is no other way for the restoration of the destroyed image and the recovery of the 
lost image than the one indicated by the perfect Image and Likeness itself, that is by 
following Christ.  
Augustine also was very fond of connecting the redemption scenario with the 
theme of image and likeness as it follows from Book XII of the De Trinitate, where 
exactly the same stages of the history of the soul are delineated: the creation of the human 
being in the image and likeness in paradise. His proud aspiration to be like God and the 
Fall “into himself”, his inability to return to God except by the grace of God through 
Jesus Christ140. In both authors we notice the emphasis on the role of Christ in the 
restoration of the image and the recovery of the likeness.  
 
3.2. Faith, Hope, Charity 
 
William differs from Augustine, however, when he suggests that the three 
theological virtues, faith, hope and love can form also an image of the divine Trinity. 
Augustine has denied in his De Trinitate the status of image to the trinity of faith, which 
he found in the inner man. His main concern was that faith had a temporary nature141, 
whereas the created trinity he struggled to discover was supposed to have permanent 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 Nat. am. 34. 
139 Nat. am. 35. 
140 Trin. 12.11.16. 
141 Trin. 14.2.4. 
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roots in the human being. William seems to ignore Augustine’s position on this point 
from De Trinitate and in his formulation of the doctrine of the created image that consists 
of faith, hope and love presented in the Speculum fidei, he rather relies on an early 
Augustinian text, the Soliloquies.   
In this early text142, Augustine speaks of three distinct conditions that the soul 
needs to meet in order to see God: to have eyes (habere oculos), to look (aspicere) and to 
see (videre). Moreover, in order to see, the soul needs sound eyes, which according to 
Augustine are healed with the help of faith, hope and charity. Once it has sound eyes, the 
reason helps the soul to look. As not everyone who looks, also automatically sees, it is 
virtue, identical with perfect reason, that is needed for the soul’s vision of God. During 
this life all three theological virtues are indispensable in order that the soul might see 
God. However, in the life to come, faith and hope are no longer necessary and charity 
alone will persist and will grow greater and greater.  
In his treatise Speculum fidei, William uses the entire passage on the soul’s vision 
of God from the Soliloquies143 with minimal modifications, but he focuses especially on 
the theological virtues, claiming that in creating the human being ad imaginem et 
similitudinem Dei, God placed the trinity formed by faith, hope and charity in the mind of 
the faithful subject as a means for his salvation144. In contrast with Augustine who sees 
faith and hope as transient virtues of the soul, William considers that when the soul is 
able to see God “faith and hope will not disappear completely but they will be 
transformed into their own object, so that what is believed will be seen and what is hoped 
will be possessed”145. By adopting this position, William still supports Augustine’s idea 
that the image must be found exclusively in eternal things.  
William’s choice of the theological virtues as an illustration of the image of God 
in the human being and his special emphasis on faith in his treatise Speculum Fidei, can 
be also seen in the context of his fight against the new directions in theology initiated by 
Abelard, which celebrated reason to the detriment of faith. The selection of this passage 
from Augustine’s early work, the Soliloquies, and its alteration to serve his own purposes 
                                                 
142 sol. 1.6.12-7.14. 
143 See especially Spec. 3-4. 
144 Spec. 1. 
145 Spec. 2: Nec tamen fides et spes peribunt, sed in res suas transibunt, cum quod credebatur videbitur, 
habebitur quod sperabatur. 
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might have been dictated by William’s concern to rely on one of the most respected 
authorities of the Church in the answer he gives to his adversary. 
4. Likeness 
 
It has been observed that Augustine employs solely the concept of similitudo 
without mentioning imago very frequently, in order to refer to the growing resemblance 
of the human being to God146. Having preserved the image of God after Adam’s fall the 
human being retains also the capacity of becoming like God: “he approaches him [i.e 
God] by a sort of likeness. For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by 
likeness, and withdrawal from him is by unlikeness”147. This quotation embodies the 
essence of Augustine’s teaching on likeness and this idea is abundantly present in his 
writings being expressed in various ways.  
William seems to have been very fond of this idea, which recurs in his writings 
relatively frequently like in the following passage, which is inspired by Augustine’s De 
civitate Dei and which, highly likely, was reproduced from memory148: 
 
Exp. Rom. 1.1.18: 
In tantum enim a Deo longe efficimur, 
quantum dissimiles. In quantum ei similes 
efficimur, in tantum propinquamus. 
civ. Dei 9.17: 
Si ergo deo quanto similior, tanto fit 
quisque propinquior; nulla est ab illo 
longinitas quam eius dissimilitudo. 
 
William also echoes Augustine’s famous claims that it is not through space that we 
approach nearer to God but by love149. The following chapter will explore in detail 
William’s development of this Augustinian principle. 
While in general William’s view on likeness coincides with that of Augustine, it 
is possible to see his own contribution to the development of this concept in his late work, 
Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei. William describes three progressive stages of likeness. 
At the lowest level he places a natural likeness, as a result of the presence of God in 
                                                 
146 Sullivan (1963) 12. 
147 Trin. 7.6.12: sed quadam similitudine accedit. Non enim locorum interuallis sed similitudine acceditur 
ad deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo.   
148 Cartwright (2003) 39. 
149 Nat. corp. 99: Intelligensque de se quia etsi non movetur per locum, movetur tamen per affectum. For 
Augustine’s view on how the soul moves towards God by means of affectus, see below, p. 141, n. 199. 
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everything that exists. This likeness is lost only with the life itself and since it is neither 
from will nor effort, but received in a natural way, the human being has no merit for it150. 
At this level there are several similarities or analogies151 to God which can be found in 
man as a consequence of his natural participation in God. D. Bell has noticed that 
William was interested in seven such similarities: unity, ubiquity, royalty, dignity, 
stability, liberty and incomprehensibility152. Gregory of Nyssa as well discussed such 
similarities in some passages from the treatise on soul153, which William follows in the 
translation of Eriugena. For our purposes, we will just look at ubiquity and 
incomprehensibility, since it is mainly here that William follows Augustine. 
“Ubiquity” is the resemblance of the soul to God, which is present in the body in 
the same way in which God is present in the world154. Déchanet155 and following him, 
Saword156 attributed this resemblance between God and the soul to the influence of 
Gregory of Nyssa on William. However, the terms used by the abbot are almost the same 
terms that Augustine uses frequently in his attempts to describe God: ubique totus and 
ubique praesens. Although I was unable to find these terms together in William’s texts, 
he does employ similar terms such as ubique existens and ubique totus157, or ubique 
locorum and ubique totus158 and, as an Augustinian reminiscence, William groups them 
stylistically in pairs opened each time by ubique. He goes beyond Augustine in the 
analogy between the ubiquity of God in the world and the ubiquity of the soul in the 
body. However, this analogy can be considered merely a logical extension of his 
reasoning and confirmed by his reading of Gregory of Nyssa.  
                                                 
150 Ep. frat. 260. 
151 Déchanet (1940) 36 has used the term “analogy” for referring to these similarities which are a 
consequence of the natural likeness. 
152 Bell (1984) 119. 
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toto corpore suo sit et ubique totus sit, licet ratio humana non comprehendat modum quo id fiat 
155 Déchanet (1940) 42. 
156 Saword (1976) 267-303. 
157 Nat. corp. 27. 
158 Sacr. alt. II. 
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“Incomprehensibility” is the similarity of the soul to God which states that since 
God is unknowable, the human being who is the image of God, is unknowable to himself. 
Augustine said something similar when he observed that the mind cannot understand 
itself, because it is the image of God159. Déchanet, like always, points only to Gregory of 
Nyssa, and this time he has textual support, for William copies a whole passage from the 
Greek writer referring to this subject160. However, in all the passages analyzed so far and 
which were attributed to the Greek writer, William never takes from Gregory something 
which is not also present in Augustine. 
At a higher level, William speaks of another likeness, which is closer to God since 
it is due to the human’s free will and it consists in the life of virtue161. It is here that the 
human being makes most progress in the restoration of the image and the recovery of the 
lost likeness. It is at this level that he approaches nearer to God, he becomes more like 
him and experiences the divine nature to a higher and higher degree.  
Finally, the higher level is reserved for a likeness which is so close in its 
resemblance to God that it is called unitas spiritus162. At this level of union with God, the 
soul is submitting its will entirely to the divine will, not only by willing the same thing as 
God, but by being unable to will anything else. In William’s opinion, this likeness is 
nothing else than perfection: 
 
Resemblance to God is the whole of the human being’s perfection. To refuse to be 
perfect is to be at fault. Therefore the will must always be fostered with this 
perfection in view and love made ready. The will must be prevented from 
dissipating itself on foreign objects, love preserved from defilement. For to this 
alone were we created and do we live, to be like God; for we were created in his 
image163.  
 
This paragraph sums up William’s entire spiritual doctrine: created in the image of God, 
the human being was created with one purpose, to be like God. It is wrong to refuse 
perfection, because in this way the human being reiterates Adam’s sin. However, 
following Christ who offered to humanity the example of a life of disciplined will and 
                                                 
159 symb. cat.  2: Ideo mens ipsa non potest comprehendi nec a se ipsa, ubi est imago dei 
160 Nat. corp. 72-73; Gregory of Nyssa De imagine 11. Cappuyns (1965) 221. 
161 Ep. frat. 261. 
162 Ep. frat. 262. 
163 Ep. frat. 259. 
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ordered love the human being restores the image and his likeness to God which grows 
greater and greater to attain the perfection for which he was created. Although the perfect 
likeness is not reserved for the earthly existence, the recovery of the lost likeness has to 
begin in this life: 
 
That likeness is in the interior human person by means of which the human person 
is renewed from day to day in the recognition of God according to the image of 
him who created him. And the more we make progress towards his recognition 
the more we are made more similar to him; and the more we are made more 
similar to him by recognizing and loving him, the more we see him in closer 
vicinity and familiarity164. 
 
Following Augustine, whom William quotes almost verbatim, the likeness is placed not 
in the body but in the inner person, where the resemblance fosters the gradual renovation 
of the soul according to the Image of God. The growth in likeness occurs by means of 
love and knowledge and the goal of the renovation is the vision of God “face to face”.  
Therefore, likeness means both perfection and vision since as William claims quoting 
Augustine more we are like God more we see. Like Augustine, in support of this 
affirmation, William quotes as a scriptural warrant a text from the First Epistle of St. 
John: “We will be like him because we will see him as he is (Similes ei erimus quoniam 
videbimus eum sicuti est 1 Jn 3:2). The canonical interpretation of this text was 
established by Augustine and William adopts it without any changes.  
As with Augustine, for William also to see (videre) is to know (cognoscere, 
intelligere) and the perfect “likeness with God” and “the vision of God” also become 
synonymous with “knowledge of God”:  
 
There [i.e. in heaven] to be like God will be to see God or to know him. He who 
will know him or see him will know or see him as he will be like him, and to the 
extent that he will be like him to that degree he will know him or see him. For 
there, to see or know God is to be similar to God, and to be like him is to see or 
know him165. 
 
                                                 
164 Aenig. 6 quotes almost verbatim a long passage from Augustine’s ep. 92.3. 
165  Spec. 107.  
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William proves his originality when he compares the vision between the Father and the 
Son with the vision that is accessible to the human being in heaven, or as the passage 
seems to imply in an ecstatic experience:  
 
There, just as in the Trinity, which is God, the Father and the Son mutually see 
one another and their mutual vision consists in their being one and in the fact that 
the one is what the other is; so those who have been predestined for this and have 
been taken up into it will see God as he is and in seeing him as he is they will 
become like him. And there, as in the Father and the Son, that which is vision is 
also unity; so in God and the human being that which is vision will be the likeness 
that is to come. The Holy Spirit, the unity of the Father and the Son, is himself the 
love and likeness of God and the human person166.  
   
Whereas the mutual vision of the Father and the Son is identified with unity in God, in 
the human being the vision is identified with likeness. This difference might have 
originated from his concern to maintain an ontological gap between the Trinity and the 
created image. William’s most important observation is that the unity of the Father and 
the Son is the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit is also the love and likeness of God and the 
human being. In making this distinction, William seems also to imply that there is a 
difference between the Holy Spirit who is a Person of the divine Trinity and who acts as 
the bond of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit that operates as love and likeness 
in the human beings during the ecstatic experience. These aspects will be considered in a 
future chapter, but it has to be mentioned nevertheless that in these passages William’s 
force and depth of his mystical thought is to be found.  
Likeness is not only vision or knowledge but also fruition as William mentions 
several times throughout his Expositio super Cantica Canticorum. Thus, in the opening 
paragraph of his commentary, William claims that “no one who contemplates you reaches 
fruition of you save insofar as he becomes like you”167. And in another paragraph he 
explains again that to be the image and likeness of God supposes to reach fruition by 
means of love and knowledge: 
 
                                                 
166 Aenig.  6. 
167 Cant. 1: quem nemo usque ad fruendum contemplator, nisi in quantum similis tibi efficitur. 
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The human being was created to the image of God for this purpose, that, devoutly 
mindful of God in order to understand him, humbly understanding him in order to 
love him, and loving him with ardor and wisdom until he attains to possession and 
fruition of him, he might be a rational animal. For this is to fear God and keep his 
commandments, which is the whole of the human being’s duty. And this is the 
image and likeness of God in the human person168.    
 
According to Augustine frui means “to cling to something by means of love for its own 
sake” (frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam)169. Frui or the 
enjoyment is reserved for God alone, while all the other created realities are not to be 
enjoyed, but only used (utuntur) for the sake of God170. Relying on Augustine’s definition 
of frui as the love of God for his own sake, William applied this term to the highest level 
of the human love for God, the one that does not seek reward and coincides with perfect 
likeness and perfect vision of God.  
  In conclusion, William demonstrates to have a broader knowledge of Augustine’s 
views on image and likeness than his friend Bernard. He used Augustine both directly 
and through intermediary sources, such as Claudianus Mamertus. He also made efforts to 
incorporate the views of Greek patristic authors, such as Gregory of Nyssa, which were 
intended to blend harmoniously with the predominant Latin sources that helped him to 
elaborate this subject. One of the fundamental aspects of William’s anthropology is his 
appropriation of Augustine’s view with regard to the image of God as being formed of 
memory, intellect and will. Unlike Augustine, however, William manifested no particular 
interest in pursuing a more adequate image of God in the soul. Following Augustine’s 
example from Book XV of the De Trinitate, he focused especially on the dynamic aspects 
of the image since they matched his contemplative goals. While William’s treatment of 
the notion of similitudo presents original aspects, he continues to follow Augustine when 
he claims that the soul approaches God by likeness, or when he considers that the highest 
likeness corresponds to perfect vision and perfect love.  
                                                 
168 Cant. 88.  
169 doc. Chr. 1.4.4. 
170 There is a large bibliography dealing with the Augustinian distinction uti/frui. For a detailed 
bibliography on this subject see Canning (1999) 861. 
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Chapter 2: Love 
 
William was preoccupied with reflecting on the role of love in the ascent of the 
soul to God at an early stage of his career171. While his first work De contemplando Deo 
deals with the highest stage of the spiritual journey, namely the experience of God, De 
natura et dignitate amoris, widely recognized as his next work172, is looking particularly 
at love as the main element of the spiritual ascent, investigating its origin, its stages and 
its goal. The ideas outlined in the early De natura et dignitate amoris will be developed 
later throughout his writings and the basic elements of William’s teaching on love will 
not undergo considerable changes throughout his career. One of the fundamental ideas of 
Augustinian origin which will accompany William in articulating his spirituality is that 
the transition from the potentiality of the image of God, preserved in the human soul even 
after the fall, to the restoration of the likeness, lost by the fallen soul, is realized by means 
of love.  
As we have looked at William’s understanding of image and likeness in the 
previous chapter, it is time now to turn our attention to the role of love in the restoration 
of likeness. This section is not intended as an integral exposition of William’s theology of 
love, but as an outline of his use of Augustine’s ideas on the same subject and as a 
reflection on the way in which he uses the material provided by his predecessor.  
A good starting point for our discussion is offered by the numerous and various 
definitions of love we encounter throughout William’s works. These definitions, far from 
being exhaustive, accentuate different complementary aspects of the same concept. Thus, 
we will follow William in his description of love as will (voluntas), weight (pondus), 
movement (motus), affect (affectus), sense (sensus), and intellect (intellectus). A special 
                                                 
171 William’s treatise on love, De natura et dignitate amoris, was probably written around 1120, preceding 
by several years Bernard’s treatise discussing the same subject and which could have been written the 
earliest around 1125. 
172 Although this order of William’s earliest treatises is in theory accepted by the majority of the scholars, 
there are some voices who contest the primacy of De contemplando Deo and who claim that De natura et 
dignitate amoris is William’s first work. Rozanne Elder is one of the supporters of this latter view and her 
main argument is content based, pointing to the fact that the treatise on love presents the spiritual itinerary 
that leads to the mystical experience and that it is logically followed by the treatise on contemplation which 
discusses the experience of God. See Elder (1976b) 89, n. 22. 
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place will be reserved for the discussion of love as God and particularly of love as the 
Holy Spirit.  
 
1. Love as voluntas 
 
Following Augustine173, William considers love a kind of will. Most frequently he 
will define it as a vehement will (vehemens voluntas174), occasionally he will refer to it as 
a well-ordered will (bene ordinata voluntas175) or a good will (bona voluntas176). The will 
or the good will is considered to be the beginning of love177. In certain occasions William 
feels the need for a more precise terminology and then he develops distinctions such as 
that between amor and desiderium178. The former is defined as good will (bona voluntas) 
the latter is defined as vehement will (vehemens voluntas). Furthermore, amor refers to an 
object which is present, while desiderium is directed towards an absent object (ad 
absentem). Understanding the desire as an experience of absence, William like Bernard179 
is in perfect agreement with Augustine’s definition: desiderium est rerum absentium 
concupiscentia180.  
 
2. Love as pondus 
 
It is relatively simple to discern Augustine also behind William’s definition of 
love as weight (pondus). In a famous passage from the Confessiones181, Augustine 
observes that each body by its weight moves towards its proper place in order to find rest, 
                                                 
173 Trin. 15.20.38: quid est aliud caritas quam voluntas ; Trin. 15.21.41: voluntatem nostram, vel amorem 
seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas. 
174 Contemp. 11: Nichil enim est amor quam vehemens (…) voluntas ; Med. 12.20: Sola quidem vehemens 
voluntas a diffinientibus amor diffiniri solet; Spec. 19: Amor siquidem vehemens voluntas.   
175 Contemp. 11. 
176 Cant. 76. 
177 Spec. 19: Voluntas siquidem initium amoris est; Cant. 76: Sed bona voluntas, iam initium amoris est. 
178 Cant. 76. 
179  Dil. 7.19; see above, p. 56, n. 246 and p. 74. 
180 en. Ps. 118.8.4. 
181 conf. 13.9.10: Amor meus pondus meum. The comparison occurs also in Gn. litt. 4.4.8; civ. Dei 11.28; 
13.18; ep. 55.10.18; ep. 157.2.9; mus. 6.11.29. For a survey of amor-pondus in Augustine’s works, see 
O’Donnell (1992) 3:356-359.  
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since things which are not in their intended position are restless. They find their rest only 
when they find their proper place. The weight of a body determines its movement which 
can be downwards as in the case of the stone, or upwards as with fire. Augustine names 
love his weight and observes that by the love of God he is carried upwards towards the 
house of God. The house of God is his proper destination and there he will be at rest.  
The same ideas are to be found in the opening paragraphs of William’s early 
treatise De natura et dignitate amoris, where he considers love as being a power of the 
soul directing it by a natural weight to its proper place182. Like Augustine, William 
considers that every creature has both a place towards which it tends and a weight that 
leads it there. In the case of the human being, the locus for the body is the earth from 
where it was created, while the locus of the soul is God who created it. Therefore the 
body moves downwards toward the earth and the soul moves upwards toward God. But 
not always is the soul able to return to its destination, although by its natural gravity it is 
inclined to do so. The fallen soul, corrupted by sin does not know how to return to God in 
spite of the natural weight of love implanted in the human soul by God as the “author of 
Nature”183. After the fall, the soul is in need of a redeemer and of a teacher184.  
 
3. Love as motus 
 
In the Augustinian tradition both the will and the love are defined as movements 
of the soul (motus animi)185 and it is highly likely that William was familiar with these 
definitions186. However, his definition of love as motus, does not follow directly 
Augustine but an intermediary source, namely, John Scotus Eriugena187. Most likely 
Eriugena’s work De divisione naturae, where the text on love as motus occurs, was not 
read by William in its entirety. More plausibly, David Bell suggests the possibility that 
William encountered the definition of love in one of the Erigenian florilegia circulating in 
                                                 
182 Nat. am. 1: Est quippe amor vis animae naturali quodam pondere ferens eam in locum vel finem suum. 
183 Nat. am. 2. 
184 Nat. am. 2. 
185 doc. Chr. 3.10.16: Caritatem voco motus animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo 
propter Deum. See also civ. Dei 14.6. 
186 See below the section on affectus. 
187 Eriugena, De divisione naturae 1.74. Sheldon-Williams (1968) 210: Amor est naturalis motus omnium 
rerum, quae in motu sunt, finis quietaque statio, ultra quam nullus creaturae progreditur motus.   
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the twelfth century. He indicates two florilegia containing this text, which might have 
been available for use to William188. The latter echoes Eriugena in speaking of love not 
only as movement, but also as a quiet abiding (quieta statio) and as an end (finis)189. The 
last two elements can also be traced back to Augustine who repeatedly speaks of love as 
finis and as a state where one can find rest190. 
 
4. Love as affectus 
 
William also speaks of love as affectus191, a term semantically so rich that it is 
difficult to find a single word in modern languages able to render all its meanings. It 
derives from the verb afficere which means “to make an impression on, to influence, to 
affect, etc.” and it represents a physical, emotional or mental state caused in the recipient 
as a result of an external impulse, force or influence. 
As a concept linked to the ancient philosophical tradition Augustine was familiar 
with it and used it frequently in his works192. As a general rule he considers affectus and 
affectio as synonyms and uses them in order to translate into Latin the Greek 
philosophical concept of pathe, which was also rendered by the terms perturbatio 
(“disturbance”) or passio (“passion”). But while Augustine confers to perturbatio 
exclusively a pejorative meaning, he employs the terms affectus and affectio both in a 
positive and a negative way.  
                                                 
188 A ninth century florilegium discovered and published by G. Mathon contains the extract, see Mathon 
(1953) 306. A florilegium from De divisione naturae also contains the passage, see Marenbon (1980) 274, 
276.  It is Bell’s contention that the influence of Eriugena on William is far more limited than scholars such 
as Déchanet, Hourlier, Brooke and Leclercq claimed and that it is highly likely that William’s use of 
Eriugena was mainly fragmentary, by the intermediary of florilegia. See Bell (1982) 26 and (1984) 127, n. 
10.  
189 Contemp. 11: Est enim amor animae rationalis sicut dicit servus tuus, motus, vel quieta statio, vel finis, 
in id ultra quod nil appetat: vel appetendum judicet voluntatis appetitus.  
190 ep. Jo. 10.5: …dilectio. ibi est finis: propter hoc currimus; ad ipsam currimus; cum venerimus ad eam 
requiescemus. See also en. Ps. 31.2.5. 
191 On William’s treatment of affectus see Châtillon (1938) 2294; Bell (1984) 129-133; Baudelet (1985) 
236-239; McGinn (1994) 251-252. The most detailed study of affectus remains Zwingmann (1967) 5-37 
and 193-226. 
192 For a survey of Augustine’s use of affectus see O’Daly & Zumkeller (1986) 166-180. 
 141
At a basic level, Augustine considers affectus and affectio as being motus 
animi193, neither good nor bad in themselves. However, they cannot exist in this neutral 
state. What separates then the good movements of the soul from the bad ones is the 
direction of the will: “For if it [i.e. the will] is perverse, it will have these movements as 
perverse ones; but if it is righteous, they [i.e. the movements of the soul] will be not only 
blameless, but also praiseworthy. The will is in fact in all of them; indeed all of them are 
nothing else than wills”194. It is clear from this passage that apart from being motus animi, 
affectus and affectio can also be understood as will (voluntas). Since a good will is 
considered by Augustine to be a good love and the bad will is respectively a bad love, 
one can consider love also a kind of affectus:  “A righteous will, then is good love; and a 
perverted will is an evil love. Therefore, love striving to possess what it loves is desire; 
love possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing  what is adverse to it is 
fear; and love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these [i.e. 
affections] are bad if the love is bad and good if it is good”195. Augustine follows here the 
Stoic classification of affectus in desire (cupiditas), joy (laetitia), fear (timor) and sadness 
(tristitia)196. But while the Stoics considered all these affectus to be bad and their 
philosophical programme envisaged the replacement of these affectus by the state of 
apatheia (the absence of all affectus), Augustine considers that cupiditas, laetitia, timor 
and tristitia can be good if the will is directed towards a good object. In opposition to the 
Stoics, Augustine considers that the state of apatheia, understood as the total absence of 
all good affectus, is insensitivity worse than all vices197. Moreover, he redefines apatheia 
understood as a life without those affectus contrary to reason as a desirable condition198. 
Depending on the direction of the will towards a good or a bad object, the affectus 
determine the human distance or nearness to God for they represent the “feet” that lead 
the human soul either towards God or far away from him199. The soul is moved in the 
                                                 
193 civ. Dei 9.4. 
194 civ. Dei 14.6. 
195 civ. Dei 14.7. 
196 Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, 3.10.35; Tusculanes 3.11.24-25 and 4.6.11.  
197 civ. Dei 14.9. 
198 civ. Dei 14.9. 
199 en. Ps. 94.2: pedes nostri…affectus nostri sunt. Prout quisque affectum habuerit, prout quisque amorem 
habuerit. Ita accedit vel recedit a deo; en. Ps. 64.2: incipit exire qui incipit amare. Exeunt enim multi 
latenter et exeuntium pedes sunt cordis affectus; Jo. ev. tr. 56.4: Ipsi igitur humani affectus (…) quasi pedes 
sunt… 
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direction of his affectio, for the affectio is the place (locus) of the soul200. If affectio 
equals the pleasures of this world, the soul moves away from God towards a place where 
it does not belong by nature; if affectio is God, the soul approaches its natural place.  
Finally, God cannot be said to be disturbed by any affectus, not even when in the 
Scriptures he is described as angered, “for this word is used to indicate the effect 
(effectus) of his vengeance, rather than any disturbance of his own”201.  
A significant portion of Augustine’s treatment of affectus and affectio occurs in a 
philosophical context, in which he constantly draws parallels or makes comparisons with 
the use of these terms by the ancient philosophers, especially the Stoics and the 
Platonists. Augustine approaches the ancient philosophical tradition critically in order to 
consolidate a distinct view of affectus and affectio appropriate to a Christian philosophy.   
Like his friend Bernard, William sees a difference between affectus and affectio in 
theory, but does not seem to be consistent either when it comes to applying it in practice. 
In William’s view, “affectus is something which possesses the mind by a kind of 
generalized force and perpetual virtue, firm and stable and maintained through grace. 
Affections are things which vary according to the various occurrences of things and 
times”202. According to this definition, the main difference between affectus and affectio 
is the stability of the former and the mutability of the latter. Moreover, affectus addresses 
the noblest part of the soul, its mind, and its stability is ensured by the role played by 
grace. Although in this definition affectus appears to be a more positive term in 
comparison with affectio, affectus can also acquire negative meanings, especially when it 
is encountered in expressions such as affectus carnis203 or affectus peccati204. On the 
other hand, affectio can have positive meanings when we read about the “holy 
affectiones”205 or the “loving affectiones”206. However, affectus is more often 
encountered in expressions such as affectus amoris207, affectus caritatis208, affectus 
                                                 
200 en. Ps. 6.9: animo autem locus est affectio sua.  
201 civ. Dei 9.5: hoc verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus non illius turbulentus affectus. 
202 Nat. am. 14. 
203 Nat. corp. 74. 
204 Exp. Rom 1.1.32; 2.4.6-8. 
205 Cant. 2. 
206 Cant. Expositio. 
207 Nat. am. 21; Cant. 89; Med. 12.29. 
208 Nat. am. 23. 
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mentis209, affectus cordis210, all having a positive meaning. William does not feel 
constrained by these definitions, and at times, when convenient for him, he will continue 
to use the terms affectus and affectio as synonyms. 
Like Augustine, who considered the will as a motus and therefore as an affectus or 
affectio, William considers the will a simplex affectus “given to the reasonable soul so 
that it can be equally capable of doing bad or good”211. The will was given to the human 
being together with the memory and understanding when the human being was created in 
the image and likeness of God. From its creation the will was constituted free much as the 
Pythagorean letter Y, William informs us212, thus symbolising the two possible directions 
that the will can follow: one towards good, another towards evil. However, the will can 
do good, become a virtue and transform into love, only when it is helped by grace. Left to 
itself, it chooses evil, becomes a vice and it is transformed in cupidity213. One can 
recognize here the Augustinian principle according to which the human soul helped by 
grace is capable of doing good but relying only on its own power cannot but fall214.  
Depending on the will which either can act on itself without the divine assistance 
or acts by cooperation with the divine grace, or is entirely passive in front of the divine 
initiative, David Bell215 argues that one can find basically three types of affectus in 
William’s thought: an active affectus, a cooperative affectus and a passive affectus. 
Affectus in its potentiality that is, before choosing between God and the rest, remains as 
we have seen a matter of grace. The active affectus corresponds to the state of the human 
being who in spite of the natural bent towards God given by creative grace, acts alone 
without God’s assistance216. The actualisation of affectus’s potential to deliberately turn 
                                                 
209 Cant. 129; Ep. frat. 256. 
210 Nat. am. 25; Med. 11.18. 
211 Nat. am. 4: sic animae rationali inditus, ut sit capax tam boni quam mali. 
212 Nat. am. 5. 
213 Nat. am. 4 
214 The examples illustrating this principle abound in Augustine’s works. We will limit ourselves just to one 
example for the necessity of grace in order to do good, and another example for the inability of the human 
will to do other than evil: corrept. 3: Intellegenda est enim gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum 
nostrum, qua sola homines liberantur a malo, et sine qua nullum prorsus sive cogitando, sive volendo et 
amando, sive agendo faciunt bonum; lib. arb. 3.1.2: nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria 
voluntate. This principle lies at the heart of Augustine’s reaction against Pelagius who considers that in 
every good action the power to do good comes from God but the will and the performance of the action 
itself come from the human being. See Bonner (2007) 27. 
215 Bell (1984) 131-132. 
216 For examples and comments on this aspect see Zwingmann (1963) 10-11. 
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to God with the aid of grace represents the cooperative affectus. The passive affectus 
corresponds to the mystical state, characterised by a passive will and a superabundance of 
grace that rapts one up into God. The terminology of this classification does not belong to 
William, but it may be said that it summarises William’s understanding of affectus.  
 Like for Augustine, not only the will but also amor can be termed as affectus. 
Although William identifies in some passages amor with affectus217, at times he also 
distinguishes between amor and affectus amoris. Amor is a natural thing218 implanted in 
the human soul by God when he created the human being, who is also God himself, 
hidden in the depths of the soul. Affectus amoris is the manifestation of this hidden love, 
given by grace219. While the human beings have always God as love with them, they do 
not always return their love to God. But when they do it, when they love God affectu 
amoris220, they encounter God in their love221. Like Augustine and Bernard, William does 
not attribute affectus to God. God loves us not affectu amoris, that is by a change or 
movement on his part, but effectu caritatis, which means that he creates in us the affectus 
amoris, which enables us to love God in return222. By the distinction between amor and 
affectus amoris, Bell observed that William distinguishes between love-in- potentiality 
and love-in-action223. The transition from amor to affectus amoris does not depend on the 
vehemence of one’s will, because as William observes one’s will might be to love God, 
but one might not always be affected by God, meaning that the will is not transformed in 
amor by a superior kind of grace. The affectus amoris depends entirely on grace and the 
love-in-potentiality becomes love-in-action when the Holy Spirit blows wherever, 
whenever and to the extent that he wills so224. This is not to say that the presence of amor 
in the human souls is not also a matter of grace. As we have already seen apart from amor 
William considers the affectus in its potentiality and the free will to be also the gifts of 
the creative grace. 
                                                 
217 Contemp. 8: affectui inquam qui amor in nobis dicitur; Ep. frat. 170: sic affectus hominis qui amor 
dicitur. 
218 Med. 12.29. 
219 Med. 12.29. 
220 Contemp. 11. 
221 Med. 12.29. 
222 Contemp. 11; Aenig. 100. 
223 Bell (1984) 130. 
224 Med. 12.30. 
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The idea of drawing near or away from God by means of affectus is another 
similarity between Augustine and our Cistercian author. Augustine preferred to refer to 
the affectus as the “feet” that lead one away from or closer to God adding that they can 
direct one either towards cupiditas or towards caritas225. William does not use the 
Augustinian comparison of the affectus with the feet, but he definitely describes the 
spiritual journey as one formed of various affectus. This idea is frequent in his writings 
and occurs as early as De natura et dignitate amoris, where William indicates four 
affectus which lead to God: voluntas, amor, caritas, sapientia226. They must not be 
understood as the steps of a ladder, warns William, since the transition form one step or 
stage to a higher one does not mean that the lower step is not needed any longer in the 
ascent227. These “affective” steps must act as the “united cords of a net drawing us up 
toward our goal”228. William returns frequently in his works to the discussion of these 
stages, which will be examined in due course229.  
So far it is possible to observe that in his treatment of affectus William follows the 
lines of interpretation established by Augustine. Both describe affectus in terms of 
voluntas and amor, both consider that there are good and bad affectus, and that one 
approaches or distance himself from God by means of affectus. Also affectus is an 
entirely human characteristic not applicable to God. Unlike Augustine however, William 
does not have references to the philosophical context from which this term originates. His 
treatment of affectus is not philosophical, but in general theological and in particular, 
mystical. William’s favorite verb used in the description of the mystical union is affici230. 
Regarding this aspect he is not different from his friend Bernard who refers to the 
mystical state with the words sic affici, deificari est231. William depicts the state of union 
of the soul with God in strikingly similar manner making use not only of the same affici, 
but echoing the syntax of the Bernadine phrase as well sicque afficiant, ut perficiant232. 
                                                 
225 en. Ps. 64.2; ep. 157.4. 
226 Nat. am. 28. 
227 Nat. am. 45. 
228 McGinn (1994) 251. 
229 See below, pp. 175-181. 
230 Ep. frat. 263: Dicitur autem haec unitas spiritus, non tantum quia efficit eam, vel afficit ei spiritum 
hominis Spiriuts Sanctus… 
231 Dil. 10.28. 
232 Ep. frat. 212. 
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The mystical aspect of affectus was already present in William’s early works where he 
teaches that affectus caritatis unites to God233. In his mature works he directly associates 
affectus with the mystical union: the human being is drawn to God, that is, he becomes 
one spirit with God234. 
One final important aspect derives from the mystical capacity of affectus, which 
demonstrates the originality of William’s mystical theology. In uniting the human being 
with God, affectus provides the former with a certain knowledge of the divine being235. 
According to William, the affectus is more appropriate for the knowledge of God, than it 
is the sense (sensus) for perceiving the corporal things or the intellect (intellectus) for 
perceiving the rational things236. Moreover, this type of knowledge is superior to that 
obtained by sensus or intellectus since it both contributes to and stems from the unity of 
the soul with its object of knowledge and affection which is God: “and the human being 
becomes one spirit with God to whom he is drawn”237. For William, the mechanism of 
this cognitive process based on affectus is analogous to that of the sense perception. 
Therefore, in order to understand how this type of knowledge operates, we need to turn 
our attention to a new aspect of love, that of sensus, not before concluding briefly this 
section.  
The similarities existing between Augustine’s and William’s treatment of affectus 
must not necessarily be understood as a direct impact of the former on the twelfth century 
author; rather William’s dealing with affectus seems to correspond to that of some of his 
contemporaries, particularly Bernard. The presence of Augustinian elements can be 
explained better by William’s and Bernard’s attachment to the same Augustinian 
tradition. While for both William and Bernard affectus is linked with the mystical state, it 
is only William who develops a new cognitive dimension of this concept, holding it 
responsible for a new superior type of knowledge: the knowledge of love.  
 
                                                 
233 Nat. am. 23. 
234 Cant.  94: Fit homo Deo affectus, hoc est cum Deo unus spiritus. 
235 Med. 12.15. 
236 Spec. 99: Plus in hoc valens amantis affectu, quam vel sensu in corporalibus vel in rationalibus 
intellectu, et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur.  
237 Spec.  99: et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur. 
 147
5. Sensus amoris 
 
Sensus amoris is an expression which does not appear in Augustine, but which is 
employed by William in order to refer to a type of knowledge of a superior kind whose 
object is God. The knowledge of love is based on William’s conviction that “only love 
can fully understand the divine things”238. In William’s view there is a certain analogy 
between the knowledge of the senses and the knowledge of love. He is able to sustain and 
develop such an analogy by claiming constantly throughout his writings that love is a 
sense (sensus) of the soul239. The implications of this statement are that its mode of 
operation must then be similar to that of the corporeal senses.  
Already in the early De natura et dignitate amoris, William draws a parallel 
between the corporeal senses and the spiritual senses, teaching that “as the body has its 
five senses by which it is joined to the soul by the instrumentality of life, so, too, the soul 
has its five senses by which it is joined to God by the instrumentality of charity”240. He 
goes further listing the five senses of the soul and their corresponding corporeal senses: 
the love of parents is compared with touch, social love or the love of the brothers241, 
corresponds to taste, natural love by which every human being is loved is paralleled with 
smell, spiritual love or love of enemies is compared with hearing and, finally, divine love 
corresponds to vision242. 
In the Speculum fidei, William speaks again of the senses and he distinguishes 
between an exterior corporeal sense that perceives corporal objects (corporalia) and a 
bifurcated interior sense. The interior sense that perceives rational, divine and spiritual 
things (rationabilia, ac divina vel spiritualia) is named intellectus. However, in order for 
the creature to sense the Creator, a higher and purer sense than the intellect is needed and 
                                                 
238 Cant. 24: nisi amor plene capiat quae sunt divina. 
239 Med. 3.8: Sensus enim animae amor est; Spec. 96: Amat enim, et amor suus sensus suus est; Spec. 97: In 
eis vero quae sunt ad Deum sensus mentis amor est. 
240 Nat. am. 15: Per quinque sensus corporis, mediante vita, corpus animae conjungitur; per quinque 
sensus spirituales, mediante caritate, anima Deo consociatur. 
241 William terms the love for the brothers as amor fraternus, without any attempt at clarifying whether this 
expression refers to the brother monks or to biological brothers.  
242 This passage is very similar to one from Bernard’s sermon Div. 10. It is difficult to say which text was 
written first, but William’s treatment of the subject is more detailed and better biblically documented than 
that of Bernard. For a parallel of the two texts and a more in depth discussion see Pennington (1980) 276-
281. 
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that sense is love243. William is careful to add that the Creator is perceived within the 
limits of the human condition (quantum sentiri vel intelligi potest a creatura Deus). He 
also refers to the knowledge offered by intellectus using the verb intellego while the 
knowledge offered by amor seems to have an experiential character and the verb 
associated with this type of knowledge is sentio. A perfect knowledge of God implies that 
intellectus and amor as the two branches of the same interior sense are intended to work 
together in order to both experience and understand God. The collaboration of amor and 
intellectus in the cognitive process will be investigated shortly244.  
No matter how important are the consequences of the identification of amor and 
sensus for William’s spirituality, my intention is to demonstrate that this identification is 
by no means the only factor that led William to developing an analogy between the 
mechanism of sense perception and that of the knowledge of love, or what he terms as 
sensus amoris. Although some scholars, such as Déchanet have seen the latter type of 
knowledge sharing affinities with “St. Gregory and the whole Greek tradition”245, I intend 
to demonstrate that like many other aspects of William’s theology which have been 
attributed to an eastern influence, in the end, when confronted with textual evidence, one 
must admit that the main source that William constantly follows is Augustine. Sensus 
amoris makes no exception to this rule.  
Let us begin by looking first at Augustine’s opinion with regard to the sense 
perception, as it is expounded in the second half of the De Trinitate (11.2.2 – 11.2.5). 
Searching for a Trinitarian image in the exterior human being, Augustine comments upon 
a trinity of the external senses and decides to focus on the act of seeing as it is considered 
to be closest in nature to the vision of the mind246. The members of this trinity are the 
thing we see (res quam videmus), next there is the actual act of sight or vision, which did 
not exist before the object presented to the sense was perceived (visio quae non erat 
priusquam rem). Thirdly, there is the soul’s intention (animi intentio) or the will 
(voluntas) that fixes the sense of the eyes on the visible object as long as it is seen. 
                                                 
243 Spec. 97: major tamen et dignior sensus eius et purior intellectus amor est. 
244 See the section Amor ipse intellectus est below, pp. 155-164. 
245 Déchanet (1970) xxiii. See also Louth (1984) who attributes William’s use of the doctrine of spiritual 
senses only to his reading of Origen and Gregory the Great.  
246 Trin. 11.1.1: is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate 
vicinior. 
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Augustine observes that the members of this trinity are all different in nature and on 
account of what is proper to each of them. The act of seeing is produced both by the one 
who sees, to whom the sense and the will pertain, and by the visible thing. The latter 
begets a form or a likeness of itself which emerges in the sense of the one who sees. 
Augustine insists that without the likeness of the visible thing formed in the sense it 
would be absolutely impossible to perceive anything. Next, he remarks that although the 
substances of the three elements involved in the act of vision are distinct, they still come 
together in a kind of unity (in quandam unitatem) since the form of the visible body 
which is seen and the image or likeness247 which arises in the sense of the seer can hardly 
be separated from each other. In addition, the will forcefully unites the two other 
members of the trinity, applying the sense to be formed to the thing that is being looked 
at and holding it there. And Augustine goes on to add that if this will is so strong as to be 
called love or lust, it will affect the rest of the subject’s body and it will change it into a 
similar appearance and colour. He gives two example in order to support his claim: the 
chameleon that changes its colour depending on its surroundings and the biblical episode 
of Jacob who in order to have coloured lambs, placed coloured rods before the eyes of the 
sheep and she-goats in the water troughs, so that they would gaze on them as they drank 
at the time they had conceived. 
The purpose of Augustine in describing how the act of seeing operates has less to 
do with the sense perception per se; rather it seeks to find a suitable metaphor that will 
enable his readers to understand the way in which a superior kind of vision, namely the 
vision of God functions. In singling out the act of seeing, he has already mentioned at the 
outset of this discussion that sight is the closest in nature to the vision of the mind248. The 
relation between these two types of vision was thoroughly examined by Margaret Miles 
in an article entitled “Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in 
                                                 
247 Augustine uses interchangeably the terms species, imago, similitudo without distinguishing between 
them. 
248 Trin. 11.1.1. The idea is already present in sol. 1.6.12-1.6.13, where speaking of the preparation of the 
soul for the vision of God, Augustine lists three important conditions that the soul needs to meet: to have 
eyes (habere oculos), to look (aspicere) and to see (videre). The theological virtues and the prefect reason 
play a central role in assisting the soul in its progress from one step to another. William knew well this text 
and he uses almost the entire passage in Spec. 3-4, but he discusses it in a different context, focusing on 
faith, hope and charity as forming the image of God in the human being. See above, pp. 129-131. For a 
discussion of Augustine’s early account on the vision of God from sol. 1.6.12-.1.6.13, see Otten (1999) 
444-446. 
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Augustine’s De Trinitate and Confessiones”249. She claims that it is “Augustine’s 
understanding of the physics of vision which enables him to describe a process by which 
one comes to a vision of “That which is”250 or to put it more plainly, the physical vision 
serves as a model for Augustine’s description of the vision of God. There are a number of 
similarities between these two types of vision which she discusses in detail: the same 
triad formed of the visible object, the seeing individual and the will, the difference in 
nature of the members of this triad, the role of the will in applying the sense to the object, 
the transformation of will in love or desire depending on its intensity and finally the will 
that unifies. Since Augustine does not deal systematically with this analogy, but mentions 
it occasionally without much elaboration251, the material that Margaret Miles brings as 
evidence for the similarities between the two types of vision, originates, apart from the 
De Trinitate and the Confessiones, in the Enarrationes in Psalmos, the Sermones, the In 
epistulam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus, and even the Soliloquies.      
Turning now to William, we find him making general observations on sense 
perception only to compare it always with the sense of love perceiving God. A close look 
at the texts252 dealing with this topic will demonstrate this as well as William’s 
indebtedness to the Augustinian sense perception theory described above. We will begin 
with a short passage from Meditatio 3 in which William presents the analogy between the 
corporeal act of seeing and the operational mechanism of the sense of the soul which is 
love: 
Every bodily sense, in order to be a sense and to perceive must be changed by 
means of a certain sensible impression, into the thing it perceives (…) For, unless 
the sense informs the reason about the thing perceived and unless the soul, 
perceiving by a certain transformation of itself, is changed into the thing or into 
the quality of the thing perceived, it is neither a sense nor it is able to perceive. In 
the same way, if it [i. e. the soul] perceives the good God by means of love which 
is its sense and if it loves him because he is good, it is only able to do this 
because, communicating through affection to him who is good, it becomes good 
itself. (…) For this is true in a certain way about the sense of the soul. For the 
sense of the soul is love: by this [i. e. sense of love] it perceives whatever it 
perceives, either when it is pleased or when it is offended. When by this [i.e. sense 
of love] the soul reaches out to anything, it is transformed in that which it loves by 
                                                 
249 Miles (1983) 125-142. 
250 Miles (1983) 125. 
251 Trin. 11.1.1; Trin. 12.15.24 in the context of divine illumination. 
252 William mentions the cognitive process several times in his works: Med. 3.9 -10; Cant. 94 and Spec. 96. 
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a certain transformation of itself, not that it becomes the same in nature, but that it 
is conformed by its affection to the thing which is loved. For it cannot love a good 
person because he is good, without being itself made good through that same 
goodness253. 
 
In this text William seems to refer to only two elements involved in the cognitive act, the 
one who senses and the thing which is sensed. No act of perception takes place without a 
certain sensible impression on the perceiver that changes him to a certain extent either 
into the thing perceived or in the quality of the thing perceived. Augustine at his turn 
spoke of a form, likeness or image of the thing seen imprinted in the subject that can 
affect the seeing individual if the will is vehement. William seems to argue for the same 
thing insisting more than Augustine on the centrality of the transformation of the subject 
that senses into the thing which is sensed. He moves then from the corporeal level to the 
spiritual level, saying that in the same way the sense of soul, which is love, operates. 
Loving God, the human soul is affected to a certain extent by the object of its love, so 
that it is somehow transformed not in God himself, because it does not become of the 
same nature as God, but “by its affection it is conformed to that what it loves”. Here the 
object of love being God, this phrase strikingly resembles one of Augustine’s claims that 
“by love we are conformed to God”254. The ontological gap between creature and Creator 
is maintained and William adds that by loving God, the soul does not change into god but 
becomes good as God is good. One could say that this principle of transformation 
parallels Augustine’s examples, since a chameleon for instance by changing in 
accordance to its surroundings, maintains its chameleonic nature, while conforming only 
its colour to that of the things perceived.   
In the Speculum fidei William discusses again the same process in similar terms. 
He begins by summarising the functional principle of the act of sensing, insisting again 
on the transformation of the one who senses into the thing which is sensed taking place 
while the sense is produced and also emphasizing that the transformation is a necessary 
condition in order for the act of perception to be produced. A short paragraph is dedicated 
to the greatness of will which unites things, by attracting them to itself by means of 
senses. The ideas presented here are without any doubt inspired by Augustine and a 
                                                 
253 Med. 3.9-10. 
254 mor. 1.13.23: Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur deo… 
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comparative look at the two texts will convincingly illustrate William’s direct source, 
although he never explicitly acknowledges Augustine as his source:  
 
Spec.100: 
Habet enim voluntas animae ad 
copulandas res etiam corporeas vim 
tantam, ut sensibus eas admovens, tanta 
nonnumquam intentione sensus ipsos in eis 
formatos detineat, ut voluntas ipsa 
efficiatur amor, vel cupiditas, vel libido; 
ferventiore intentionis vehementia in 
tantum rebus senses inhians, ut de eis 
ipsum corpus inhiantis vel amantis sic 
afficiat vel inficiat, ut aliquando illud in 
similem vel speciem vel colorem 
transfundat. Non hoc latuit patriarcham 
Iacob, qui colores quos volebat artificiali 
et naturali machinamento pecudibus 
nascituris indidit, ne hominis barbaris 
nequitia laboris sui mercede defraudetur. 
 
Trin. 11.2.5: 
…voluntas autem tantam habet vim 
copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum 
formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur 
et in ea formatum teneat. et si tam violenta 
est ut possit vocari amor aut cupiditas aut 
libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis 
vehementer afficit, et ubi non resistit 
pigrior duriorque materies in similem 
speciem coloremque commutat. (…) 
sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari 
possint, sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis 
libris quod fecit Iacob ut oves et caprae 
uarios coloribus parerent supponendo eis 
variata uirgulta in canalibus aquarum 




William’s dependence on Augustine is quite apparent in this section, where he seems to 
have conveyed the essence of Augustine’s text, if not his exact wording. He has 
eliminated some of Augustine’s explanations and retained only as much as it sufficed for 
him to make his point. He kept only one of Augustine’s examples, namely the episode of 
Jacob’s sheep and she-goats. In addition, he used this Augustinian passage in order to 
make the transition to a different, also Augustinian aspect of the will, namely that of the 
Holy Spirit as will or love. Next, he smoothly moves to a description of the spiritual 
cognitive process in which the human soul loves God and its spiritual sense (amor) is 
fixed on the object of its desire by the will which is the Holy Spirit itself: 
 
This [i.e. the transformation of love] takes place more powerfully and more 
worthily when the Holy Spirit himself, who is the substantial will of the Father 
and the Son, so draws the human will to himself, that the soul loving God, and 
perceiving him by loving, is transformed suddenly and totally, not indeed into the 
nature of divinity, but still into a certain form of beatitude above what is human 
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and below what is divine, into the joy of illuminating grace and the knowledge of 
the enlightened conscience255.  
 
In this passage, there are three elements involved in the process of love’s transformation: 
the soul, God and his substantial will, namely the Holy Spirit. The human will is also 
mentioned but it is presented as being entirely passive in face of the divine initiative, 
almost annihilated by the Holy Spirit, which attracts it to himself. This superior act of 
knowledge is ultimately a gift of superabundant grace. Applying the principle of 
transformation of the one who senses into that which is sensed, the result, as David Bell 
observed, is “that the ‘object’ and the ‘sense’ are in the last analysis the same thing”256, 
though the sense was not transformed by nature into the thing sensed. The will that unites 
the two is as we have seen not the human will but the Holy Spirit. This leads to a kind of 
unity and there is no wonder that William refers to the result of this affective and at the 
same time cognitive process as unitas spiritus257, paralleling Augustine’s comment that in 
spite of the diversity of natures, the three elements involved in the act of seeing form a 
kind of unity. Evidently, it is just a formal parallel, but one could argue that William 
arrived at this result combining Augustinian elements such as the operational principle of 
sense perception and the idea of the Holy Spirit as love. 
Finally a third text we need to look at briefly is an excerpt from the Expositio 
super Cantica Canticorum § 94 which apart from the usual information on the theory of 
perception contained in the texts already discussed, also explains what William has in 
mind when he claims that there is no sense without the transformation of the subject 
which senses into that which is sensed (transformetur sentiens in id quod sentitur). The 
transformation William is speaking about so often is a “certain similitude of the thing 
sensed” (quaedam sensae rei similitudo) which is formed in the mind (in ipsam mentem) 
or in the soul of the one who sees (formetur in anima videntis). This likeness, by which 
the one who senses is transformed into that which is sensed (per quam transformetur 
sentiens in id quod sentitur) conditions the act of sensing.  
The similarity of these ideas with those of Augustine’s contained in the De 
Trinitate 11.2.3 is obvious when we compare the two texts. Although Augustine never 
                                                 
255 Spec. 101. 
256 Bell (1984) 165. 
257 Spec. 99: et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur. 
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uses such strong expressions as to speak of a “transformation” of the seeing individual 
into the object which is seen, he, nevertheless, considers that the act of seeing takes place 
by having a likeness (similitudo) or an image (imago) produced or imprinted in the sense 
of the one who sees. He also insists that one cannot possibly sense unless some likeness 
of the object observed is produced in one’s sense. William following Augustine says 
exactly the same thing when he repeatedly informs his readers that without the 
transformation of the one who senses in the object sensed (which implies the presence of 
some likeness of the object perceived in the soul or mind of the one who senses) there can 
be no sensing. From the corporeal level, William moves again to the comparison with the 
sense of love which has God as its object, accentuating its superiority in contrast with the 
other senses, by the use of the introductory expression: sic et multo magis. The vision or 
the knowledge of God which takes place in “the sense of love” (in sensu amoris) is 
superior to any other kind of knowledge or vision. The likeness and transformation that 
each act of sensing God requires, analogically to the corporeal act of sensing, makes the 
human being become, in the vision of God, one spirit with God, that is to become like 
God, not by nature, but by grace. Visio Dei and unitas spiritus refer to the same 
privileged state of superior knowledge. Elevated to this condition, the human being 
becomes the recipient of “a certain and clear experience of God” (certam de Deo et 
manifestam experientiam) not sensed by any other sense except by sensus illuminati 
amoris  and not understood by anything else except by intellectus illuminati amoris. Both 
expressions sensus amoris and intellectus amoris seem to refer to the same process, but 
when William wants to emphasise the experiential dimension of the process he will use 
rather the expression sensus amoris and the corresponding verb sentio. When he wants to 
underline that it is a real knowledge, he uses the expression intellectus amoris and the 
corresponding verb intellego258. The latter aspect of the superior cognitive process is also 
summarized by William in the famous formula which became his mystical signature: 
amor ipse intellectus est.  
In conclusion, it is possible to claim that William’s understanding of sensus 
amoris has deep Augustinian roots, which do not pertain only to William’s reading of a 
                                                 
258 Cant. 94; Spec. 97; McGinn (1994) 253-254 observes the contextual use of sensus amoris and intellectus 
amoris. 
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particular text, namely that of the De Trinitate 11. Undoubtedly, William knew extremely 
well Augustine’s view on the mechanism of sense perception more fully articulated in 
this text, but he also had a profound and wide knowledge of Augustine’s other works and 
this familiarity with Augustine’s works in general enabled him to draw more boldly 
connections between different aspects of Augustine’s teaching. In order to assert such an 
analogy between the two types of vision, William needed to rely on disparate passages 
from Augustine works, since this analogy is not treated systematically by Augustine. 
William demonstrates again that he is not merely a compiler, drawing on Augustine’s 
passages without any attempt to understand those passages in a larger context.  
 
 6. Amor ipse intellectus est 
 
Amor ipse intellectus est is a slight adaptation of an expression pertaining to 
Gregory the Great amor ipse notitia est259, as William himself acknowledges in his work 
Disputatio adversum Abelardum260. However, the principle conveyed by this succinct 
expression has a long history and its roots must be traced back before Gregory. Augustine 
wrote a great deal on the interaction between love and knowledge and the principle of the 
knowing love appears already in one of his works although in a different formulation 
from that of Gregory: Qui novit veritatem, novit eam [sc. lucem incommutabilem]; et qui 
novit eam, novit aeternitatem. Caritas novit eam261. Among William’s contemporaries 
there are many who make use of the Gregorian formula and of the principle it 
conveyed262. 
Employed merely four times by William263, who used it in parallel with the 
equivalent expression intellectus amoris264, the dictum amor ipse intellectus est retained 
the attention of the modern scholars, who made it the core of their debate. David Bell has 
shown that this phrase can be understood in more than one way, due to the ambiguity of 
                                                 
259 Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia 27.4. SC 522:170. 
260 Disp. Ab. 2: In huiusmodi etenim, sicut dicit beatus Gregorius, amor ipse intellectus est. 
261 conf. 7.10.16. 
262 Unlike William, Bernard quotes Gregory in a correct way, see Div. 29.1: Exponit beatus Gregorius, quia 
amor ipse notitia est. For a list of twelfth century writers who make use of this idea see Bell (1984) 232-
233. 
263 Cant. 57; 76; Disp. Ab. 2; Ep. frat. 173. 
264 Cant. 21; 105. 
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the verb esse which can be used either denoting identity like in the statement “John Smith 
is a man”, or denoting inseparability like in the statement “The rose is red”265. One of the 
first scholars to pay attention to this phrase and to comment upon it was P. Rousselot, 
who suggested that it had to be interpreted as representing a formal and conceptual 
identification between love and understanding266. M.-M. Davy, who did not recognise 
love as a cognitive faculty, argued that the phrase amor ipse intellectus est must be 
understood metaphorically267. More recently and under the influence of Malevez’s 
position268 these early scholarly positions have been refuted and there seems to be a 
consensus among scholars nowadays (Déchanet, Brooke, Bell, McGinn)269 that the type 
of knowledge conveyed by the expressions amor ipse intellectus est and intellectus 
amoris must be understood not as an identification, but as an “interpenetration” of love 
and understanding. Moreover, amor-intellectus is accepted as to refer to experiential, 
non-discursive, non-conceptual, suprarational knowledge, yet knowledge in the strict 
sense of the term, and not to have been used by William merely as a kind of metaphor. 
The real character of this type of knowledge is also due to its eschatological dimension 
being regarded as an anticipation of the beatific vision and therefore offering not merely 
knowledge about God, but a direct knowledge of God as he is in himself: ipsum vero 
idipsum quod est270. Finally, the result of this type of knowing does not reveal the 
Trinitarian mystery, but remains obscure, or, as William puts it using an Augustinian 
expression, offers a quaedam docta ignorantia271, which is more a recognition of God’s 
incomprehensibility. 
After this summary of the conclusions reached by modern scholars regarding 
William’s doctrine of amor-intellectus it is the moment to inquire whether Augustine in 
any way might have contributed to the development of William’s doctrine of amor-
intellectus. We have seen that William himself attributes the formula amor ipse 
intellectus est to Gregory the Great, but apart from the terminological similarity, one 
                                                 
265 Bell (1984) 238. 
266 Rousselot (1933) 76. 
267 Davy (1954) 201-215. 
268 Malevez (1932) 2:277-279. 
269 Déchanet (1945) 349-374; Brooke (1959) 109-115; Bell (1984) 234-249; McGinn (1994) 255-259. 
270 Ep. frat. 292. See also Brooke (1980) 28. 
271 Exp. Rom. 5.8.27. William quotes here a larger text from Augustine’s ep. 130.28 which contains the 
expression docta ignorantia. 
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cannot detect important Gregorian elements in William’s treatment of this idea. 
Therefore, it is necessary to search for his source of inspiration in other authors, while 
acknowledging, at the same time, William’s original contribution in developing this idea 
further than it had ever been done before him. 
The perusal of the contexts in which this formula appears brings forth an idea 
regarding the relationship between love and knowledge that is very similar to ideas about 
love and knowledge expressed by Augustine. Thus, in paragraph 57 from the Expositio 
super Cantica Canticorum, William discusses how the soul begins to know and love God 
after it has previously been known and loved by God. Knowledge and love are directly 
interconnected because the degree of love increases with the increase of knowledge272.  
The mutuality of love and knowledge is emphasised in another passage from the 
same work representing a direct explanation of the dictum amor ipse intellectus est: 
 
The love of God is itself knowledge of him: unless he is loved, he is not known, 
and unless he is known, he is not loved. Indeed, to the extent he is loved, so much 
is he known, and to the extent he is known so much is he loved273. 
 
This way of describing the relationship between love and knowledge echoes Augustine. 
In his attempt to demonstrate the link between love and knowledge, Augustine frequently 
makes use of the principle that no one loves that which one does not know274. Giving the 
example of an unknown word of which one knows that it is a sign and therefore that it 
signifies something, he shows that “the more a thing is known but not fully known, the 
more the mind desires to know the rest”275. In this case knowledge increases love, but the 
opposite seems to function as well and Augustine, beginning from the same principle that 
nothing can be loved unless already known, reaches the conclusion that love increases 
knowledge: “For that cannot be loved which is altogether unknown. But when what is 
                                                 
272 Cant. 57. 
273 Cant. 76. 
274Trin. 10.1.1: nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest;  Trin. 10.1.2: certe enim 
amari aliquid nisi notum non potest; ibid. quoniam firmissime novimus amari nisi nota potest. This idea 
occurs constantly in De Trinitate throughout books 8 to 10: Trin. 8.4.6: sed quis diligit quod ignorat?; Trin. 
9.3.3: nam quomodo amat quod nescit?; Trin. 9.12.18: amor (…) quo id quod notum est, amatur.  
275 Trin. 10.1.2: quo igitur amplius notum est sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod 
reliquum est. 
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known, in however small a measure, is also loved, by the self-same love one is led on to a 
better and fuller knowledge.”276   
Augustine also connects love and knowledge with likeness and according to him a 
gradual progress in the knowledge and the love of God determines a greater likeness to 
God. The human being becomes like God by knowledge of him, for “insofar as we know 
God we are like him”277. In addition, the human being becomes like God also through 
love of God and there is no doubt that for Augustine this is a prime aspect, for “it is 
through love that we become conformed to God”278. William has no disagreement with 
Augustine in sustaining that the more human beings progress in the knowledge and love 
of God, the more like him they become. The passage where this idea occurs is almost 




In interiore ergo homine similitudo ista est, 
qua renovator homo de die in diem in 
agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui 
creavit eum: ubi tanto ei efficimur 
similiores, quanto magis in eius 
cognitionem caritatemque proficimus… 
 
For it is in the inner human being that that 
likeness exists by which the human being is 
renewed day by day in the knowledge of 
God according to the image of him who 
created him. And it is there that we become 
more like him as we progress more in 
knowledge and love of him.  
Ep. 92. 3: 
(…) in interiore igitur homine ista 
similitudo est, qui renovatur in agnitione 
Dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creavit 
eum. et tanto efficimur similiores illi, 
quanto magis in eius cognitione et caritate 
proficimus… 
 
In the inner human being therefore is this 
likeness, which is renewed in the 
knowledge of God according to the image 
of him, who created him. And so much we 
become more similar to him, the more we 





Apart from the peculiarly similar ideas to those of Augustine on the interaction between 
love and knowledge presented above, this direct use of the Augustinian text referring to 
                                                 
276 Jo. ev. tr. 96.4: Non enim diligitur quod penitus ignoratur. Sed cum diligitur quod ex quantulacumque 
parte cognoscitur, ipsa efficitur dilectione ut melius et plenius cognoscatur. 
277 Trin. 9.11.16: Quocirca in quantum Deo novimus, similes sumus. 
278 mor. 1.13.23: Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur Deo… 
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the same matter, confirms that, among the various sources that William might have used 
in understanding the love-knowledge relationship, Augustine played an important role. 
Turning now to the mechanism of amor-intellectus, it is noteworthy to observe 
that it is exactly the image of God formed of memory, intellect and will, as expounded by 
Augustine in the De Trinitate, that William takes as his starting point in order to explain 
what he understands by knowledge of God or intellectus amoris, although he does not 
mention the latter expression explicitly in the paragraph we are going to look at. There is 
no doubt however that this is what he has in mind279. In a very significant passage from 
the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei (242-251), William endeavours to describe two 
types of knowledge: one ordinary, the other having God as object. William’s starting 
point of the discussion is anchored in Augustine’s understanding of cogitation as the 
unity of a trinity formed by memory, inner vision and will which he discovers in the inner 
human being280. William in his turn defines cogitation in exactly the same way with the 
single exception that the elements involved in the act of thinking belong to the most 
accurate image of God to be found in the human soul: memory, understanding and 
will281. Like Augustine, William considers that the word cogitatio derives its meaning 
from the verb coago “to compel”282. For both Augustine and William it is the will which 
compels the other elements of the image and by uniting them leads to the formation of 
cogitatio: 
 
Ep. frat.  242: 
 
Voluntas cogit memoriam, ut proferat 
materiam; cogit intellectum ad formandum 
quod profertur, adhibens intellectum 
memoriae, ut inde formetur, intellectui vero 
aciem cogitantis, ut inde cogitetur. 
 
 
The will compels the memory to bring 
Trin. 11.3.6: 
 
voluntasque ipsa quomodo foris corpori 
obiecto formandum sensum admovebat 
formatumque iungebat, sic aciem 
recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam 
ut ex eo quod illa retinuit ista formetur, et 
fit in cogitatione similis uisio. 
 
And the will itself, as it moved the sense to 
                                                 
279 McGinn (1994) 257. 
280 Trin. 11.3.6: atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria et interna uisione et quae utrumque copulat uoluntate, 
quae tria cum in unum coguntur ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur.  
281 Ep. frat. 242: Tria enim sunt quae cogitationem faciunt: voluntas ipsa, memoria et intellectus. 
282 Ep. frat. 242: …a cogendo cogitatio nomen accepisse videtur. see Trin. 11.3.6: …ab ipso coactu 
cogitatio dicitur. 
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forth the matter; it compels the intellect to 
form what is brought forth, applying the 
intellect to memory, so that the concept is 
formed, and applying the acuteness of the 
thinking subject to the intellect, so that it is 
thought. 
be formed to the body that was presented to 
it from outside and combined both of them 
when it had been formed, so in the act of 
remembering it causes the eye of the mind 
to turn back to the memory, in order that it 
may be formed by that which memory 
retained and then there happens a similar 
vision in thought. 
 
De Trinitate 11. 8. 15: 
 
Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum 
corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic 
cogitantis aciem memoriae. 
 
Furthermore, just as the will applies the 
sense to the body, so it applies memory to 
the sense and the acuteness of the thinking 
subject to the memory. 
 
It is the will for both William and Augustine that applies the intellect or the acies 
cogitantis to the memory so that the thought might be formed. The human beings are 
unable to think without willing to do so283. The formation of thoughts is a willed one. 
Although William does not quote Augustine verbatim and although he feels free to adapt 
the Augustinian model of thought formation, by introducing intermediary stages which 
do not appear in the Augustinian text, the definition of the cogitation as a unity of the 
members of imago Dei, the use of the expression aciem cogitantis, as well as the 
rendering of the main idea concerning the role of the will in the formation of thought 
confirms William’s familiarity with and partial dependence on the Augustinian theory of 
cognition from Book 11 of the De Trinitate.  
In the same way as it was the case with the sensus amoris, William uses the 
mechanism of this ordinary type of knowledge as the basis for the knowledge that has 
God as its object. The same elements of the imago Dei are present in this higher kind of 
knowledge: memory, intellect and will. The main difference, however, is that it is not any 
longer the human will that acts upon memory and intellect, but the consubstantial will of 
the Father and the Son, namely the Holy Spirit. As soon as the Holy Spirit acts upon 
                                                 
283 O’Daly (1987) 132. 
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memory, it transforms it into wisdom (memoria efficitur sapientia284). This 
transformation occurs “when the good gifts of God in a sweet way are wise towards 
wisdom and, what has been thought through those good gifts apply to the intellect, as 
something that has to be formed into affection” (cum suaviter ei sapiunt bona Domini, et 
quod ex eis cogitatum est formandum in affectum adhibet intellectui285). The next stage 
marked by the repetition of efficitur takes place when “the intellect of the person thinking 
turns into the contemplation of the one who loves” (intellectus cogitantis efficitur 
contemplatio amantis286) again under the compelling of the Holy Spirit. The result of this 
stage is “certain experiences of spiritual and divine sweetness” (quasdam spiritualis vel 
divinae experientias287), which “affects the sharpness of the thinking person” (afficit ex 
eis aciem cogitantis). Finally the acies cogitantis becomes (the third efficitur in the 
construction of this passage) joy of the one who is enjoying (gaudium fruentis288). 
Augustine is barely recognizable in this passage, but seen in a broader context the 
mechanism of the knowledge of God described in this passage is based on that of the 
ordinary type of knowledge, which is definitely rooted in Augustine as we have shown 
above. Moreover, in developing his theory of sense perception and that of cognition 
Augustine was keen to show a strong link existing between sense and thought and that as 
a general rule the latter derives from the former289. Applying this model to William’s 
ideas about sensus amoris and intellectus amoris, the result would be that what is sensed 
by means of sensus amoris is understood by means of intellectus amoris. William is not 
very consistent with the terminology and sometimes he treats the two expressions as 
synonyms290, but he makes a difference between them when he describes the process that 
corresponds to each of them. For sensus amoris, the process is based on Augustine’s 
theory of sense perception291, for intellectus amoris, the process is based on Augustine’s 
theory of cogitation or thought formation.  
                                                 
284 Ep. frat. 249. 
285 Ep. frat. 249. 
286 Ep. frat. 249 
287 Ep. frat. 249. 
288 Ep. frat. 249. 
289 Trin. 11.3.6. 
290 Cant. 21; 105. 
291 See the section on sensus amoris, pp.147-155. 
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Apart from the Augustinian pattern of the process of knowledge which forms 
William’s scaffolding of this text it is necessary to observe in the construction of this 
paragraph and of those that immediately follow292, the presence of a few other likely 
Augustinian elements, such as the notions of wisdom and contemplation, the 
transformative character of the knowledge of God, the gracious nature of the divine 
knowledge which cannot be acquired simply by human will but has to be granted by the 
Holy Spirit and finally, the most important aspect of all, the identification of the Holy 
Spirit with will and love.  
The transformations of memory into wisdom and that of the intellect into 
contemplation presents similarities with what Augustine discusses in Book XII of the De 
Trinitate, regarding the knowledge of the temporal things which he calls scientia and that 
of God and the eternal things, which he calls sapientia293. According to Augustine, action 
is the activity of scientia, while contemplation is the activity of sapientia294. However, 
few are those who reach this state of wisdom by means of contemplation and when they 
achieve this as far as it is possible for them, they have not the strength to abide in it and 
the result is only a transitory thought about a non-transitory thing which is committed to 
memory295.  
Augustine’s claim of the transformative character of the knowledge of God is 
based on his own theory of sense–perception according to which when one sees an object 
a likeness of this object is formed in one’s sense and committed to memory. But the 
image of the body in the memory is better than the reality itself because it is in a better 
nature.  
 
By the same token when we know God although we are indeed made better 
ourselves than we were before we knew him, especially when we like this same 
knowledge and appropriately love it and it is a word and becomes a kind of 
likeness to God; nevertheless it remains inferior to God because it is in an inferior 
nature296. 
 
                                                 
292 Ep. frat. 250-251. 
293 Trin. 12.14.22. 
294 Trin. 12.14.22. 
295 Trin. 12.14.22. 
296 Trin. 9.11.16. 
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William subscribes to the idea that the knowledge of God has a transformative character 
and in the text we have just discussed above, he simply hints at this by using the term 
afficit which indicates that the thinking subject is affected as a result of this experiential 
knowledge. In other texts describing the highest state of knowledge for the human being, 
especially those texts where he addresses the issue of the unitas spiritus, William also 
considers that a sort of likeness of God is impressed in the human souls and thus gives to 
the human beings the possibility to experience the union with the divine persons297. 
Although the human beings need to prepare each element that constitutes thought 
by cleansing the memory of idle and unnecessary business, the intellect of anxieties and 
the will of foreign attachments, it is not in their power to raise themselves to knowing 
God298. The direct knowledge of God, the intellectus amoris, is entirely a gift of grace. In 
stressing the gracious character of this type of knowledge which is based on a direct 
encounter with the divinity William is in agreement with Augustine who from the first 
experience of God he was granted when he was not yet a Christian in Book VII of the 
Confessions, recognized the role of the divine assistance in the soul’s ascent to God299. 
Finally, the essential element of amor-intellectus is, as Odo Brooke pointed out300, 
the Holy Spirit. It is under that influence that the image of God is restored and in being 
restored succeeds to know God through love and to love God by knowing him. The 
amor-intellectus is to a certain extent the Holy Spirit301, the mutual knowledge and love 
of the Father and the Son and their unity. Behind this idea we find again Augustine in 
whose view it is the Holy Spirit who loves and knows God through us302. William 
adopted this idea and made it the core of his mystical theology, as we shall see next. As 
he approached this topic from different perspectives such as amor intellectus, unitas 
spiritus, or love of God, it is quite difficult to pin down his doctrine in a systematic way 
or to give a comprehensive account of it by considering it only from one angle. 
                                                 
297 See above, p. 148.  
298 Ep. frat. 251. 
299 conf. 7.10.16. 
300 Brooke (1959) 113.  
301 Brooke (1959) 113, n. 137, considers that William does not speak of an identification between amor-
intellectus and the Holy Spirit, his intention being that of suggesting that amor-intellectus is a real 
participation in the life of the Holy Spirit. 
302 See the discussion about the Holy Spirit below, pp. 167-169. 
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Therefore, a change of perspective is needed at this stage in our discussion, not before 
concluding briefly. 
In reflecting upon the state denoted by intellectus amoris, William relies directly 
on Augustinian texts which treat of the relation between love and knowledge, makes use 
of various Augustinian elements (the triune created image of God in the human being, the 
concept of wisdom, the role of the Holy Spirit in the act of loving and knowing), follows 
Augustine’s operational cognitive principle and in general arrives to surprisingly original 
results by reading Augustine with Augustine’s help.   
 
 
7. The Holy Spirit as love 
 
 
One of the most distinctive, even unique elements of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
doctrine is the appropriation of love to the Holy Spirit. Although far from being 
systematic or fully elaborated, this aspect of Augustine’s treatment of the Trinity had a 
significant impact on medieval thought and William is a case in point. In this section, we 
will present briefly the main lines of the discussion of the Holy Spirit as love in 
Augustine. Then we will observe to what extent Augustine’s ideas are used by William. 
The material considered in this section will serve as a basis for the discussion of the role 
of the Holy Spirit in the union of the soul with God, which William terms as unitas 
spiritus.  
In articulating his teaching on the aspect of the Holy Spirit as love, Augustine 
cannot benefit from biblical support since he himself acknowledges that nowhere in the 
sacred text is to be found explicitly stated that the Holy Spirit is love303. Therefore, he 
relies on two ideas which he combines in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of such a 
statement: the idea of the Holy Spirit as gift of God (donum Dei) and that of the Holy 
Spirit as the link between the Father and the Son304. The first idea is rooted in Scripture305 
and was also remarked and commented upon by Christian Latin authors who preceded 
                                                 
303 Trin. 15.17.27. 
304 Burnaby (1938) 173. 
305 See the biblical narratives of the Samaritan woman in Jn 4:10 and that of Simon Magus in Acts 8:20. 
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Augustine306. The second idea seems to be of Platonist origin and suggested to Augustine 
by the reading of Marius Victorinus307 and Porphyry308. 
In Book V of the De Trinitate, these ideas appear together as different steps in an 
argumentation that aims at introducing the theme of the Holy Spirit as love309. Beginning 
with the biblical evidence of the Holy Spirit as donum Dei, Augustine meditates on the 
nature of the gift and this allows him to make a smooth transition to the theme of the 
Holy Spirit as the bond of the Father and the Son: “to speak of the gift of the giver and 
the giver of the gift is to use terms that are relative one to another. Therefore the Holy 
Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son”310. Augustine insists 
throughout the De Trinitate that the Holy Spirit is that which “is common to both Father 
and Son and therefore properly called that which both have in common”311, “an 
inseparable and eternal connection”312, “the unity of both”313 Father and Son, or that the 
third Person of the Trinity is “a certain ineffable embrace of the Father and the image [i.e. 
the Son]”314. 
Because the terms communio, complexus, connexio or unitas reveal something of 
the nature of love “which is a kind of life which binds or seeks to bind some two 
                                                 
306 Hilary, De Trinitate 2.29. CCL 62:64 and Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 1.5.66. PL 16:721A. For a 
discussion of the views on the Holy Spirit of other early Latin Christian authors, see Wilken (2000) 1-18. 
307 Marius Victorinus, Hymn 1.3. CSEL 83/1:285 speaks of the Spirit as copula while Hymn 3.242-345. 
CSEL 83/1:303 refers to the Spirit with the terms conexio and conplexio.  
308 TeSelle (1999) 435 observes that Augustine might have had this notion from Porphyry, whom he quotes 
in civ. Dei 10.23 referring to the Father and the paternus intellectus and the medium between them. 
309 The idea of the Holy Spirit as love is already present in Augustine’s early works such as f. et symb. 19 
(regarding the Spirit’s activity ad extra) and mus. 6.56 (as a substantive term), but in the De Trinitate we 
witness the whole argumentative process that supports Augustine’s claim that the Holy Spirit is love. For 
more examples of the Holy Spirit as love in Augustine’s works preceding the De Trinitate, see Cavallera 
(1930) 382-387. Among Augustine’s predecessors who wrote on the Holy Spirit, such as Hilary of Poitiers, 
Dydimus the Blind and Ambrose, none of them identified the third person of the divine Trinity with love. 
Ambrose, however, goes further than the others when commenting on Rom 5:5 and emphasizes that the 
Holy Spirit is “the dispenser and abundant fount of divine love”, see De Spiritu Sancto. 1.5.66. PL 
16:721A. For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of the Holy Spirit in these authors preceding 
Augustine see Wilken (2000) 1-8.  
310 Trin. 5.11.12: Donum ergo donatoris et donator doni cum dicimus relative utrumque ad invicem 
dicimus. ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio…  
311 Trin. 15.19.37: Quia enim est communis ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter. 
312 Trin. 6.4.6: …inseparabilis atque aeterna connexio. 
313 Trin. 6.5.7: unitas amborum. 
314 Trin. 6.7.11: … ineffabilis quidam complexus patris et imaginis. 
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together”315, in Book VI of the De Trinitate, Augustine relies on this point in order to 
introduce the notion of love in relation to the Holy Spirit: 
 
The Holy Spirit, therefore is something common to the Father and the Son, 
whatever that is. And this communion is consubstantial and co-eternal; which, if it 
may appropriately be called friendship, let it be so called; but still more aptly it is 
called love. And this love is also substance, because God is substance, and God is 
love, as it is written316.  
 
In this paragraph which culminates in the famous quotation from 1 Jn 4:16, Deus caritas 
est, love, although identified with the third person of the Trinity, does not reveal the 
relationship of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, rather it is a “substantive” 
term which like Wisdom or Power can be applied to all members of the Holy Trinity317. 
Augustine comes back to the idea of the Holy Spirit as love only in the last book of the 
De Trinitate, where he is in search of what forms the proprium of the third person of the 
divine Trinity in relation with the other two persons. His identification of the Holy Spirit 
with love is made in the light of his long discussion of the analogies of the image of God 
in the human soul, where the third component of the image during the inward search was 
constantly will or love. However, his main argument for the appropriation of the term 
love to the Holy Spirit is entirely exegetical, being based on 1 Jn 4:7 “love is of God” 
(dilectio ex Deo est) and on 1 Jn 4:8 “God is love” (Deus dilectio est), which Augustine 
inverses to “love is God”318. Therefore, in Augustine’s own words “God from God is 
love” (deus ergo ex deo est dilectio)319. As it is not possible to say of the Father that he is 
God of God but only of the Son or of the Spirit, Augustine concludes that the Apostle 
must be referring to the latter since the biblical context, which explicates the expressions 
“love is of God” and “God is love” continues like this: “‘In this’, he said, ‘we know that 
we abide in him and he in us because he has given us of his Spirit’. Therefore the Holy 
Spirit, of whom he has given us causes us to remain in God and God in us. But love does 
this. He is, therefore, the God who is love”320.  
                                                 
315 Trin. 8.10.14: quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans vel copulari appetens 
316 Trin. 6.5.7. 
317 Burnaby (1938) 174. 
318 On the inversion of 1 Jn 4:8 see Teske (2008) 49-60. 
319 Trin. 15.17.31. 
320 Trin. 15.17.31. 
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The intratrinitarian distinctions of the Holy Spirit from the other two persons of 
the divine trinity (namely the gift of God, the ineffable communion of the Father and the 
Son, the love), which forbid the confounding of the divine persons, have also 
consequences regarding the salvation economy, that is, regarding God’s dealing with his 
creatures. As gift of God and love, the Holy Spirit pours the charity of God in the hearts 
of the human beings, according to the biblical passage which states that: Caritas Dei 
diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum (Rom 5:5). In this way, the Holy 
Spirit is the source of every true love (love for God and love for one’s neighbour) since, 
as Augustine repeats incessantly, the human beings do not have from where to love God, 
except from God himself321.  
In Augustine’s view, however, the gift of God is not only the source of our love 
for God, he goes further than that, identifying the gift of God with the act of loving God, 
or in other words, the human love for God is the gift of God: Amare Deum donum Dei 
est322. And since “the gift of the Spirit is nothing else than the Spirit himself”323, it 
follows that our love for God is God, the Holy Spirit himself. Thus, rather than giving to 
human beings anything created or inferior, God gives God: “Is he not God who gives the 
Holy Spirit? Nay, how great a God is he who gives God”324 exclaims Augustine. This 
idea is also present in some of Augustine’s sermons in very bold formulations: 
 
He whom we have loved has given us himself, he has given us that from where 
we may love (…) so that we love God through God, because the Holy Spirit is 
God and we cannot love God except through the Holy Spirit325. 
 
…or even a more radical statement: 
 
That you may love God, let him dwell in you and love himself through you326. 
  
According to the passages quoted above our act of loving becomes the Spirit’s act of 
loving or to put it in a different way, when God is the object of our love, God loves God 
in us and through us. In addition to this, since in Augustine’s view we cannot love what 
                                                 
321 Trin. 15.17.31.  
322 s. 297.1. 
323 Trin. 15. 19. 36: …sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam spiritus sanctus. 
324 Trin. 15.26.46: Quomodo ergo Deus non est qui dat Spiritum Sanctum? Imo quantus Deus est qui dat 
Deum. 
325 s. 34.2-3. 
326 s. 128.4: Ut ergo ames Deum, habitet in te Deus, et amet se de te. 
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we do not know, the Holy Spirit manifests himself not only in the act of loving but also in 
that of knowing. Thus, in contemplation the Holy Spirit takes over the human cognitive 
capacity in such a way that it is not the contemplative soul who knows or sees God but 
God who sees himself through the human soul. Augustine refers to this aspect of 
contemplation in a passage in the Confessiones: 
 
To those who see your works through your Spirit, it is you who sees in them. 
When they see that the works are good, you see that they are good; and whatever 
delights you through your Spirit, delights you in us (…). When I ask why “‘No 
one knows what belongs to God but God’s Spirit’ (1 Cor 2:11), and therefore how 
shall we know what are the gifts that God has given us?” the answer is that what 
we know through his Spirit is only known by the Spirit of God (…). Therefore, 
whatever they see in God’s spirit to be good, it is not they but God who sees that 
it is good327.  
 
These are very striking ideas suggesting that in the act of loving God and knowing or 
seeing God, it is the Holy Spirit, the gift of God, who loves and knows through human 
beings, rather than anything related to the human capacity of doing so. These radical 
formulations can be seen as the logical consequence of Augustine’s constant conviction 
and response against the Pelagians that of his own power the human being “made it 
possible to fall, but is not able to generate his resurrection”328 and that everything good is 
the work of God in his creatures. 
By emphasizing that it is the Holy Spirit who works in human beings in order that 
they may love God or that it is God who loves himself in human beings, it is important to 
observe that Augustine avoids to draw any distinction between the love of God which the 
Spirit pours into the human hearts or the love for God on the one hand and the love which 
is God himself on the other hand329. Augustine’s silence in this aspect gave rise to 
controversy in the twelfth century with opinions ranging from complete identification of 
the virtue of charity with the Holy Spirit, as in the case of Peter Lombard330, to sharp 
                                                 
327 conf. 13.31.46. On the importance of this text see also Kenney (2005) 105-107, 123, 126-127 and 
McGinn (2006) 14. 
328 en. Ps. 129.1: idoneus potuit esse homo ad casum suum; non est idoneus ad resurrectionem suam. 
329 Burnaby (1938) 174. 
330 Peter Lombard, Sententiae 2. PL 191:1339C. See also Landgraf (1952) 220-221. 
 169
distinction between created and uncreated love as in the case of Abelard331 and Rupert of 
Deutz332.   
Finally, apart from being the consubstantial communion of the Father and the 
Son, in his activity ad extra the Holy Spirit as the gift of God is intended to bring human 
beings in communion with their creator: 
 
That which is common to the Father and the Son, through this they have willed 
that we should have communion with one another and with them, [they have 
willed] that we should be brought together into one through that gift which they 
both have as one, that is through the Holy Spirit, God and God’s gift333.  
 
The divine intention in giving the Holy Spirit as gift of God to humans was to enable 
them to participate in the Trinitarian life. This idea is mentioned also in the De Trinitate 
where Augustine says: 
 
Love therefore which is from God, and which is God, is in the true sense the Holy 
Spirit, through whom is poured into our hearts the charity of God, through which 
the whole Trinity dwells in us334.  
  
It is therefore by means of love which is the Holy Spirit that we are united to God. The 
communion or unity consisting of the Holy Spirit and existing within the Holy Trinity, to 
which Augustine refers by using the term unum, based on the biblical verse Ego et Pater 
unum sumus (Jn 10:30), is entirely different from the unity between God and the soul, 
brought about by the same Holy Spirit and to which Augustine applies the term unus 
spiritus (1 Cor 6:17). In the first unity there is sameness of nature, while in the second 
there is difference in nature. By love which is the Holy Spirit the human soul is joined to 
God and although the natures remain distinct, as a result of this unity, the human soul 
undergoes a certain transformation. Like in the case of vision, where the viewer is 
affected by the object which is seen335, Augustine is convinced that the object of love 
affects the lover: “Do you love the earth? You will be earth! Do you love God? What 
shall I say? You will be God? I do not dare to say it from myself, let us hear the 
                                                 
331 Abelard, Epistola ad Romanos 2.5. PL. 178:860. 
332 Rupert of Deutz, De divinis officiis 11.7. PL. 170:300. 
333 s. 71.18. 
334 Trin. 15.18.32. 
335 See the section on sensus amoris, pp. 147-155. 
 170
scriptures: I said you are gods and all of you children of the Most High (Ps. 81:6)”336. Of 
course, Augustine is careful to add that human beings become merely gods by grace and 
not by nature337, since in the unity brought about by the Holy Spirit as love, the natures 
remain always distinct.   
Turning to William, it is important to observe that he refers to the Augustinian 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love already in his first writings. Thus, in De natura et 
dignitate amoris he makes the third element of the Augustinian image of God in the 
human being, namely the will or love, correspond to the Holy Spirit338. But he does not 
discuss the mystical implications of such a statement. In this early work, the accent seems 
to fall more on God in general being called love339. In the De contemplando Deo of the 
same period, William goes much further when dealing with the same topic and offers to 
his readers a comprehensive summary of the Augustinian teaching on the Holy Spirit as 
love. The idea that the Holy Spirit is love is repeated several time throughout this 
paragraph and examined from different perspectives. Thus, William defines substantially 
the Holy Spirit as love like in the following passage: 
 
Therefore, you love yourself, oh lovable Lord, in yourself, when from the Father 
and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit, the love of the Father towards the Son, and 
the love of the Son towards the Father, and the love is so great that it becomes 
unity; and the unity is so great that it is homoousion, that is, the same substance of 
the Father and the Son340.  
 
William uses the expression amor tuus to refer to the Holy Spirit in his intratrinitarian 
operation: “But your love is your goodness (…) the Holy Spirit proceeding from the 
Father and the Son”341. However, amor tuus as the third person of the Trinity may also 
act in creation by his dwelling in the human beings: “And when your love, the love of the 
Father towards the Son and the love of the Son towards the Father, the Holy Spirit, 
                                                 
336 ep. Jo. tr. 2.14: Diligis terram? Terra eris. Deum diligis? Quid dicam? Deus eris? Non audeo dicere 
ex me, scripturas audiamus: Ego dixi, dii estis,  et filii altissimi omnes. 
337 en. Ps. 49.2: Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus: sed hoc gratiae adoptantis, non naturae 
generantis. 
338 Nat. am. 3. 
339 Nat. am. 12.  
340 Contemp. 14. 
341 Contemp. 14: Sed amor tuus, bonitas tua est (…) spiritus sanctus a patre procedens et filio. 
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dwelling in us, he is towards you that which it is, that is, love”342. By his activity ad extra 
the Holy Spirit entrusts to the human hearts the charity of God, according to the biblical 
verse from Rom 5:5 to which William alludes repeatedly343, so that we love God affectu 
amoris which has been implanted in us by God344. Human beings have not just received 
love from God, they have received the love which is God, since the love we have for 
God, which William likes to term amor noster, is also the Holy Spirit: “For he [i. e. the 
Holy Spirit] is our love by which we reach out to you, by which we embrace you”345. The 
logical conclusion of this reasoning, repeated by William four times in this paragraph 
alone, is that to love God is identical with saying that God loves himself in or through us: 
“we love you or you love yourself in us”346.  
And yet in spite of this identification of amor tuus with amor noster or of God’s 
love for us with our love for God, there seems to be a difference in the way these two 
types of love operate, for William tells us that we love God affectu, while he loves us 
effectu: nos affectu, tu effectu347. Like Augustine, he considers affectus a term which 
cannot be applied to God348, since this would suggest that God is liable to change. 
Therefore God’s love for his creatures will not affect him in any way. To love effectu 
caritatis, explains William, means that God loves us by making us his lovers: “You love 
us therefore in as much as you make us lovers of you349”. This is not an original idea by 
William. It is already to be found in Augustine’s interpretation of the expression caritas 
Dei from Rom 5:5 which represents in Augustine’s view “not the love by which God 
loves us but the love by which he makes us his lovers”350. 
On the other hand our love for God is transformative, we love affectu amoris and 
are affected by the object of our love: “When we love you, our spirit is affected by your 
                                                 
342 Contemp. 17: Cumque amor tuus, amor Patris ad Filium amor Filii ad Patrem, Spiritus sanctus, 
habitans in nobis ad te est quod est, id est amor. 
343 Contemp. 14: et Dei in nos caritas commendans; Contemp. 17: per quem [i.e. spiritum sanctum] 
habitantem in nobis caritatem Dei habemus diffusam in cordibus nostris. 
344 Contemp. 14: Sed nos te diligimus affectu amoris a te nobis indito.  
345 Contemp. 17: Ipse enim est amor noster quo ad te pertingimus; quo te amplectimur.  
346 Contemp. 17: Amamus te vel amas tu te in nobis; Contemp. 14: Amas et te ipsum in nobis, mittendo 
Spiritum Filii tui in corda nostra; Contemp. 14: immo sic teipsum in nobis amas; Contemp. 15: Tu teipsum 
amas in nobis et nos in te cum per te amabimus.  
347 Contemp. 17. 
348 See above, pp. 144, n. 222. 
349 Contemp. 15: Amas itaque nos in quantum nos efficis tui amatores. 
350 spir. et litt. 56:… non qua nos ipse diligit, sed qua nos facit dilectores suos. 
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Holy Spirit”351 and we are united to him. It is important to note that already in this early 
work the long discussion of the Holy Spirit as love is nothing else than a prelude to the 
theme of the soul’s unity with God. The final aspect of this journey which has started 
with God’s love for his creatures is that through the unity with him realized by love, i.e. 
the Holy Spirit, we may be transformed into gods as well. William quotes as support for 
this idea Ps 81:6352, which appears in a similar context in Augustine353. And also like for 
Augustine, human beings become gods or children of God only per adoptionis gratiam 
while Christ is God and the Son of God per naturam354.  
Along these lines, I dare to argue that already at this early stage in his career as a 
writer William had a comprehensive view of the fragmentary and unsystematic 
Augustinian doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love. In spite of not containing explicit 
quotations from Augustine’s works, the central chapters from the De contemplando Deo 
contain a concentrated summary of the most important Augustinian ideas on love. 
It is possible to bring more substantial evidence that the ideas presented in this 
early work are based on Augustine by looking at some of William’s later works, where he 
quotes directly from Augustine. One may rightly ask why William, who seems to have 
known Augustine’s ideas regarding the Holy Spirit already quite early in his career, uses 
them explicitly particularly in his later works. When attempting to answer this question, 
firstly, one needs to take into account the genre of William’s works. It is known that a 
significant part of William’s works consists to a great deal of compilations, as for 
instance the Sacramentum altaris, the Expositio super Cantica Canticorum and the 
Aenigma fidei. Secondly, the main works written during the time when William was still 
abbot of St. Thierry do not have a polemical dimension. Later in his career, becoming 
entangled in theological disputes against Abelard and William of Conches, his works 
begin to acquire a more polemical dimension, in addition to the explicitly acknowledged 
goal of theological edification. This is the case with a treatise such as the Aenigma fidei, 
which was probably written with the undeclared intention of refuting the Trinitarian 
                                                 
351 Contemp. 17: Cum te amamus, afficitur quidem spiritus noster, Spiritui tuo sancto. 
352 Contemp. 15: Genus, inquam, sumus Dei, dii et filii Excelsi omnes. William quotes Ps 81:6 slightly 
different from Augustine using the term excelsi instead of altissimi in order to refer to the Most High.  
353 See above, pp. 169-170. 
354 Contemp. 14: The idea appears almost in the same formulation at the end of the Aenigma fidei in a very 
Augustinian context.  William tells his readers that God loves us non affectu sed effectu caritatis. See 
Aenig. 100. 
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teaching of Abelard355. In opposing Abelard, William had to make sure that the words of 
his treatise acquired a transparency which allowed a versed theologian immediately to 
identify the authoritative voice that stands behind these words. Thus, in the Aenigma fidei 
he makes ample use of the books V, VI and XV of Augustine’s De Trinitate. From Book 
VI for instance, he uses the substantive definition of the Holy Spirit as love: 
 
Aenig. 98: 
Cum ergo sit Spiritus Sanctus spiritus 
Patris et Filii et ab utroque procedat sitque 
caritas et unitas amborum, manifestum est, 
quod non sit  aliquis duorum, quo uterque 
coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente  
diligitur, genitoremque suum diligit, ut sint 
non participatione aliena sed propria 
essentia, nec alterius dono sed suo proprio 
servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo 
pacis.  
Trin. 6.5.7: 
quapropter etiam spiritus sanctus in eadem 
unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. 
sive enim sit unitas amborum sive sanctitas 
sive caritas, sive ideo unitas quia caritas et 
ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est 
quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque 
coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente 
diligatur generatoremque suum diligat, 
sintque non participatione sed essentia sua 
neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo 
proprio servantes unitatem spiritus in 
vinculo pacis. 
  
William’s dependence on Augustine is also clear from his use of the ideas of the Holy 
Spirit as the gift of God, the source of the human love for God and neighbour, the Holy 
Spirit as love itself and in the particular emphasis that the human being has not from 




Sanctus enim Spiritus caritas est Patris et 
Filii, qua se diligunt, et unitas qua unum 
sunt. Hic cum datus fuerit homini, accendit 
eum in dilectionem Dei ac proximi. Et ipse 
ipsa dilectio est quia Deus caritas est; nec 
habet homo unde diligat Deum nisi ex deo.  
Trin. 15.17.31: 
 
Deus igitur spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex 
deo cum datus fuerit homini accendit eum 
in dilectionem dei et proximi, et ipse 
dilectio est. Non enim habet homo unde 
deum diligat nisi ex deo. 
 
                                                 
355 Although William has never made clear the relation existing between this work and his polemic with 
Abelard, the academic consensus sees this treatise as being a part of William’s polemical work against 
Abelard. See Brooke (1960) 194; Brooke (1963) 188; Anderson (1974) 10.  
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In the same work William borrows from Augustine other crucial ideas with regard to the 
Holy Spirit, namely the idea that the Holy Spirit is that which is common to the Father 




Cum autem unusquisque eorum sit Spiritus 
et utique sanctus, est Spiritus Sanctus qui 
communis est duorum et proprie censetur 
eo nomine, quod commune est amborum  
sicut ipse commune est amborum quicquid  
commune est eorum, divinitas eorum, 
caritas, suavitas, beatitudo et caetera.  
Trin. 5.9.12 : 
 
Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod 
illi communiter quia et pater spiritus et 
filius spiritus et pater sanctus et filius 
sanctus. ut ergo ex nomine quod utrique 
convenit utriusque communio significetur, 
vocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus. 
et haec trinitas unus deus, solus, bonus, 
magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi 




Augustine’s ideas on the Holy Spirit as love which William adopted and 
comprehensively presented in his early treatise De contemplando Deo remain a constant 
motif in his works, as one of William’s last works demonstrates:  
 
For the love of God or the love that is God, the Holy Spirit, infusing himself into 
the human being’s love and spirit, attracts him to himself; and God loving himself 
through the human being makes him and his spirit and his love, one with himself. 
For as the body has not from where to live apart except from its spirit, in the same 
way the human being’s affectus which is called love, does not live, that is to say, 
it does not love God, except from the Holy Spirit356.  
 
That the love of God is the love which is God, namely the Holy Spirit, is one of the major 
ideas that Augustine bequeathed to the Middle Ages not without complications though, 
for it gave rise to a lively debate among William’s contemporaries regarding the nature of 
the two loves. Peter Lombard maintained the identification of the two while Abaelard and 
Rupert of Deutz357 distinguished between the love which is God the Holy Spirit as 
substantialiter amor and the love for God which is merely accidentali dono358. William 
persists in the ambiguity which characterized Augustine’s view on this topic. More than 
                                                 
356 Ep. frat. 170. 
357 See above, pp. 168-169, n. 330, n. 331 and n. 332. 
358 Brooke (1980) 56, n. 137. 
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Augustine, however, while stressing that it is the same Spirit in both our love for God and 
the love which is God, William also seems to acknowledge that the two types of love are 
not identical. Thus, he speaks of the distinction between divine love and human love in 
terms of substance and quality359, unity and likeness360, consubstantiality and grace361, 
essence and participation362. At the same time in the same context while mentioning these 
differences, William stresses that nevertheless “it is the same, completely the same 
Spirit”363. David Bell solved this ambiguity at the heart of William’s spirituality in a 
convincing manner, which he has demonstrated also to be in line with the Augustine’s 
position on this subject: regarding the question whether our love for God is or is not the 
Holy Spirit “we are forced inexorably into answering both yes and no: yes, our love for 
God is the Holy Spirit, but no, not in the same sense in which the Holy Spirit is the 
consubstantial love of the Father and Son. Our love is not the Holy Spirit by essence, 
nature or substance; it is the Holy Spirit by participation (…) If God is love, love is like 
God in that it is what it is only by participation in him who is love, but as we saw in the 
case of Augustine, uncreated love always remains greater”364.   
It is noteworthy that in making use of Augustine’s ideas on the Holy Spirit as 
love, William did not single out a particular aspect of them; rather he embraced them in 
their entirety and made them the cornerstone on which he based his discussion of the 
mystical union of the soul with God. This direction had already been indicated by 
Augustine but it remained William’s task to develop it fully.  
 
8. Amor, dilectio, caritas 
 
Repeatedly throughout his works, from the early De natura et dignitate amoris to 
the later Epistula ad fratres de monte Dei, William presents his readers an ascending 
scale of several stages representing the order of love, which, in spite of some variations 
from one work to another, contains, nevertheless, as the most usual elements: amor, 
                                                 
359 Nat. am. 12. 
360 Aenig.  6; Spec. 107. 
361 Cant. 132. 
362 Aenig. 98.  
363 Cant. 132: …idem tamen, idem plane Spiritus. 
364 Bell (1984) 139-140. 
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dilectio and caritas365. These significant terms of the vocabulary of love have been 
singled out and commented upon in the Western tradition, and already by Augustine on 
several occasions. Depending on the context he was either prepared to claim that they 
were synonymous366, or he considered it relevant to point out the different nuances 
carried by each of these terms. Thus, caritas is the easiest to be distinguished from the 
other two terms, since it is always related to worthy objects such as God, the neighbour or 
the soul367. Augustine shows no resolve to introduce a clear distinction between amor and 
dilectio, which, he observes, are used in Holy Scripture both in a good and a bad sense368. 
In spite of the indiscriminate use of amor and dilectio, the former seems to be the 
“neutral” term369, covering a wider area of meanings and is more the correspondent of the 
Greek term eros, while the latter together with caritas, because of their predominant use 
in a positive context, is more the analogous term for the Greek word agape370. 
Furthermore, Augustine considers dilectio and caritas as total synonyms when he is 
quoting the very important biblical verse of 1 Jn 4:8, both as Deus dilectio est and as 
Deus caritas est, but he never uses amor in this context371. These vague distinctions 
between amor, dilectio and caritas have been observed in the tradition after Augustine 
and the fluctuation in their use is observable, for instance, in the works of Bernard who 
does not show a particular interest in trying to cut a sharper distinction between them. 
In general, William’s use of the terms amor, dilectio, caritas, goes along the lines 
indicated by Augustine. When he speaks of love in general, like for Augustine, amor is 
the term serving all purposes, while dilectio and especially caritas are used only in 
relation to superior and worthy objects. While William uses amor and dilectio as perfect 
synonyms on many occasions, one has to observe, nevertheless, his preference of the 
former term together with its derivative verb amare over dilectio/ diligere372. This 
                                                 
365 The stages of the order of love are voluntas, amor, caritas and sapientia in Nat. am. 3; 4 and 28. In 
Cant. 6 William mentions only amor, dilectio and caritas. In Ep. frat. 49 he speaks first of voluntas ad 
Deum, amor and caritas  and later in the same works he will present an order of love formed of four stages 
amor, dilectio, caritas and unitas spiritus.  
366 civ. Dei 14.7; Jo. ev. tr. 123.5. 
367 div. qu. 36.1; en. Ps. 31 s. 2.5. 
368 civ. Dei. 14.7 
369 Burnaby (1938) 115. 
370 Bochet (1982) 279-280.  
371 Teske (2008) 51.  
372 Bell (1984) 156 n. 106.  
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preference can be explained by the fact that amor conveyed a certain warmth for and 
closeness to the object of love which recommended it for being used particularly in 
mystical contexts. Dilectio, on the other hand, in spite of being perceived as synonymous 
with amor, had a more calculated, rational dimension, which reduced its use 
considerably373. Such loose distinctions between the three terms allow William to affirm 
that amor, dilectio and caritas can be used interchangeably in order to designate the love 
of God, or the love by which God is loved, since it is the same Spirit present in all of 
them374 and since, we can add, according to Augustine and also William, they are all 
basically a form of will375. As a matter of fact, in order to emphasise the will as the 
subsistent factor of our return to God, William endeavors to depict the ascent of the soul 
to God only in terms of will. Thus, in his Meditatio 12, he speaks of a threefold ascent to 
God formed of the successive stages of magna voluntas, illuminata voluntas and affecta 
voluntas376. A similar threefold progression of the will in its ascension toward God is to 
be found in the Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei. According to this text, the will 
advances from voluntas ad Deum, to voluntas ratione formata, and finally to voluntas 
illuminata. William makes correspond the first level, that of the will turned to God, to 
simplicity, while the will formed by reason corresponds to amor and the illumined will 
corresponds to caritas377. In view of these texts, it is clear that terms such as amor and 
caritas are only partially synonymous, in so far they are both a form of voluntas.  
More than Augustine and Bernard, William shows a particular interest in 
employing amor, dilectio and caritas together with a few others terms in order to 
delineate several stages in the development of love. However, such a position is again 
supported by an idea deeply rooted in Augustine according to which we draw near to God 
not in spatial terms but in terms of affectus378. Embracing this idea, William claims in his 
early treatise De natura et dignitate amoris that four affectus are demanded from human 
beings in their entirety: voluntas, amor, caritas and sapientia379. These steps operate in 
the following way: “the will first moves the soul towards God, love advances it, charity 
                                                 
373 Casey (1988) 90. 
374 Cant. 6. 
375 See above, p. 138. 
376 Med. 12.16. 
377 Ep. frat. 49. 
378 See above, p. 144. 
379 Nat am. 28.  
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contemplates and wisdom enjoys”380. That Augustine’s idea of the affectus leading to 
God is paramount for William is proven by the fact that the entire structure of the De 
natura et dignitate amoris is dictated by the four stages of the growth of the same 
affective movement to God, which William parallels with the ages of the human being, 
advancing from birth and infancy (voluntas), to youth (amor), further to maturity 
(caritas) and finally to old age (sapientia). This early treatise was described by J.-M. 
Déchanet as “a concentrated synthesis of Augustine’s best thinking on the love of 
God”381. A brief look at the order of love exposed in this early work will demonstrate 
that, although William cannot find a similar gradation anywhere in Augustine, his 
teaching of the different levels of love nevertheless roots deeply in Augustine’s thought.  
William’s point of departure in his discussion about love is represented by a famous idea 
of Augustine which defines love in general as weight which carries the soul to its proper 
birthplace, namely God382. Next, William connects the idea of the gravity of love which 
carries the soul towards God with another theological element from Augustine, namely, 
the presence of the Trinitarian image, formed of memory, reason and will, in the human 
soul as a consequence of the soul’s creation in the image and likeness of God. Voluntas is 
given therefore by God and when the human being receives it, it is free, in the sense that 
it has the capacity to turn either towards good or towards evil. However, in accordance 
with Augustine’s teaching, on its own, the will can head only to perdition. One is in need 
of grace in order to direct the will toward God383. Since for the movement of the will 
there are ultimately only two options, away from or towards God, Déchanet claims that 
one can safely argue that in William’s understanding of the nature of love, there are only 
two types of love384. One arises when the will is left to itself, and some of the names for 
its forms are cupidity, avarice, lust. The other type of love born from a will accepting the 
divine grace enjoys a natural development that leads the soul through the successive 
stages of love, charity and wisdom to its proper place, which is God. The Christian 
perfection which is the goal of the cloistered life is understood then as advancement in 
                                                 
380 Nat. am. 28: Primum enim ad Deum, voluntas animam movet, amor promovet, caritas contemplatur, 
sapientia fruitur. 
381 Déchanet (1972) 14. 
382 For more details on the theme of love as pondus, see above p. 138-139. 
383 See above, p. 143. 
384 Déchanet (1980) xxv. 
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the positive ascending direction. Similarly, Augustine defined the Christian perfection as 
a “transference of weight”385 from cupiditas to caritas. 
More elements stemming from Augustine’s thought may be encountered in the 
description of the remaining stages of the order of love. For instance, there is no doubt 
that amor defined as “will ardently fixed on something good” is reminiscent of 
Augustine386. Caritas described as God and gift of God, apart from the biblical support 
echoes Augustine387. In addition, one may also find Augustinian roots for the idea that 
makes caritas correspond to the contemplation and vision of God. In one of his first 
works as a Christian, the Soliloquies, the highest stage in the ascent of the soul to God is 
represented by contemplation or vision of God, and the virtue corresponding to this stage 
is primarily caritas388. William knew well this text, and although here he merely alluded 
to it, in one of his later works, the Speculum fidei, he dealt with it at length389. Finally, 
William’s elevation of wisdom to the highest position and its description as fruition is 
also of Augustinian origin. In De doctrina Christiana, Augustine was presenting an 
ascent of the soul to God consisting of seven steps.390 Wisdom represents the highest 
stage, following immediately after the contemplation or vision of God, and at this stage, 
like in William’s description, the soul enjoys God391.  
William appears to have considered the order of love as quite important since he 
returns to it in his later works, but then changes the names of the stages that lead to God 
to a certain extent. Thus, in the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei, the stages of the 
progress of the soul to God are amor, dilectio, caritas and unitas spiritus and they are 
mentioned twice in the course of this work. William first describes these stages in the 
following way: 
When this [i.e. the will] stretches upwards like fire to its own place, that is when it 
is joined with truth and is moved to higher things, it is amor. When it is suckled 
by grace so that it might be moved on it is dilectio. When it seizes its object, when 
                                                 
385 Burnaby (1938) 94. 
386 See above the section on love as voluntas.  
387 See above, pp. 164-165. 
388 sol. 1.7.14. 
389 Spec. 3. For a longer discussion of William’s treatment of Augustine’s passage from the Soliloquies, see 
pp. 128-129.  
390 Pollmann (2005) 225-230. 
391 doc. Chr. 2.7.11: talis filius ascendit ad sapientiam, quae ultima et septima est, qua pacatus 
tranquillusque perfruitur. Nat. am. 28: sapientia fruitur.  
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it takes hold of it, when it enjoys it, it is caritas, it is unitas spiritus, it is God, for 
God is charity392.  
 
The first half of the definition of the first stage of amor as “will which stretches upwards 
like fire going to its own place” is reminiscent of Augustine and although the word 
pondus is not mentioned here, the comparison with the fire that mounts up to its own 
place, shows clearly William’s dependence on Augustine393. At the highest level, caritas 
is identified with unitas spiritus and described by making use among others of the verb 
frui, which was assigned in the earlier works to the stage of wisdom. While in this 
passage caritas and unitas spiritus seem to coincide, in a later section of the same work, 
William introduces a certain difference between the two stages: 
Amor is a great will to God; dilectio a clinging to him or conjunction to him; 
caritas, fruition. But for the human being who has his heart on high, unity of spirit 
with God is the perfection of the will that progresses into God, when not only 
does it will what God wills, but it is so much not affected but perfected in 
affection that it cannot will anything save that which God wills394.   
 
Again amor is the first stage of love described in Augustinian terms as magna voluntas. 
At the second level, dilectio described as adhaesio echoes Augustine’s reference to 
dilectio using exactly identical terms395. William is not saying anything, new not even in 
the description of caritas as fruition, but merely alludes to the famous definition of 
caritas given by Augustine in the De Doctrina Christiana according to which caritatem 
voco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum396. 
Finally, the definition of William’s fourth and highest stage of the ascent of the soul to 
God, that of the unitas spiritus, as the inability to will anything else but what God wills, 
needs also to be understood, as Bell has convincingly argued397, against the backdrop 
provided by Augustine’s writings. Thus, in one of his later works directed against the 
Pelagians, the De correptione et gratia398, Augustine drew a distinction between the type 
                                                 
392 Ep. frat. 235. 
393 conf. 13.9.10. 
394 Ep. frat. 257.  
395 s. 216.5: Mihi adhaerere Deo, bonum est; hanc adhaesionem, illa dilectio praestat. 
396 doc. Chr. 3.10.16. 
397 Bell (1984) 193-195. 
398 Bernard follows this text also in his treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio. He uses the expression non 
posse peccare in order to describe the highest state of freedom that the saints will enjoy in the kingdom of 
God as a result of their renovatio in melius and which he terms liberum complacitum. See the discussion 
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of free choice enjoyed by Adam in paradise and the free choice that the predestinated 
saints will possess in the kingdom of God as a result of the renovatio in melius. To the 
former correspond the activities of posse non peccare, posse non mori, bonum posse non 
deserere, while to the latter correspond the activities of non posse peccare, non posse 
mori, non posse deserere399. The difference between the two states is rendered by the 
contrast between posse non and non posse, or in other words, by the opposition between 
possibility and impossibility. By stating that unitas spiritus represents the impossibility of 
willing anything else but what God wills, and by using the expression non posse William 
alludes to Augustine’s description of the condition of saints after the resurrection. 
Moreover, William’s decision of defining the unitas spiritus in these Augustinian terms, 
can also be explained by the fact that this highest stage of the development of love is also 
identified by William with the highest type of similitude with God400; but, ultimately, the 
highest similitude with God is nothing else than our renovatio in melius.  
In conclusion, although Augustine never arranges the term amor, dilectio and 
caritas in an ascending order in his works, it may still be argued that William’s view on 
the progress of the will has its roots in the thought of the bishop of Hippo. William’s 
profound knowledge of Augustine’s writings enabled him to use scattered Augustinian 
material referring to different aspects of love, which he organized in such a way that the 
result of his work of synthesis was a new and innovative one. However, all the elements, 
of his new edifice are traditional and may be traced back to Augustine. 
                                                                                                                                                 
above, pp. 47-48. For a comparative look at Bernard’s understanding of liberum complacitum and 
William’s view on the unitas spiritus, see below, p. 201. 
399 corrept. 33. 
400 Ep. frat. 262. 
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Chapter 3: The Soul’s Direct Encounter with God 
 
At the end of the section dealing with William’s anthropology, several passages 
stating the identity between likeness and vision were presented, for as William himself 
put it “a clearer vision brings a clearer likeness”401. As it was possible to see in the 
second section of the present chapter this likeness is restored by means of love, which 
springs from a correct orientation of the will helped by grace toward God. The will then 
increases as to become dilectio, caritas and finally unitas spiritus. William speaks about 
the unitas spiritus (which sometimes is equated with charity402) as belonging to the 
highest type of likeness available to the human being. Therefore, likeness, vision and the 
perfection of love attained in the unitas spiritus may all be considered as referring to the 
same state of human perfection looked at from different perspectives403. As we have 
already discussed the highest type of likeness in our treatment of William’s view of the 
creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God404, the remaining tasks of 
this chapter are to explore the notions of visio Dei and unitas spiritus, as they were 
understood by our author, and to determine what role Augustine played in the articulation 
of William’s teaching on these topics.  
 
1. Visio Dei 
 
In dealing with this subject, it is necessary first to have a look at what Augustine 
had to say regarding this matter, since his theory of seeing God, both in the present life 
and in the next, played a significant role in the Western medieval discussion regarding the 
visio Dei405. It has been noticed that throughout his works, from his early to his mature 
texts, from his sermons and letters written in a more accessible style to the more 
intellectual discourse of his treatises, the preoccupation with happiness and hence with 
                                                 
401 Ep. frat. 271. 
402 Ep. frat. 235 and 263. 
403 On the identity between vision and likeness see Spec. 107; Aenig. 5; Ep. frat. 210 and 271. On the 
identity of vision and love see Contemp. 4; Nat. am. 20. On the identity between vision, love and likeness 
see Ep. frat. 267-275. 
404 See above, pp.133-136.  
405 For an introduction to the medieval debate on visio Dei see McGinn (2007) 15-34. 
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the vision of God is a constant feature in Augustine’s thought406. Augustine was the 
architect of a theory on the vision of God, which rejected all possibility of seeing God 
corporeally, either in the present life or in the future life, while, maintaining, 
nevertheless, that it was possible for the human being to see God invisibly407. Basing his 
argumentation on the biblical text, Augustine claims that it is only the pure of heart who 
will see God, but not with the eyes of the body; God is seen exclusively by the inner 
human being, in this life through a glass darkly, while in the life to come the vision will 
be face to face408. Augustine describes the state of the beatific vision at the end of the De 
civitate Dei in the following words: “Restored by him and perfected by a greater grace we 
shall rest forever and see always that he is God (…) There we shall be at rest and see, 
shall see and love, shall love and praise! This should be in the end without end!”409. 
Regarding the vision of God in this life, Augustine articulated a theory which attempted 
to harmonize conflicting scriptural passages about whether the human being could really 
see God here below. In his attempt to reconcile biblical texts such as: “No one shall see 
my face and live” (Ex 33:20), “No one has ever seen God” (Jn 1:18), and “I was speaking 
to God face to face as one is speaking to a friend” (Ex 33:11) or “Blessed are the clean of 
heart because they shall see God” (Mt 5:8), (to quote just a few examples) Augustine 
finds a solution to the conflicting scriptural verses, by introducing two useful distinctions: 
one between seeing God in specie410 and in substantia and the other between glimpse and 
                                                 
406 O’Connell (1968) 205. Augustine’s earliest accounts on the notion of seeing God are sol. 1.6.12-7.14 
and quant. 33.70-76. These two works were known and used by William, the former in Spec. 3-4, the latter 
in Nat. corp. 108. Augustine’s main works focusing particularly on visio Dei are Gn. litt. 12, ep. 92, ep. 147 
from which William quoted extensively in his own treatment of this subject presented in Aenig. 3-6. 
Augustine discusses also the notion of visio beatifica in ep. 148; ep. 162; s. 277; civ. Dei 22.29. The kinds 
of visions attainable in this life are examined in en. Ps. 41.2-10; 99.5-6; 134. 6; Jo.ev.tr. 20.11. Augustine’s 
major work on Trinity offers also extensive material for the notion of seeing God scattered throughout its 
fifteen books. Finally, the autobiographical accounts of Augustine’s direct encounter with God from conf. 
7.10.16; 7.17.23; 7.20.26; 9.10.23-9.10.26 as well as his searching for God in memory in Book 10 of the 
Confessiones, are also connected with the vision of God, the brevity of these experiences being explained 
mainly as the inability to gaze on the unchangeable light. For Augustine’s notion of vision of God see 
especially, Bell (1984) 65-89; McGinn (1991) 232-243; Teske (1994) 287-309.  
407 ep. 147.37. 
408 ep. 92.4; ep. 147.15. These are Augustine’s arguments against a belief spreading in his time among the 
cultivated roman people, who claimed that God is seen in this life by the mind and in the afterlife by the 
body. Moreover they considered that the wicked will see God in the same manner as the good. See Brown 
(1967) 273. 
409 civ. Dei 22.30. 
410 Bell shows that the term species is used by Augustine with one of the following meanings: 1) in relation 
to the face to face vision, so that in specie is equivalent to in substantia 2) species as referring to Ideas and 
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gaze411. As a general rule he states that no human being is allowed to see God in 
substantia, in natura, in essentia, or sicuti est412 in this life and live through the 
experience. In the majority of the examples of the vision of God presented in the Old 
Testament, God showed himself to the Patriarchs not in his substance but under the 
appearance (in specie) which he willed413, thus confirming the authority of the negative 
biblical evidence. However, Augustine grants some exceptions to this rule, for he admits 
that it is possible in exceptional conditions to see God in substantia or sicuti est when 
“the human mind is divinely caught up from this life to the angelic life before it is by our 
death freed from the body”414. This occurs in advanced ecstasy, when the mind is 
withdrawn from this life and when there is a complete separation of the mind from the 
body as happens in real death. The biblical statement that “No one shall see my face and 
live” has to be then understood not as a total negation of the possibility of seeing God in 
his substance in the present life, but as a reward granted to few415 in the state of ecstasy 
understood as a temporary death. Therefore, it is possible for very few to see now in a 
glimpse “That which is”, but the gaze is reserved for the afterlife. The main difference 
between the vision in this life as opposed to the next seems to lie in duration; as Andrew 
Louth observed: “ecstasy is something which if it went on for ever would be 
indistinguishable from the joys of heaven. But it does not, it is fleeting. Ecstasy is 
something that brings to Augustine’s mind the thought of the beatific vision, but it is 
other than it”416.   
A summary of Augustine’s views on seeing God may be found in Book XII of the 
De Genesi ad litteram, where a threefold ascending typology of visions is set forth. 
Augustine differentiates between corporeal, spiritual and intellectual seeing. The first 
category, that of the corporeal visions refers to corporeal objects which can be seen 
naturally through bodily eyes. At the next level, the spiritual visions refer to corporeal 
                                                                                                                                                 
finally 3) species as signifying “appearance”. See Bell (1984) 67 n. 3. In the aforementioned distinction 
between in specie and in substantia, species is used as referring to “appearance”.  
411 Miles (1983) 136-137.  
412 All these terms are synonyms.  
413 ep. 147.19. 
414 ep. 147.31: … nisi quia potest humana mens divinitus rapi ex hac vita ad angelicam vitam, antequam 
per istam communem morte carne salvatur. 
415 Augustine maintains that Moses, Paul and John were granted such experiences. 
416 Louth (2006) 133. 
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images of absent objects, either preserved in memory or fashioned by the imaginative 
power of the mind. Finally, the highest type of seeing called intellectual is extra-
conceptual. Ecstasy belongs to the higher two types of seeing, being therefore either 
spiritual, such as the revelation given to John in the Apocalypse417, or intellectual, when 
God speaks face to face to human beings deigned worthy of such vision418, such as Moses 
and Paul. 
Let us now turn to William’s view on seeing God and begin by saying that early 
in his career he manifested a particular interest in discussing this theme, since one of his 
first treatises bears the title De contemplando Deo, while another relatively early work, 
the Meditativae orationes is constructed around the idea of the contemplation of God’s 
face. The most extensive and clear evidence for William’s dependence on Augustine in 
his understanding of the vision of God is offered in his mature treatise Aenigma fidei. 
William’s view on this matter is presented in the larger context of the discussion of the 
human being’s inability to penetrate the mystery of God. William gives the impression 
that he has little to say on his own accord since almost the entire section is a mosaic of 
phrases extracted directly from Augustine’s Epistula 147, Epistula 92 and the Book XII 
of the De Genesi ad litteram. The twelfth century author’s contribution seems minimal, 
being reduced, at first glance, to the modest attempt of providing the link between the 
disparate Augustinian quotations. A parallel look at William’s text and at the original 
Augustinian texts will clearly show the extent to which William relies on Augustine when 
he discusses this topic. At the same time this comparative look will offer us an idea of the 
method used by William in dealing with his sources. In the first column William’s text 
quoted integrally, is presented in a way that facilitates the recognition of the passages 





Si enim quaeritur utrum in hac vita mortali 
a mortali homine potest videri Deus, 




credimus videri deum nunc; num quia 
vidimus el per oculos corporis, sicut 
videmus hunc solem, vel mentis obtutu, 
                                                 
417 Gn. litt. 12.23.53. 
418 Gn. litt. 12.23.54. 
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oculis, sicut videmus hunc solem; vel 
mentis obtutu, sicut unusquisque 
semetipsum videt aliquid quaerentem aut 
scientem;  
 
sed fide, quae canonicarum Scripturarum 
auctoritate muniatur.   
 
 
Visus est tamen a Patribus, sed ea specie 
quam voluntas elegit, non natura formavit.  
 
Deum enim nemo vidit umquam, ait 
evangelista Ioannes; utique sicut videntur 
ista quae visibilia dicuntur. Propter quod 




Unigenitus qui est in sinu Patris, 
narratione ineffabili, creatura rationalis 





Quae sic potest intelligere narrantem, 
sicuti est verbum, non sonus auribus 
strepens, sed imago mentibus innotescens, 
ut illud ei interna et manifesta lucet 
clarescat, quod dictum est a Domino: 






Desiderium enim veraciter piorum, quo 
videre deum cupiunt, non, ut opinor, in eam 
speciem flagrat contuendam, qua quando 
vult sicut vult quod ipse non est, sed in eam 




Videri enim hic mundo corde potest, 
sicut se quisque interius videt uiuentem, 
videt volentem, videt quaerentem, videt 







Nam multi viderunt; sed quod voluntas 









Proinde narrante unigenito, qui est in sinu 
patris, narratione ineffabili creatura 
rationalis munda et sancta impletur 




si possumus, unigenitum filium, qui est 
in sinu patris, sic intellegamus narrantem, 
quo modo et verbum est non sonus auribus 
instrepens sed imago mentibus innotescens, 
ut illic interna et ineffabili luce clarescat, 
quod dictum est: qui me vidit, vidit et 
patrem quod hic Philippo dicebatur, 




desiderium autem veraciter piorum, 
quo videre deum cupiunt et inhianter 
ardescunt, non, opinor, in eam speciem 
contuendam flagrat, qua, ut vult, apparet, 
quod ipse non est, sed in eam substantiam, 









Sed in hac quaestione Deum videndi, plus 
mihi videtur valere vivendi modum quam 
loquendi. Nam qui dicerit a Domino Iesu 
Christo mitis esse et humilis corde, plus in 
hoc cogitando et orando proficiet quam 
legendo vel audiendo, quamvis 
nonnumquam  et legendo et audiendo 
proficiat. 
 
Nemo autem se dicat velle Deum videre, 
qui mundando cordi curam tantae rei 
dignam noluerit impendere. 
 
 
Nemo enim valet Deum videre et vivere; 
quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita 
mentem, qua in illius visionis 








quae in futuro promittitur, sed iam hic in 
cunctis filiis gratiae inchoatur.  
 
 
Unigenitus ergo Filius deitatis natura  
atque substantiam insonabiliter narrans 
dignis idoneisque oculis tanto cospectui 
etiam in hac vita, insvisibiliter monstrat. 
Et qui potest Deum invisibiliter videre, 













quam ob rem primum mihi videtur plus 
ualere in hac inquisitione vivendi quam 
loquendi modum. nam qui didicerunt a 
domino Iesu Christo mites esse et humiles 
corde, plus cogitando et orando proficiunt 









nemo potest faciem meam videre et vivere , 
quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita 













unigenitus autem filius, qui est in sinu 
patris, deitatis naturam atque substantiam 
insonabiliter narrat et ideo dignis 
idoneisque tanto conspectu oculis etiam 
invisibiliter monstrat. ipsi enim sunt oculi, 
de quibus apostolus dicit: inluminatos 
oculos cordis vestri et de quibus dicitur: 
inlumina oculos meos, ne umquam 
obdormiam in morte. dominus enim spiritus 
est; unde, qui adhaeret domino, unus 
spiritus est; proinde, qui potest deum 





Deus enim invisibilis et incorruptibilis, qui 
solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem 
habitat inaccessibilem, quem nemo 
hominum vidit vel videre potest, per id 
quod videt homo corpore corpora, per hoc 
ab hominibus videri non potest. Qui si et 
mentibus piroum esset inaccesibilis, non 
diceretur: Accedite ad eum et illuminamini. 
Et si mentibus piorum esset invisibilis, non 
diceretur: quia videbimus eum sicuti est. 
Perspiciamus totam ipsam epistolam 
Iohannis. Dilectissmi, inquit, nunc filii dei 
sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. 
Scimus autem quoniam, cum apparuerit, 
similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum 
sicuti est. In tantum ergo eum videbimus, in 
quantum similes ei erimus, et inde eum 
videbimus unde similes ei erimus, mente 
scilicet: quia et nunc in tantum non 
videmus, in quantum dissimiles ab eo 
sumus. 
Qui autem vel dementissimus dixerit 
corpore nos similes Dei fore ? In interiore 
ergo homine similitudo ista est, qua 
renovatur homo de die in diem in agnitione 
Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit 
eum: ubi tanto similiores efficimur, quanto 
magis in eius cognitionem caritatemque 
proficimus; et in tantum eum propinquimus 
ac familiarius videmus, in quantum 
cognoscendo eum ac diligendo efficimur 
similiores. In quo quantuscumque hic 
perfectus fuerit, longe est ab illa 
perfectione, qua Deus videbitur sicuti est 




Sed aliter in summa essentia, aliter in 
inferiore natura.  
 
Ibi enim videbitur claritas Domini, non per 
visionem significantem sive corporalem, 
incorporaliter adhaerere. 
 
ep. 92.3:  
 
Non ita est deus invisibilis et 
incorruptibilis, qui solus habet 
inmortalitatem et lucem habitat 
inaccessibilem, quem nemo hominum uidit 
nec videre potest. Per hoc enim videri ab 
homine non potest, per quod videt homo 
corpore corpora. Nam si et mentibus 
piorum esset inaccessibilis, non diceretur: 
accedite ad eum et inluminamini, et si 
mentibus piorum esset invisibilis, 
non diceretur: uidebimus eum, sicuti est. 
Nam perspice totam ipsam in epistula 
Iohannis sententiam: dilectissimi, 
inquit, filii dei sumus et nondum apparuit, 
quod erimus. Scimus, quia, cum apparuerit, 
similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum, 
sicuti est. In tantum ergo videbimus, in 
quantum similes erimus, quia et 
nunc in tantum non videmus, in quantum 
dissimiles sumus. 
Inde igitur videbimus, ubi similes erimus. 
quis autem dementissimus dixerit corpore 
nos vel esse vel futuros esse similes deo? in 
interiore igitur homine ista similitudo est, 
qui renovatur in agnitione dei secundum 
imaginem eius, qui creavit eum. Et tanto 
efficimur similiores illi, quanto magis in 
eius cognitione et caritate proficimus, 
quia, etsi exterior homo noster 
corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur de die 
in diem ita sane, ut in hac uita, 
quantuscumque provectus sit, longe absit 
ab illa perfectione similitudinis, quae 
idonea erit ad videndum deum, sicut dicit 
apostolus, facie ad faciem. 
 





Ibi videtur claritas domini non per 
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sicut visa est in monte Syna, sive 
spiritualem sicut vidit Isaias, vel Iohannes 
in Apocalypsi, sed per speciem; non per 
speculum sed et in aenigmate, sicut hic 
videtur ab hominibus qui digni sunt hac 
visione, quantum eam capere potest mens 
humana secundum assumentis gratiam, sed 
facie ad faciem. 
visionem significantem sive corporalem, 
sicut visa est in monte Sina, sive spiritalem, 
sicut vidit Esaias vel Iohannes in 
apocalypsi, sed per speciem non per 
aenigmata, quantum eam capere humana 
mens potest, secundum adsumentis dei 
gratiam. 
 
In the few paragraphs quoted above, which contain the whole discussion of the vision of 
God here and in the hereafter, William succeeds in offering an accurate summary of 
Augustine’s view on seeing God as well as adding his own distinctive mark, by 
distinguishing between the vision existing within the Holy Trinity and the human being’s 
vision of the Holy Trinity. Thus, borrowing Augustine’s voice, William begins by saying 
that God can be seen in this life by the human beings, although not with the eyes of the 
body419. However, some of the patres were able to see God, but under the appearance (in 
specie) which he willed and not in his nature420. But truly religious persons long not after 
the form in which God deigns to appear and which is not God himself; instead, their 
desire is to behold God in his substance, through which God is that which he is421. 
William like Augustine considers that the pure of heart may see the substance of God in 
this life, although they cannot comprehend it422. William’s interpretation of the biblical 
verse “No one shall see my face and live” is that of Augustine. The vision of God in this 
life in his substance happens during ecstasy “because it is necessary for the soul which is 
taken up into that unspeakable vision to be drawn out of this life”423. Another biblical 
verse, “because we shall se him as he is” (1 Jn 3:2) helps establishing the link between 
vision and likeness and a large passage from Epistula 92 speaking about becoming like 
God in the inner human being is quoted to this effect. Also by quoting Augustine, 
William distinguishes between the vision of God which already can be granted here but 
which is far from the perfection of the beatific vision which is going to be possessed in 
                                                 
419 Aenig. 3 quotes ep. 147.3. 
420 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.20. William extracted these lines from a context in which Augustine speaks of 
Moses and John. William himself mentions John by name, making it clear that in speaking of patres, he 
refers to biblical figures and not to patristic authors.  
421 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.20. 
422 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.21. 
423 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.31. 
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heaven424. Finally the series of quotations from Augustine ends with a passage from the 
De Genesi ad litteram which refers to the three types of vision, corporeal, spiritual, and 
intellectual, and applies the latter to the direct vision of God “face to face” which is going 
to take place in the future life425. William continues in his own words in the next 
paragraphs to explain why a stable vision of God is not possible in this life and his 
answer is once again Augustinian: human beings are impeded by their concupiscentia 
carnis. However, by the grace of God, the soul can rise above this carnal cloud and being 
granted a glimpse of the truth, then returning immediately to its weakness, but yearning 
to be allowed this experience again426.  
William’s own contribution, wedged between two quotations from Augustine, 
risks to pass unnoticed. He speaks first of the mutual seeing of the Father and the Son 
within the Holy Trinity which is identical with their substance and their unity and which 
is the Holy Spirit. Next, turning his attention to the vision between the human being and 
God, William observes that their mutual seeing is also the Holy Spirit, but not as 
substance and unity like in the divine Trinity, rather it is the Holy Spirit as love and 
likeness427. It is possible to recognize here one of William’s most profound and daring 
ideas on the vision of God according to which to see God is to be what he is. William 
developed this idea on the basis of a scriptural text which had already received some 
attention from previous Christian mystics428, but which represents for him one of the 
biblical roots of his Trinitarian mysticism: “Nobody sees [knows, Vg.] the Father, except 
the Son, and the Son except the Father” (Mt 11:27)429. According to William’s constant 
interpretation of this key biblical text430, the mutual knowledge or vision of the Father 
and the Son is not different from their substance, since “this is what is to be the Father, 
that is, to see the Son and to be the Son is to see the Father”431. Presenting this idea 
                                                 
424 Aenig. 6 quotes ep. 92.3. 
425 Aenig. 7 quotes Gn. litt. 12.26.54. 
426 Aenig. 8. 
427 Aenig. 5.   
428 Verdeyen points out to Origen’s exegesis of Mt 11:27 from In Canticum Prologum. PG 13:72D-73A and 
De Principiis 2.4.3. PG 11:202BD and contends that William follows in his footsteps when he interprets 
the same biblical verse. See Verdeyen (1990) 87-89. 
429 William quotes this verse both as Nemo vidit Patrem nisi Filius, et Filium nisi Pater in Med. 3.8 and 
Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filius, et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater in Contemp. 17. 
430 Contemp. 17; Med. 3.8; Spec.106. 
431 Med. 3.8. 
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already as early as in the De contemplando Deo, William links it explicitly with the 
human being’s vision of God in another of his early texts, the Meditatio 3. In this text he 
observes that the biblical passage of Mt 11:27 continues by adding that the mutual vision 
of the divine persons may be revealed by the Son to those to whom he wills to reveal it. 
But the Son’s will coincides with that of the Father and is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the 
mutual vision or knowledge of the Father and the Son and consequently also their 
substance is revealed through the Holy Spirit to the human being. The human being sees 
then the Father as the Son and the Son as the Father but not in every way (sic omnino, sed 
non per omnem modum)432. While asserting that the vision of God will be one of 
substance, William is nevertheless cautious to add that it will be different to some extent 
from that of the Father and the Son, sed non per omnem modum, because the ontological 
gap between God and the human beings remains. At the same time, as William explains 
in another text, the Holy Spirit acts in one way in the divine substance, where he is 
consubstantially united with the Father and the Son and in a totally different way in the 
inferior nature433. In the remainder of the Meditatio 3, William endeavors to explain the 
way in which the vision of God takes place. He relies in his demonstration on the familiar 
analogy, inspired by Augustine434, between the mechanism of the bodily senses and that 
of the spiritual senses. Each sense in order to sense anything at all needs to be 
transformed into what it perceives for sensation to take place. This transformation is not 
one of substance, rather is a conformation of the sense to the object perceived435. As the 
mechanism of the human vision of God is similar to that of corporeal vision, it follows 
that the consequence of the vision of God is not a substantial transformation of the human 
being into God, rather it manifests itself as a kind of likeness of the visible object in the 
seeing individual and as a union of the elements involved in the act of vision436. Vision of 
God, likeness and union with God refer ultimately to the same reality. It is this last 
aspect, namely the union of the soul with God which remains to be discussed in the next 
pages, not before concluding briefly this section.   
                                                 
432 Med. 3.8. 
433 Spec. 107. The same idea is present in Aenig. 5 as well. 
434 See section on Sensus amoris, pp. 147-155. 
435 Med. 3.8.   
436 See for instance, p.149. 
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In his treatment of the visio Dei, William proves that he has a thorough 
knowledge of Augustine’s major texts written on this topic and he quotes at great length 
from them in his mature treatise Aenigma fidei. While extracting the phrases out of their 
context, the result of William’s “cut and paste” writing method is a surprisingly accurate 
summary of Augustine’s view on seeing God. He also inserts discretely his own opinion 
based on the biblical verse from Mt 11:27, exposed previously in other of his works, 
which fits perfectly in the Augustinian patchwork, by adding a Trinitarian note to the 
vision of God sicuti est. 
2. Unitas spiritus  
 
Throughout his writings, William, even more than his friend Bernard, gives 
explicit and detailed analyses of the nature of unitas spiritus437. Both Bernard and 
William grounded their doctrine of the union of the soul with God biblically in the 
Pauline verse Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est (1 Cor 6:17) and in the Pauline 
expression unitas spiritus (Eph 4:3). However, while Bernard draws on Augustine’s anti-
Arian exegesis of 1 Cor 6:17 in order to develop his view on the unity of the soul with 
God438, William makes use of other aspects of Augustine’s theology, of which that of the 
Holy Spirit as love is without any doubt the most significant439. Their dependence on 
different aspects of Augustine’s thought as well as their different ways of reading 
Augustine with Bernard selectively extracting the elements he needs from their original 
context while William synthetically, proving that he reads Augustine as a whole, makes 
them present distinct accounts of the unitas spiritus. These differences have prompted 
scholars such as Paul Verdeyen to argue persuasively that Bernard’s and William’s 
different views concerning their understanding of the unitas spiritus might have led to a 
controversy that undermined their friendship towards the end of their lives. As there is no 
historical evidence available for such a disagreement between the two friends, Verdeyen 
                                                 
437 Contemp. 10-17; Cant. 130-131; Nat. Corp. 107; Ep. frat. 235, 257-258 and 262-263; a longer 
discussion concerning the mechanism of sensus amoris, the nature of the Holy Spirit, the vision of God and 
finally the state referred to as unus spiritus takes place in Spec. fid. 101-111. 
438 Trin. 6.3.4-5.7; conl. Max. 14; c. Max. 1.14; ep. 238. 28. See in this thesis the section Qui adhaeret 
Domino unus spiritus est (1 Cor 6 :17), pp. 94-102. 
439 In the previous pages of this thesis, different aspects of William’s view on the unitas spiritus have 
already been touched upon when discussing the sensus amoris, the intellectus amoris and the Holy Spirit as 
love. 
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relies in his assumptions exclusively on their different theological accounts of the 
mystical union. As the core of his argument he opposes two texts written roughly in the 
same period (1145-1148) and which he interprets as being clearly antagonist: Bernard’s 
Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 71 and William’s Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei 
262-3. Verdeyen would have us believe that the differences between the two views on the 
mystical union are due to different patristic influences. In his opinion, Bernard remains 
faithful to Augustine440, while William owes much to Origen for the way in which he 
understands the intertrinitarian relationships which also play an important role in the 
mystical union441. 
No matter how attractive such a theory of controversy would seem, the intention 
of this chapter is to argue against it, in favor of a freedom in dealing with the biblical and 
patristic sources of which the medieval authors were fully aware442 and which allows 
different views to coexist within the same theological tradition443. Moreover, I will try to 
see whether the views of Bernard and William are truly irreconcilable as Verdeyen 
claims. Finally, an attempt will be made to question Verdeyen’s claim that William’s 
different account on unitas spiritus is mainly the result of an Origenian influence. 
One of the main difficulties in accepting Verdeyen’s position regarding the likely 
controversy between Bernard and William is that in building his argument he relies solely 
on a single passage from each author ignoring the previous accounts on unitas spiritus 
given especially by William during his theological career. It is important to notice that 
although in each situation William might highlight different aspects of the mystical 
union, overall his teaching does not undergo considerable changes during time444. 
Therefore, an analysis of one particular paragraph dealing with this subject should not 
ignore the existing links with other passages from William’s works treating the same 
topic. Jean-Marie Déchanet was absolutely right when he observed that William’s work 
                                                 
440 Verdeyen (1990) 72. 
441 Verdeyen (1990) 70-71, 87.  
442 Bernard claims that if something is said after the Fathers without contradicting them, it should displease 
neither the Fathers nor anybody else. See Miss. 4.11. See above, p. 30, n. 109. 
443 Bernard defended himself before the attacks of those who accused him of presenting different accounts 
of the human being created in the image of God, by saying that they are diversa sed non adversa. See SC. 
81.11. See above, p. 39. 
444 This is an aspect that Verdeyen himself is ready to recognize. See Verdeyen (1990) 107. 
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Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei cannot be properly understood without recourse to his 
other writings445.  
Furthermore, while assuming that there was discord between the two friends due 
to their opposite views on the mystical union, Verdeyen avoids, nevertheless, to explain 
clearly, which of the two texts was written as a reaction to the other. Sometimes he seems 
to consider that William’s account of the unitas spiritus from the Epistola ad fratres de 
Monte Dei is a refutation of the Bernardine position446. But as many scholars have 
already observed William speaks constantly about the unitas spiritus throughout his 
writings, without changing his position radically, apart from the unavoidable additions, 
resulting from the author’s constant reflection on this topic, and which come to enrich 
and consolidate the primary teaching. The main elements of his understanding of the 
mystical union are already present in one of his first works, the De contemplando Deo447. 
There is evidence that Bernard knew William’s early work on contemplating God448 and, 
far from reacting against it, he integrates, in his own treatise on love the De diligendo 
Deo449, William’s description of the unitas spiritus as the means by which the soul “loves 
in God solely God and does not love some of its own goods and loves itself in God”450. 
Instead of considering William’s account of the unitas spiritus from his late work the 
Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei as directed against Bernard’s position expressed in 
Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 71, it seems more likely that it represents simply a 
concentrated summary of what William had said in his previous works on this subject.  
If, on the other hand, it is Bernard who reacts against his friend’s position, as 
Verdeyen seems to imply somewhere else in his interpretation451, the situation becomes 
even more problematic. How could one then explain Bernard’s obvious change in attitude 
                                                 
445 Déchanet (1980) xx. 
446 Verdeyen (1990) 71: «Nous voulons démontrer d’abord que Guillaume tenait particulièrement à ces 
recherches trinitaires jusqu’à engager à ce propos  une controverse avec son meilleur ami, l’abbé de 
Clairvaux». 
447 Contemp. 10-17. 
448 Hourlier (1968) 85, n.1. 
449 Dil. 9.26; 10.28. 
450 Contemp. 10: per unitatem spiritus in deo solum amet deum non suum aliquod privatum, nec nisi in deo 
amet seipsum. It has been remarked that this description of the unitas spiritus, coincides with the final two 
degrees of the affective ascent of the soul to God in Bernard’s De Diligendo Deo. But as the latter work 
was written at least five years after William’s it is clear that Bernard is inspired by his friend in drawing the 
ascending stages of the soul’s itinerary to God. See Hourlier (1968) n.1, 85. 
451 Verdeyen (1990) 73: «Voici la position de Guillaume que saint Bernard n’a pu ignorer et qu’il rejette au 
moins implicitement». 
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towards the ideas of a book he enthusiastically embraced early in his career but allegedly 
refuted years later? Finally, how does one interpret the fact that several of William’s 
works including the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei circulated for centuries under 
Bernard’s name452? If the two accounts on the mystical union were so contradictory, how 
was it possible that the differences remained unobserved for so long? Is it not more likely 
that they were perceived for centuries as belonging to the same author, namely Bernard, 
exactly because of what these views had in common and not because their theology was 
seen as incompatible? 
Let us begin our analysis by looking at William’s first detailed discussion of the 
unitas spiritus which occurs already in his early treatise De contemplando Deo. 
Embracing Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love, William goes on to expound two 
parallel two types of unity, one existing in God and which he introduces with the words: 
“Thus, you love yourself in you” (amas ergo te …in te ipsum) and the other existing 
between human beings and God which he refers to as: “you love also yourself in us” 
(amas et teipsum in nobis)453. The former is the Holy Spirit himself, the unity of the 
Father and the Son, homoousion, the substantial unity of the Father and the Son. The 
second type of union occurs when the Holy Spirit who was sent as a gift to humans and 
implanted in their hearts, enables them to become lovers of God (nos efficiens tui 
amatores)454. As a result of this: “you love yourself in us and us in you, when we love 
you through you and we are made one with you insofar as we are worthy to love you; and 
we will be made partakers, as it was said, of that prayer of Christ your Son: “I wish that, 
in the same way as I and you are One, so these also may be one in us (Jn 17:22)”455. 
William makes a clear distinction between the divine unity which is consubstantial and 
the mystical union which is participation (participes efficiemur) to the Trinitarian life, 
due to the role of the Holy Spirit “who is called the love, the unity and the will of the 
Father and the Son, and who, dwelling in us by his grace and implanting in us the charity 
of God and reconciling him [i.e. God] to us through this very love, unites us with 
                                                 
452 See above, p. 107, n. 1 and n. 2. 
453 Contemp. 14. 
454 Contemp. 14.  
455 Contemp. 15.  
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God”456. William also refers to the mystical union using some Augustinian terms such as 
adhaesio and fruitio and finally considers it a kind of unitas quoting Jn 17:22: “I will that 
they may be one in us as you and I are one”.  
In my opinion there are several ideas in William’s first account of the mystical 
union which can be related to Augustine. First of all, while interpreting verse Jn 17:21 in 
his dispute with the Arians, Augustine also speaks of the divine unity which is 
consubstantial (he uses the term homoousion) and which cannot be understood as 
participation457. As Augustine’s main focus is the intertrinitarian relationship, he does not 
go further in showing how the union of the human soul and God should be understood, 
but one can guess that is understood as participation, which, as he warns, cannot be 
attributed to the divine unity. William differs from Augustine and Bernard in the use of 
the terminology. He uses indiscriminately the terms unum and unus spiritus.  The biblical 
passage Jn 17:21 enables him to refer to the unity between the soul and God not only as 
unus spiritus, like Augustine and Bernard, but also as unum. But because he is applying 
this term, reserved by Augustine and Bernard exclusively for the consubstantial unity, to 
the mystical union, this does not necessarily mean that William is confusing the two types 
of unity. In fact, he is always making efforts in his writings to distinguish between them.  
Although William does not strictly follow Augustine in his terminological 
distinction between unum and unus spiritus, he definitely relies on him in his description 
of the mystical union as “God loving himself in us”. It is possible to show that William 
borrowed this idea directly from Augustine by looking at a relatively early text, 
William’s compilation, the Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos458:  
 
Exp. Rom. 3.5.5: 
Vis enim hoc et vehementer vis ut per 
spiritum tuum amorem tuum, ames nos in te 
et ames te de nobis et in nobis… Da ergo 
s. 128.4: 
Ne putaret quisque a se sibi esse quod 
diligit deum, continuo addidit, per spiritum 
sanctum qui datus est nobis ut ergo ames 
                                                 
456 Contemp. 14.  
457 ep. 238.28. 
458 This work was written probably immediately after William entered the Cistercian abbey of Signy in 
1135. However, according to Anderson (1980) 4, William’s interest in the Epistle to the Romans seems not 
to be connected so much with the early Cistercians, whose object of exegesis was almost exclusively the 
Song of Songs, but with the school of Reims which William attended before he became a Benedictine 
monk. This makes Bell argue that William might have been collecting materials for his compilation already 
during his student years. See Bell (1984) 183, n. 51. 
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eum nobis et in nobis habitans, O deus, 
amate de nobis movendo nos et accendendo 
ad amorem tuum, illuminando et excitando. 
deum, habitet in te deus et amet se de te; id 
est, ad amorem suum moveat te, accendat 
te, illuminet te, excitet te. 
 
Although William does not follow the exact wording of the original text, it is obvious that 
Augustine is the primary source for an idea that William repeats not less than three times 
in the passage where he discusses the mystical union. 
Another idea of major significance present already in this early account on the 
unitas spiritus, namely that of the Holy Spirit as love, unity and will of the Father and the 
Son, whose role it is to implant charity in the human hearts so that the human beings may 
be reconciled with their Creator and ultimately united to him, may also be traced back to 
Augustine. The confirmation of William’s direct reading of Augustine comes again from 
his compilation, the Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos, where he quotes almost 
verbatim from one of Augustine’s sermons: 
 
Exp. Rom. 3.5.5: 
 
…Quod communis vobis est, sancte Pater, 
sancte Filii, per hoc nos vultis habere 
communionem inter nos et vobiscum, cum 
per illud donum nos colligitis in unum, 






…Quod ergo commune est patri et filio, per 
hoc nos voluerunt habere communionem et 
inter nos et secum, et per illud donum nos 
colligere in unum, quod ambo habent 
unum, hoc est per spiritum sanctum deum 
et donum dei. In hoc enim reconciliamur 
diuinitati eaque delectamur. 
 
 
 Verdeyen is totally right in signaling the importance of the scriptural text Nemo novit 
Pater nisi Filius et nemo novit Filius nisi Pater (Mt 11: 27), already present in this early 
treatise and which helps William to define better the intertrinitarian relationships and the 
role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation459. According to William’s teaching, 
the Holy Spirit is the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son, and by becoming unus 
spiritus with God, the human beings participate in the knowledge of the Father and the 
Son, in the same way in which they also participate in the love of the Father and the 
Son460. But while Verdeyen is probably correct in detecting William’s dependence on 
                                                 
459 Verdeyen (1990) 87. 
460 Contemp. 17. 
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Origen’s exegesis of this biblical text461, his claim that William’s position regarding this 
doctrinal matter rests exclusively on Origen has to be dismissed as an exaggeration. It is 
impossible not to observe that the exegesis of Mt 11:27, which supports the idea that the 
Holy Spirit is the reciprocal knowledge of the Father and Son, harmoniously completes 
Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit representing the mutual love of the Father and the 
Son, and moreover everything that is common to the Father and Son. If indeed William 
follows Origen in his understanding of Mt 11:27, he definitely does this not because 
Origen is the only ancient ecclesiastical writer to have understood the relations between 
the divine persons and the operational role of the Holy Spirit ad extra in such way, but 
because his teaching is compatible to that of Augustine462.    
This early understanding of the unitas spiritus, according to which the Holy Spirit 
is the mutual love and knowledge of the Father and the Son, who conforms us to God and 
unites our spirit with him463, represents the basis to which William returns often in his 
later writings, never in order to contradict it, only in order to add some new and profound 
insights.  
One of William’s constant struggles in his writings is to distinguish between the 
two types of union. While the divine unity is always consubstantial, he describes the 
unity between the human being and God as unitas voluntatis464 or as unitas 
similitudinis465.  
In a passage from the Expositio super Cantica Canticorum, a work written earlier than 
the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei466, speaking about the ordered love of the Bride who 
loves God and herself in God and her neighbour as herself, William observes how when 
“she begins to will what God wills then through likeness of will she becomes one spirit 
                                                 
461 Origen, In Canticum Prologum. PG 13:72D-73A; De Principiis 2.4.3. PG 11:202BD. 
462 In a recent article on the reception of Origen in Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos, Thomas Scheck 
observes that, as a general rule, William’s use of Origen is realised by the adaptation of his thought to that 
of Augustine, never the other way around. See Scheck (2004) 236-256.  
463 Contemp. 17. 
464 Cant. 130-131; Nat. corp. 107. 
465 Exp. Rom. 5.8.27: donec renovatus ad imaginem eius qui creavit eum, per unitatem similitudinis incipiat 
esse filius. Ep. frat. 289: Haec enim unitas hominis cum Deo vel similitudo ad Deum. Aenig. 6: Spiritus 
sanctus unitas Patris et Filii, ipse etiam caritas et similitudo Dei et hominis. 
466 As William himself acknowledges in Vita prima 12.59, this work was conceived as early as his first 
visits to Clairvaux. The conversations he had with Bernard, while being both ill, inspired him in writing this 
book, which he will never finish as he interrupted his work on it in order to refute Abelard’s perilous 
theology. 
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with God”467. Therefore the soul is united with God “through likeness in willing the same 
thing from whom it withdraws by unlikeness in willing”468. Here William merges two 
Augustinian ideas we have encountered before: one that the human soul draws near to 
God by likeness to him and distances itself by unlikeness, the other that the human soul 
draws near to God by means of affectus. But we have seen that the affectus are basically a 
form of will, therefore the distance or the closeness to God is determined by willing as 
well469.  According to William’s early treatise on love, the will has only two possibilities: 
to turn either towards God or away from him. In the first case it becomes, amor, caritas 
and unitas spiritus, in the second less fortunate situation, it becomes, concupiscentia. He 
warns his readers that the levels of voluntas, amor, caritas and unitas spiritus must not be 
understood as the steps of a ladder, clearly separated one from the other470. They lead, 
they follow, often the last becomes the first and the first becomes the last. This is also 
true about concupiscentia, or the will in its negative way of operation.  For no matter how 
much the soul advances through the ascending affective levels towards God, while it is 
still in the flesh, the concupiscentia cannot be eliminated. It can be diminished, by 
advancing the spiral of the ascending levels of love, by God’s grace, but it cannot be 
integrally eradicated. The idea of the persistence of concupiscentia as long as human 
beings are alive is rooted in Augustine, as the following brief phrase from the Speculum 
fidei, demonstrates it: 
 
Spec. 12: 
Quamdiu enim hic vivitur, carnalis 
concupiscentia minui potest, frenari potest, 
extingui vero non potest.  
s. 151.5 : 
…quia ipsa concupiscentia, cum qua nati 
sumus, finiri non potest quamdiu vivimus : 
quotidie minui potest, finiri non potest. 
  
William was not alone in following Augustine on this point; Bernard also shares the same 
view when he makes the distinction between voluntas propria (the will turned on itself 
                                                 
467 Cant. 130: incipiat tunc velle quod vult Deus. Et tunc per similitudinem voluntatis unus cum Deo spiritus 
fit. 
468 Cant. 131. 
469 See  above, p. 143. 
470 Nat. am. 45. See also above, p. 145. 
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which leads to concupiscentia) and voluntas communis which is charity471. Since 
concupiscentia or voluntas propria will endure as long as the human being’s life in the 
body, William’s choice of speaking even of the state of unus spiritus as a likeness of the 
human will with the will of God appears more justified. The passage from the Expositio 
super Cantica Canticorum, finishes with another description of the mystical state which 
presents similarities with that of Bernard from Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 71: 
 
Whoever is a Bride then has but one sole desire and aspiration: that her face be 
joined continually to your face in the kiss of charity- that is that she becomes one 
spirit with you through the unity of the same will472. 
 
While at first glance the expression per unitatem eiusdem voluntatis stands in opposition 
to Bernard’s expression applied to the mystical union, that of conniventia voluntatum473 
or communio voluntatum474, one needs to understand this passage not as a perfect identity 
of the human will with the will of God, but in the light of what William said just a few 
lines earlier in the same paragraph, when he clearly indicates that one becomes one with 
God “by likeness of willing the same thing”. As Bernard wrote his account on the unitas 
spiritus later than William, he might have well been inspired by this passage from the 
Expositio super Cantica Canticorum. Opting for the plural voluntatum, he is more 
explicit than William in stating that there is no perfect identity between the human and 
the divine will. The barrier in both cases is concupiscentia or voluntas propria which 
persists as long as the life in the flesh. 
William returns to the ideas he presented in the Expositio super Cantica 
Canticorum in his late work Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei. He discusses the unitas 
spiritus in the larger context of the three likenesses of the human being to God475. He 
considers the third likeness to be so close in its resemblance to God that it deserves better 
to be referred to as unitas spiritus. As the starting point of this discussion, it is possible to 
recognise the central idea on the mystical union from the Expositio super Cantica 
                                                 
471 Pasc. 2.8. For a discussion of voluntas propria and voluntas communis in Bernard see Gilson (1940) 54-
59.  For a more detailed discussion of this aspect common to both William and Bernard, see Bell (1984) 
186-193.  
472 Cant. 131.  
473 SC. 71.10; SC. 71.8. 
474 SC. 71.10. 
475 Ep. frat. 257-263. See above, p. 133. 
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Canticorum. Thus, to be like God, William says is to will what God wills476. However, he 
refines his understanding of the unitas spiritus, by claiming in a way that is reminiscent 
of Augustine that unitas spiritus is not only unity of willing the same thing, but inability 
of willing anything else than what God wills477. It is not excluded that William had direct 
knowledge of Augustine’s text making a distinction between the paradisiacal state, whose 
main characteristic was the possibility of not sinning expressed by posse and the 
eschatological state of the renovatio in melius whose characteristic is the impossibility of 
sinning expressed by non posse. At the same time an equally probable source for this 
division between posse and non posse might have been Bernard himself. In the treatise on 
the De gratia et libero arbitrio which is dedicated to William, Bernard himself made use 
of the Augustinian expression non posse peccare in order to refer to the mystical 
union478. The inability to sin (non posse peccare) is termed by Bernard liber 
complacitum, and he admitted that although this state is reserved for the life to come, a 
few perfect souls enjoy it rarely for a fleeting moment in this life. By understanding the 
mystical union as inability to will anything else than what God wills, it seems as if 
William refined his initial view on the unitas spiritus in the light of what Bernard has to 
say on this subject with the help of Augustine.  
The passage from the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei on the unitas spiritus 
continues in the following way:  
 
It is called unity of spirit not only because the Holy Spirit brings it about or 
inclines a human being’s spirit to it, but because it is the Holy Spirit himself, the God 
who is Charity. He who is the Love of the Father and Son, their unity, Sweetness, Good, 
Kiss, Embrace and whatever they can have in common in that supreme unity of truth and 
truth of unity, becomes for the human person in regard to God in the manner appropriate 
to him the same what he is for the Son in regard to the Father or for the Father in regard 
to the Son through unity of substance. The conscientiousness in its happiness finds itself 
standing somehow midway in the Kiss and the Embrace of the Father and the Son. In a 
manner which exceeds description and thought, the human being of God is found worthy 
                                                 
476 Ep. frat. 258. 
477 Augustine provides him with the distinction between posse and non posse present in corrept. 33; see 
Bell (1984) 193-195; see also the discussion of the unitas spiritus in the context of the order of love, pp. 
180-181.  
478 Gra. 7.21. See above, pp. 48-49. 
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to become not God, but still what God is – that is to say he becomes by grace what God is 
by nature.479 
 
Bernard showed that the unity of spirit is realised through the bond of love (glutino 
amoris). But while for Bernard love is the intermediary that enables God and the human 
being to unite their wills, for William love is the unity itself. Furthermore, relying on 
Augustine480, William strongly emphasises that the Holy Spirit is love and therefore that 
the unity of spirit is the Holy Spirit himself, the God who is charity. Although there is 
evidence that Bernard was familiar with Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as love, 
since he referred to the third person of the divine Trinity as the ‘kiss of the Father and the 
Son’481 and also as the love of the Father and the Son482, he never engages in theological 
explorations of this idea. Contrastingly, William bases his entire mystical theology on the 
identification of the Holy Spirit with love. This will take William a step further than 
Bernard. However, while engaging in speculative theology William does not exceed the 
boundaries of ‘orthodox’ theology, and remains firmly grounded in the Augustinian 
tradition as he carefully preserves the ontological gap between the human being and God.  
 William finds himself in agreement with Augustine and Bernard in the distinction 
between the temporal character of the mystical union conveyed by the verb fit and the 
eternal aspect of the divine and consubstantial unity expressed by est. In the human being 
the Holy Spirit becomes (fit) what he is (est) in the consubstantial union between the 
Father and the Son. More than that, the Holy Spirit becomes for the human being suo 
modo in a manner appropriate to him, while in the divine unity he represents the 
consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son. Suo modo hints at the fact that the human 
being becomes merely by participation and by grace what God is by nature. 
 One passage from the Speculum fidei483, a work written between 1140-1143 
confirms that William was preoccupied with the understanding of the unitas spiritus as 
participation in the Holy Spirit which offers a glimpse of the Trinitarian life, before 
writing the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei: here William distinguishes between the 
                                                 
479 Ep. frat. 262.  
480 On William’s dependence on Augustine regarding the idea of Holy Spirit as love or charity, see above, 
pp. 164-175.   
481 SC. 8.2. 
482 SC. 8.4.  
483 Spec. 107.  
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Holy Spirit in God and the Holy Spirit in the human being, as there is a difference 
between the Holy Spirit as the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit in the inferior nature, between the Holy Spirit in the Creator and the Holy 
Spirit in creature, between what he is in his own nature and what he is in grace, between 
what he is in the Giver and what he is in the recipient, between what he is in the eternity 
and what he is in time. In God, the Holy Spirit is naturally and consubstantially mutual 
love, unity, mutual knowledge, and everything that is common for both Father and Son. 
The Holy Spirit bestows all these things by grace on the human being, and in doing so he 
dwells in the human being. In turn the human being, in whom all these things occur and 
who is thus transformed, dwells in the Holy Spirit. This indwelling does not entail a 
transformation of the human soul into divine nature, but William admits that while not 
reaching the divine beatitude this is nevertheless a state that surpasses exceedingly the 
human beatitude484.  
William goes on then to describe the unitas spiritus as a state of supreme 
happiness in which the soul finds itself included in the Embrace and the Kiss of the 
Father and the Son, being deigned worthy of a taste of the Trinitarian life485. However, 
such a description comes only after he took serious care to emphasise the differences 
which exist between the Holy Spirit as consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son and 
the Holy Spirit in his operation ad extra. This daring description of the unitas spiritus 
occurs in a shortened form in the passage from the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei, we 
quoted above and which Verdeyen wanted to see as contradicting Bernard’s account of 
the unitas spiritus, which does not allow that in this privileged state the soul reaches such 
an intimate relation to God486: 
 
Ep. frat. 262:  
Cum in osculo et amplexu Patris et Filii 
mediam quodammodo se invenit beata 
conscientia.487 
Spec. 111: 
(…) in amplexu et osculo Patris et Filii qui 
Spiritus Sanctus est, hominem 
quodammodo invenire se medium et ipsa 
caritate Deo uniri qua Pater et Filius unum 
sunt.  
                                                 
484 Spec. 101. 
485 Spec. 111. 
486 SC. 71.9-10. 
487 Ep. frat. 263. 
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The fact that William repeats ideas he presented before in earlier works, seems to confirm 
the impression that far from reacting to the position of his friend, he is offering a 
concentrated summary of what he has said before on this subject. He might have felt the 
need for recapitulating his ideas on this subject in the same way in which he presents in 
the preface to the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei a list of all his works, out of concern 
for the Carthusian monks, the beneficiaries of William’s letter, who probably did not 
have an integral knowledge of everything he had ever written. 
In conclusion we can state that in developing his view on the unitas spiritus, 
William seems to have relied primarily on Augustine’s idea of the idea of Holy Spirit as 
love and subsequently on that of God who loves himself in us, on Augustine’s view on 
will in general, on Augustine’s distinction between the divine unity and the mystical 
unity, where the first is always consubstantial, while the second is participation. His use 
of Origen is dictated only insofar as his Trinitarian insights are compatible to and 
complete Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as everything which is common to the 
Father and the Son. Williams seems to have influenced his friend Bernard in his 
description of the mystical union as a communion of wills, but at the same time he also 
appears to have been influenced by Bernard. As a result of this influence he refined his 
position on the mystical union seeing it not merely as willing the same thing as God but 
as an impossibility of willing anything else than what God wills. In addition, there is no 
quarrel between the two friends in acknowledging the eternal character of the divine unity 
as opposed to the temporal character of the mystical unity. They both choose to express 
this significant difference by adopting Augustine’s opposition between est and fit.  
The present analysis attempted to show that Bernard’s and William’s views on the 
mystical union, far from being irreconcilable, share many common elements and by 
highlighting the fact that these two authors influenced each other an important argument 





William’s knowledge of Augustine is vast and thorough. Early in his career he 
compiled a series of excerpts from Augustine’s works, under the title Sententiae, which, 
unfortunately, are no longer extant today. He quoted Augustine extensively in his works 
based on the method of compilatio, but apart from his De sacramento altaris and his 
Disputatio adversus Abaelardum, where he indicates the provenance of each quotation, 
as a general rule he does not name his sources. However, it has been demonstrated that 
Augustine provides the main material for those of William’s treatises in which he collects 
excerpts from the writings of the patristic authors, such as the Expositio super Epistolam 
ad Romanos488 and the Aenigma fidei489. Augustine occupies pride of place also in the 
treatises where William chooses to speak with his own voice rather than with that of his 
patristic predecessors. Thus, even Jean-Marie Déchanet, who was more inclined to search 
for William’s Greek sources admitted that his early treatises De contemplando Deo, De 
natura et dignitate amoris and Meditativae orationes are “nettement augustiniens”490.   
William draws on a large number of Augustine’s texts, from the early treatises to 
the late anti-Pelagian writings and from the bishop’s major works such as the 
Confessiones, the De Trinitate, the De Genesi ad litteram, the De civitate Dei to his 
biblical commentaries and his letters. Apart from a broad knowledge of Augustine’s 
numerous works, William seems to have had something even more valuable - a synthetic 
view of his mind and teaching491. While relying on disparate quotations from a wide 
range of Augustine’s works in many of his compilations, William’s arrangement of these 
fragments is carried out in accordance with his reading of Augustine synthetically, as a 
whole.  
  Although William attempted to achieve a synthesis of different patristic views in 
his works, in general, it is Augustine who sets the theological tone to which all other 
patristic voices need to attune. Thus, William relies both on Augustine and Origen in his 
treatment of the grace of God; he consults Augustine together with Basil when speaking 
                                                 
488 Cartwright (2003); Scheck (2004) 236-256.  
489 Anderson (1974) 20. 
490 Déchanet (1940) 57, n.1.  
491 Déchanet (1972) 143 made this observation about William’s knowledge of patristic authors in general. 
As a result of this investigation, I can argue that this is particularly true of his knowledge of Augustine.  
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of Trinity; he merges the views of Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa on the nature of the 
soul, etc. As David Bell has remarked, William uses Greek sources “not to construct but 
to elaborate his basic Augustinian scheme”492.  
  While William’s depends on Augustine in his treatment of a large number of 
theological themes, in the present thesis we have explored his reliance on his predecessor 
only in those topics, that help us to understand his teaching about the path to attaining 
union with God, namely the image and likeness, the doctrine of love and the vision and 
union with God.  
The first chapter devoted to the exploration of William’s anthropological 
principles explained how William embraced Augustine’s doctrine of humanity being 
created in the image and likeness of God as the framework for his discussion of the soul’s 
encounter with God. William demonstrates a detailed knowledge of Augustine’s teaching 
on the subject, taking for granted Augustine’s claim that the most accurate image in the 
human soul is formed of memory, intellect and will, which can never be erased. What 
was lost as a result of Adam’s fall is the likeness. However, due to the permanence of the 
image of God in the human soul, the likeness may be restored. Augustine’s hesitation in 
drawing too direct an analogy between the three elements of the created image and the 
three persons of the Holy Trinity is totally set aside. William speaks confidently about 
this analogy, but his main interest like that of Augustine in the last book of the De 
Trinitate, is to use it as a solid foundation for a Trinitarian anagogy, which will result in 
the restoration of the lost likeness. William brings his own insights to the discussion 
when he distinguishes between three levels of likeness and identifies the highest with the 
unitas spiritus, which represents the soul’s union with God. While William considers that 
all three divine persons play an important role in the restoration of the lost likeness and in 
attaining union with God, he focuses especially on the activity of the Holy Spirit, which, 
following Augustine, he identifies with love.  
The second chapter explored the notion of love in William showing that like in 
the case of the doctrine of image and likeness, he displays a profound knowledge of the 
subject, following Augustine in his understanding of love as voluntas, pondus, motus or 
affectus. More than Augustine, William emphasises the cognitive aspect of love and 
                                                 
492 Bell (1984) 252. 
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draws inspiration from the theory of sense perception and of thought formation from 
Book 11 of the De Trinitate in order to explain the mechanism of what he names sensus 
amoris or intellectus amoris. However, the crucial element of William’s teaching on love 
with major consequences for his understanding of the soul’s encounter with God is his 
appropriation of Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. Three main aspects of 
Augustine’s unsystematic teaching are present in William: the understanding of the Holy 
Spirit as the consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son; the understanding of the Holy 
Spirit as donum Dei; and the idea that in loving God is rather God who loves himself 
through us. Based on these elements William insists that human love for God is the Holy 
Spirit. This claim must be understood not as referring to human love as the Holy Spirit by 
nature, essence or substance, but as referring to the Holy Spirit by participation, as David 
Bell has demonstrated493. It is exactly through the human being’s participation in the 
Holy Spirit that the likeness is restored and the unitas spiritus realised.  
 Finally, the last chapter dealt with the vision of God and with the unitas spiritus, 
both of which represent the stage of the perfect likeness with God. William’s discussion 
of the vision of God is based directly on Augustine’s Epistula 147, from which he quotes 
extensively, offering a summary of his predecessor views on the subject. However, 
William brings his own contribution to the discussion by reflecting on Mt 11:27: 
“Nobody sees the Father, except the Son and the Son except the Father”. This enables 
him to carry out a distinction between the mutual seeing of the Father and the Son within 
the Holy Trinity, which is identical with their substance and their unity and which is the 
Holy Spirit, and the human being’s vision of God, which he also equates with the Holy 
Spirit, but not as substance, rather, as he himself puts it, as likeness and love494.  
Since following Augustine William adopted the view that each vision involves a 
sort of unitas brought about by the will, which unites the seeing individual with the 
exterior object, it follows that the perfect vision of God is nothing else than union with 
God, or unitas spiritus. While the vision of God is based on the understanding of the 
Holy Spirit as the mutual vision of the Father and the Son according to Mt 11:27, the 
unitas spiritus is based on Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. However, 
                                                 
493 Bell (1980) 139-140. 
494 Aenig. 5. 
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William goes further than Augustine when he claims that to be united with God is to 
participate in the Holy Spirit, which is the consubstantial love of the Father and the Son. 
He remains in agreement with Augustine when he maintains the ontological gap between 
the human being and God in the unitas spiritus, claiming that one who experienced this 
state can become god, but not by nature, only by grace. Finally, the description of the 
unitas spiritus as the impossibility of willing anything else than what God wills alludes to 
the way in which Augustine refers to the human condition at the end of renovatio as non 
posse peccare495. A direct source for this idea could be his friend Bernard who, following 
Augustine, described himself the highest state of freedom (liberum complacitum) as non 
posse peccare in the treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio, which he dedicated to William.  
                                                 




The present thesis examined the role played by Augustine in the articulation of 
the mystical thought of Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry. In this study I 
have argued that the cohesion of the mystical thought of these medieval authors is 
ensured by their appropriation of the “guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical 
theology”1, summed up by the bishop of Hippo himself in the first lines of his 
Confessiones: (1) “You made us for yourself and (2) our heart is restless until (3) it rests 
in you”2. Consequently, following Augustine, both Bernard and William consider the 
human being (1) to have been created with a natural tendency towards God (2) that 
renders him unable to be satisfied with anything other (3) than God himself. Accordingly, 
the central theological themes of their mystical thought are: (1) the creation of humanity 
in the image and likeness of God, (2) love and (3) the direct encounter of the soul with 
God. These themes are inextricably bound up together, discussing (1) the grounds for the 
soul’s encounter with God, (2) the means to attain it and (3) the nature of this encounter, 
which represents the ultimate goal of the human being to be fulfilled completely only 
after the resurrection.  
Gerald Bonner has repeatedly pointed out that the aforementioned principle (i.e. 
conf 1.1.1) governs what he has designated as the “optimistic” or “dynamic” field of 
Augustine’s theology, apparent especially in the bishop’s early and mature writings, 
which speak confidently of the true end of the human being as the eternal enjoyment of 
God. However, by contrasting the field of Augustine’s spirituality with that of his 
dogmatic theology dealing with the notions of grace, predestination and original sin, 
which he labels as “pessimistic”, Bonner presents a polarized picture of Augustine’s 
1 Louth (2006) 129. 
2 conf. 1.1.1. 
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thought3, which has been increasingly questioned in recent years by scholarly endeavors 
which advocate the coherence of the bishop’s teaching4.  
This contrasting picture suits perhaps better Augustine’s reception in the West 
than his actual writings. Along these lines, Aimé Solignac has observed that the different 
facets of Augustine’s views in regard to the nature and destiny of the human being are 
reflected in what he named “la double tradition augustinienne”5. Thus, on the one hand he 
has spoken of a “tradition lumineuse” stemming from Augustine’s anthropology that 
affirms the dignity of the human being as image of God, considering him created for a 
noble destiny. To this tradition belong the great mystics of the Western Christendom, the 
Cistercians, Bernard and William, the Victorines, Hugh and Richard, the Franciscan 
Bonaventure and the Dominican Meister Eckhart, who have primarily seen Augustine as 
the doctor caritatis6. On the other hand, Solignac has spoken of a “tradition ombreuse” 
based on Augustine’s more sombre anthropological views, which consider humankind as 
having inherited Adam’s original sin, underline the helplessness of the human condition 
without divine grace, and reject the universality of salvation. The history of the 
pessimistic tradition founded especially on Augustine’s late works written during the 
Pelagian controversy begins with Prosper of Aquitaine and includes names such as 
Anselm of Canterbury, Luther, Calvin and Jansen, to mention just a few7.  
The result of the present research confirms Solignac’s observation that Bernard 
and William pertain to the “luminous Augustinian tradition”. However, it is important to 
add that while Bernard and William adopt the fundamental principle of the optimistic 
tenor of Augustine’s theology as the underlying principle of their mystical thought, they 
completely disregard its frictions with some of the sombre aspects of Augustine’s 
theology. Indeed they manage to make use of some of Augustine’s later works by 
completely ignoring their negative conclusions. For instance, Bernard and William 
focused particularly on the problem of grace, each of them devoting lengthy treatments to 
this subject. Bernard followed the late Augustine in his De gratia et libero arbitrio, 
3 Bonner (1987) 203-215. More recently, he returned to this problem in a book-length study, see Bonner 
(2007). Other scholars have observed the same tension between Augustine’s reading of the First Epistle of 
John on God’s love and his reading of Paul on predestination, see Rist (2001) 3. 
4 See above, p. 6. 
5 Solignac (1985) 67. 
6 Solignac (1985) 67-68. 
7 Solignac (1985) 71-77. 
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which also borrows the title of one of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatises. William drew 
extensively on the late Augustine in his Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos, where, 
apart from concentrating on the problem of grace, he also quoted Augustine on other anti-
Pelagian issues such as original sin and predestination. Furthermore, Bernard and 
William integrated into their mystical thought views on grace shaped by reading the late 
Augustine, emphasising the need for grace at each stage of the ascent of the soul to God 
and underlining the inability of the human soul to turn towards God by relying solely on 
its own will. This demonstrates that, unlike modern critics of the bishop of Hippo who 
often signal tensions and even self-contradictions in Augustine’s teaching, Bernard and 
William approached his works with an absolute confidence that they form a homogenous 
and coherent body of doctrine.  
Although both Bernard and William established their mystical thought based on 
the same categories of (1) image and likeness, (2) love and (3) direct encounter with God, 
quite often they used Augustine differently in the elaboration of these themes. Thus, 
William pays much more attention than Bernard to the image of God in the human soul 
as being formed of memory, intellect and will. He sees a direct analogy between the three 
factors of the created image and the three divine persons and understands the image as a 
means of union with the Trinity. Bernard, in turn, although acquainted with Augustine’s 
classical view on the Trinitarian aspect of the created image, identified the image of God 
with free choice and located it at the level of will. However, like William he followed 
Augustine in his understanding of imago Dei as the human capacity for God persisting in 
the human soul in spite of Adam’s fall, which caused only the loss of the likeness to God. 
Also as a consequence of their use of Augustine, both Bernard’s and William’s concept 
of image is dynamic, in the sense that as a result of his creation in the image of God, the 
human being tends naturally towards him and finds satisfaction in nothing other than 
God. As with Augustine, the dynamic aspect of Bernard’s and William’s teaching on the 
image is strengthened by their additional emphasis on the restoration of likeness as a 
process. The soul’s return to God from the regio dissimilitudinis where Adam’s sin 
condemns it to fall is possible only through Christ’s redeeming grace, which will also 
restore the human being to a greater dignity and a greater likeness than that with which 
God endowed Adam. Again in accordance with Augustine’s teaching Bernard and 
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William understand the restoration of likeness as a renovatio in melius and they define it 
in Augustine’s terms as a state where it will be impossible for the soul to commit sin (non 
posse peccare). Finally, the perfectly restored likeness implies the perfect vision of God 
and perfect love.   
Embracing Augustine’s principle that the soul approaches God not by spatial 
movement but by affections, which when correctly ordered by Christ’s grace foster the 
restoration of the likeness, Bernard and William focused particularly on the role of love 
in the soul’s ascent to God. In spite of the similarities presented by their doctrine on love 
that contributed to a certain extent to the incorrect attribution of some of William’s 
treatises to Bernard for centuries, their views on the subject are at times different. The 
distinctive nuances of their teaching on love are also manifest in the way in which they 
use different material from Augustine. Thus, Augustine’s exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10 
and Rom 5:5 asserting the primacy of divine love forms the bedrock of Bernard’s views 
on love. The human being is able to love God only because he was loved by God first. 
Following Augustine, Bernard argued that God loved human beings before the 
foundation of the world and he manifested his love by creating them in his own image 
and likeness. His divine love is also manifest in the redemption work, when God 
delivered up his Son for the benefit of humanity. In Bernard’s view the capacity of the 
human being to love God in return (his velle, affectio, desiderium, amor, dilectio, caritas) 
is a consequence of his creation in the image of God; however this capacity which in the 
beginning is a disordered dynamism in the nature of the human being, which makes him 
tend restlessly towards his real end, needs to be oriented with Christ’s grace towards God 
in order to become perfect love of God. While Bernard envisaged numerous itineraries 
mapping the return of love to God, I have argued that his most famous ascending pattern 
of the soul’s loving ascent to God presented in his treatise De diligendo Deo is inspired 
by Augustine’s description of the Christian perfection as an advancement from cupiditas 
to caritas and by the definition of these two concepts as exposed in Augustine’s treatise 
De doctrina Christiana. As such the human love progresses from the stage where the 
human being loves himself for his own sake to the stage where the human being loves 
himself for the sake of God. 
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Like Augustine, William defined love as a form of will imprinted in the human 
being as a consequence of his creation in the image and likeness of God. In order to 
suggest the dynamism inherent in the concept of love, William followed Augustine in his 
understanding of love as motus and especially as pondus, which draws the human soul 
upwards towards its proper resting place, which is God. William also provides itineraries 
of the soul’s ascent to God and although the stages of this ascent may vary from one 
work to another, they are usually identified as voluntas, which under the influence of 
grace progresses to amor, dilectio, caritas and/or unitas spiritus. William differs from 
Bernard when, relying on Augustine’s theory of sense perception and thought formation, 
he insists on the cognitive character of love. He also differs from his friend in the 
appropriation of Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. Although Bernard was 
acquainted with this aspect of Augustine’s teaching, mentioning it occasionally in his 
works, this idea does not play any role in his mystical thought. For William, however, it 
represents the cornerstone of his mysticism. It is the appropriation of this idea that 
enables William to claim that when the soul loves God, it is rather God who loves 
himself in us. In William’s view, the human love for God is to a certain extent the Holy 
Spirit, but not as substance as it is in the consubstantial union with God, but as likeness.  
The growth of human love for God restores the lost likeness of the soul with God 
and at this stage the soul sees God and is united with God. This state is rarely experienced 
in this life, only by a few exceptional human beings and only for a fleeting moment. Its 
full realisation is reserved for the life of the just after the resurrection, i.e. it is subject to 
eschatological suspense. However, both Bernard and William are in agreement with 
Augustine that the process of restoration of the likeness must begin in this life. While 
Bernard identified likeness with vision, he did not develop this aspect in his works. 
However, he seems to have known Augustine’s distinction of the three types of vision 
from the De Genesi ad litteram, Book XII where Augustine differentiates between 
corporeal, spiritual and intellectual vision, which Bernard mentions in his Sermo super 
Cantica Canticorum 31. In turn, William was familiar with Augustine’s major texts on 
vision, such as Epistula 147, Epistula 92 and De Genesi ad litteram, Book XII. He 
quoted extensively from all these works arranging the material in a synthesis which, 
214
while capturing the essence of Augustine’s teaching, also allowed him to add his own 
contribution in a way that was not discordant with the views of his predecessor.  
Bernard and William developed the union of the soul with God, a concept that is 
absent from Augustine’s works, drawing nevertheless again on different aspects of 
Augustine’s thought. Bernard followed closely Augustine’s exegetical distinction 
between unum and unus spiritus based on Jn 10:30 and 1 Cor 6:17. Augustine developed 
this distinction in order to refute the Arian claims that the union between the Father and 
the Son is merely a unity of will and not one of substance. Bernard seems to have read 
Augustine fragmentarily by selecting only those aspects that deal with the differences 
between the two types of union while ignoring some other important aspects discussed by 
Augustine in the same passage, namely the idea that the Holy Spirit is the consubstantial 
unity of the Father and the Son. Like Augustine, Bernard strongly maintains the 
ontological gap existing between the human being and God even in their union. Thus, he 
speaks of the union of the soul with God as the perfect accord of wills in the glue of 
charity, and differentiates it from the consubstantial unity existing within the Trinity. In 
turn, William totally ignores the exegetical distinction established by Augustine and he 
refers to the union of the human soul with God both as unum and as unus spiritus. He 
also focuses on the idea of the Holy Spirit as love, which enables him to describe the 
union of the soul with God not as totally distinct from the consubstantial union of the 
Trinity, but as participation in the consubstantial life of the Trinity. Like Bernard and also 
in agreement with Augustine, William maintains the ontological gap between the two 
types of union, claiming that while the result of this union is deification, the human being 
does not become God by substance, he becomes only God by grace.  
It is especially the way in which Bernard and William draw on different aspects of 
Augustine’s teaching that makes them adopt different positions in regard to the notion of 
the soul’s union with God. Following closely Augustine in his exegesis of 1 Cor 6:17 
Bernard finds himself bound to maintain not only the radical difference of natures 
between God and the soul in unus spiritus which is only a union of the wills in the bond 
of love, but also he denies that the soul which is granted to experience this privileged 
state may have access in any way to that simple unity which is the Holy Trinity. For this 
reason Bernard’s view on unus spiritus has been described as the union of two beings by 
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juxtaposition. William in turn, by adopting Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit as love 
and by emphasising also like Augustine that in loving God, it is God who loves himself 
in us, describes the union of the soul with God as being nothing else than the Holy Spirit 
himself, the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son. While William does not go so 
far as to identify the soul with God, taking care to maintain the ontological gap between 
creature and Creator, he differs from Bernard in his understanding of the mystical union 
as the soul’s participation to the consubstantial life of the Holy Trinity.  
Finally, Bernard and William differ not only in the way in which they select 
different material from Augustine and adapt it to their contemplative goals, but also in the 
way in which they approach the works of the bishop of Hippo. For Bernard, Augustine is 
the authoritative guide to his interpretation of the Scripture. He follows closely the 
bishop’s exegesis of a few biblical verses which play an essential role in Bernard’s 
mystical thought so that the result of his approach is an “exegetical” mysticism deeply 
anchored in Augustine. In turn, William, who consolidated his knowledge of Augustine’s 
enormous oeuvre in the course of writing his numerous patristic compilations, acquired a 
synthetic view of the bishop’s thought which enabled him to bring together the multiple 
facets of particular theological issues that Augustine had never attempted to expound 
systematically. William’s appropriation of Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as 
love as the foundation for his “pneumatic” mysticism is largely based on his synthetic 
reading of the bishop’s scattered passages dealing with this issue. Bernard’s and 
William’s different ways of reading Augustine reflect two different personalities and also 
bring testimony for a freedom in dealing with the patristic sources that allows different 
















Introduction, note 1: 
 
Ep. frat. 16: Aliorum est enim Deo servire, vestrum est ADHAERERE. Aliorum est Deum 
credere, scire, amare et revereri; vestrum est SAPERE, INTELLIGERE, COGNOSCERE, FRUI 
(…) Ep. frat. 25: Ipsa enim est professio vestra: quaerere Deum Iacob, non communi 
omnium more, sed QUAERERE FACIEM DEI Iacob qui dicit: Vidi Dominum facie ad faciem 
et salva facta est anima mea.  
 
 
Part I - The Exegetical Mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux 
 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 29: 
 
Vita prima 1.4.24: Canonicas autem Scripturas simpliciter et SERIATIM libentius ac 
SAEPIUS legebat, nec ullis magis quam ipsarum verbis intelligere se dicebat (...) SANCTOS 
ET ORTHODOXOS EARUM EXPOSITORES HUMILITER LEGENS, NEQUAQUAM EORUM SENSIBUS 
SUOS SENSUS AEQUABAT, SED SUBJICIEBAT FORMANDOS: et vestigiis eorum fideliter 
inhaerens, saepe de fonte unde illi hauserant, et ipse bibebat. 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 30: 
 
 Hum. Retractatio:  …improvide quiddam aposui, quod in Evangelio scriptum non esse 
postea deprehendi. Nam cum textus habeat tantummodo: neque filius scit, ego deceptus 
magis quam fallere volens, LITTERAE QUIPPE IMMEMOR, SED NON SENSUS: Nec ipse, 
inquam, filius hominis scit. 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 90: 
 
Ep. 77: Ideoque non quaerimus pugnas verborum, NOVITATES quoque VOCUM iuxta 
apostolicam doctrinam evitamus. PATRUM tantum opponimus sententias ac verba 
proferimus et non nostra: NEC ENIM SAPIENTIORES SUMUS QUAM PATRES NOSTRI.  
 
Preliminary remarks, note 99: 
 
SC. 5.7: Videntur Patres de huiusmodi diversa sensisse, nec mihi perspicuum est unde 
alterutrum doceam, et nescire me fateor. Sed et vestris profectibus non multum conferre 
arbitror harum rerum notitiam. 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 108: 
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 Hum. Retractatio: Alio quoque in loco quamdam de Seraphim opinionem posui, quam 
nunquam audivi, nusquam legi. Ubi sane lector meus attendat, quod proinde 
temperanter «puto» dixerim, volens videlicet non aliud quam putari, quod certum 
reddere de Scripturis non valui. 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 111: 
 
Div. 34.1: Quamvis ne hoc quidem silendum arbitror quod evidentissime illum contra 
fidem nonulla scripsisse sanctorum Patrum tradat auctoritas, atque ideo non sine 
circumspectione esse legendum. 
 
 
Chapter 1, note 165: 
 
Gra. 9.28: Puto autem in his tribus libertatibus ipsam, ad quam conditi sumus, 
Conditoris imaginem atque similitudinem contineri, et imaginem quidem in libertate 
arbitrii, in reliquis autem duabus bipertitam quamdam consignari similitudinem. 
 
Chapter 1, note 166: 
 
Gra. 9.28: Hinc est fortassis, quod solum liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu 
diminutionem non patitur, quod in ipso potissimum aeternae et incommutabilis divinitatis 
substantiva quaedam imago impressa videatur. 
 
Chapter 1, note 176: 
 
Gra. 10.35: Nemo proinde putet ideo dictum liberum arbitrium, quod aequa inter bonum 
et malum potestate vel facilitate versetur, cum cadere quidem per se potuerit, non autem 
resurgere, nisi per Domini Spiritum. 
 
Chapter 1, note 199: 
 
Gra. 7.21: Habet siquidem unaquaeque illarum duos gradus, superiorem et inferiorem. 
Superior libertas consilii est NON POSSE PECCARE, inferior POSSE NON PECCARE. Item 
superior libertas complaciti NON POSSE TURBARI, inferior POSSE NON TURBARI. 
 
Chapter 1, note 204: 
 
Gra. 5.15: Hi plane, quod negandum non est, etiam in hac carne, raro licet raptimque, 
complaciti libertate fruuntur, qui cum Maria optimam partem elegerunt, quae non 
auferetur ab eis. Qui enim iam tenent quod auferendum non est, experiuntur utique quod 
futurum est. Sed quod futurum est felicitas est; porro felicitas et miseria eodem tempore 
simul esse non possunt. Quoties igitur per Spiritum illam participant, toties istam non 
sentiunt. Itaque in hac vita soli contemplativi possunt utcumque frui libertate complaciti, 
et hoc ex parte, et parte satis modica, viceque rarissima. 
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Chapter 2, note 272: 
 
Dil. 10.35: Quid vero in summa et beata illa Trinitate summam et ineffabilem illam 
conservat unitatem, nisi caritas? Lex est ergo, et lex Domini, caritas, quae trinitatem in 
unitate quodammodo cohibet et colligat in vinculo pacis. Nemo tamen me aestimet 
caritatem  hic accipere qualitatem  vel aliquod accidens – alioquin in Deo dicerem, quod 
absit, esse aliquid quod Deus non est -, sed substantiam illam divinam, quod utique nec 
novum, nec insolitum est, dicente Ioanne: Deus caritas est. Dicitur ergo recte caritas, et 
Deus, et Dei donum. Itaque caritas dat caritatem substantiva accidentalem. Ubi dantem 
significat, nomen substantiae est; ubi donum qualitatis.    
 
Chapter 2, note 277: 
 
Jo. ev. tr. 110.6: Quapropter incomprehensibilis est dilectio qua diligit Deus, neque 
mutabilis. Non enim ex quo ei reconciliati sumus per sanguinem Filii eius, non coepit 
diligere; sed ANTE MUNDI CONSTITUTIONEM DILEXIT NOS, ut cum eius Unigenito etiam nos 
filii eius essemus, priusquam omnino aliquid essemus. Quod ergo reconciliati sumus Deo 
per mortem Filii eius, non sic audiatur, non sic accipiatur, quasi ideo nos reconciliaverit 
ei Filius, ut iam inciperet amare quos oderat; sicut reconciliatur inimicus inimico, ut 
deinde sint amici, et invicem diligant qui oderant invicem: sed iam nos diligenti 
reconciliati sumus ei, cum quo propter peccatum inimicitias habebamus. 
 
Chapter 2, note 283: 
 
Dil. 5.15: Siquidem non solum de me, sed de omni quoque quod factus est, scriptum est: 
Dixit, et facta sunt. At vero qui me tantum et semel dicendo fecit, in reficiendo profecto et 
dixit multa, et gessit mira, et pertulit dura. 
 
Chapter 2, note 285: 
 
Trin. 15.17.31: non enim habet homo unde deum diligat nisi ex deo. propter quod paulo 
post dicit: nos diligamus quia ipse prior dilexit nos. apostolus quoque Paulus: dilectio, 
inquit, dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. 
 
Chapter 2, note 289: 
 
Ep. 107.8: Libenter Dei amor nostrum, quem praevenit, subsequitur. (…) O geminum, 
ipsumque firmissimum Dei erga nos amoris argumentum! Christus moritur, et meretur 
amari. Spiritus afficit, et facit amari. Ille facit cur ametur; iste, ut ametur. Ille suam 
multam dilectionem in nobis commendat, iste et dat. In illo cernimus quod amemus; ab 
isto sumimus unde amemus. Charitatis igitur ab illo occasio, ex isto affectio. Quanta 
confusio, Dei Filium ingratis oculis cernere morientem! quod quidem facile contingit, si 
desit Spiritus. Nunc autem quia charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum 
sanctum, qui datus est nobis amati amamus, amantes amplius meremur amari. 
 
Chapter 2, note 339: 
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Dil. 7.19: Ea namque suae cupiditatis lege, qua in rebus ceteris non habita prae habitis 
esurire, et pro non habitis habita fastidire solebat, mox omnibus quae in caelo et quae in 
terra sunt obtentis et contemptis, tandem ad ipsum procul dubio curreret, qui solus 
deesset omnium Deus. Porro ibi quiesceret, quia sicut citra nulla revocat quies, sic nulla 
ultra iam inquietudo sollicitat. 
 
Chapter 2, note 343: 
 
SC. 83.2: Non mota quasi locis migrans, aut pedibus gradiens; sed mota, sicut substantia 
utique spirituali moveri est, cum suis affectibus, immo defectibus, a se quodammodo in 
peius vadit, cum se sibi vitae et morum pravitate dissimilem facit, reddit degenerem. 
 
Chapter 2, note 356: 
 
SC. 84.1: Quis terminus quaerendi Deum [adscribi possit]? Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius 
semper. Existimo quia nec cum inventus fuerit, cessabitur a quaerendo. Non pedum 
passibus, sed desideriis quaeritur Deus. Et utique non extundit desiderium sanctum felix 
inventio, sed extendit. Numquid consummatio gaudii, desiderii consumptio est? Oleum 
magis est illi: nam ipsum flamma. Sic est. Adimplebitur laetitia; sed desiderii non erit 
finis, ac per hoc nec quaerendi. Tu vero cogita, si potes, quaeritandi hoc studium sine 
indigentia, et desiderium sine anxietate: alterum profecto praesentia, alterum copia 
excludit. 
 
Chapter 2, note 392: 
 
doc. Chr. 1.27.28: Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat quos 
non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod diligendum est, aut amplius  diligat quod minus 
diligendum est, aut aeque diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus 
vel amplius quod aeque diligendum est 
 
Chapter 2, note 393: 
 
Trin. 8.8.12: Nec illa iam quaestio moveat, quantum caritatis fratri debeamus impendere, 
quantum Deo. Fratri enim quantum nobis ipsis; nos autem ipsos tanto magis diligimus, 
quanto magis diligimus Deum. Ex una igitur eademque caritate Deum proximumque 
diligimus, sed Deum propter Deum, nos autem, et proximum propter Deum. 
 
Chapter 3, note 452: 
 
SC. 8.6: Utrumque enim munus simul fert osculi gratia, et agnitionis lucem et devotionis 
pinguedinem. (…) Quamobrem geminae gratiae sacrosancti osculi suscipiendae paret e 
regione duo labia sua quae sponsa est, intelligentiae rationem, sapientiae voluntatem… 
 
Chapter 3, note 483: 
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SC. 82.8: Admiranda prorsus et stupenda illa similitudo, quam Dei visio comitatur, immo 
quae Dei visio est, ego autem dico in caritate. CARITAS ILLA VISIO, ILLA SIMILITUDO est (…) 
Siquidem veniente quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est; eritque ad 
alterutrum casta et consummata dilectio, agnitio plena, visio manifesta, coniunctio firma, 
societas individua, similitudo perfecta. 
 
Chapter 3, note 500: 
 
Trin. 6.3.4: Diversum enim natura spiritus hominis et spiritus dei, sed INHAERENDO fit 
UNUS SPIRITUS ex diuersis duobus, ita ut sine humano spiritu beatus sit dei spiritus atque 
perfectus, beatus autem hominis spiritus non nisi cum deo. 
 
Chapter 3, note 507: 
 
Trin. 6.5.7: cum illo autem UNUS SPIRITUS, quia AGGLUTINATUR anima nostra post eum. Et 
nobis HAERERE Deo bonum est. 
 
Chapter 3, note 525: 
 
SC. 71.8: Quo contra homo et Deus, quia unius non sunt substantiae vel naturae; UNUM 
quidem dici non possunt, UNUS tamen SPIRITUS certa et absoluta veritate dicuntur, si sibi 
GLUTINO AMORIS inhaereant. Quam quidem unitatem non tam essentiarum cohaerentia 




Part II - The Pneumatic Mysticism of William of St. Thierry 
 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 14: 
 
Nat. corp. 2:  Scias autem quae legis non mea esse, sed ex parte philosophorum vel 
physicorum, ex parte vero ecclesiasticorum doctorum, nec tantum eorum sensa, sed ipsa 
eorum sicut ab eis edita sunt dicta vel scripta quae excerpta ex eorum libris his in unum 
congessi. 
 
Preliminary remarks, note 15: 
 
Exp. Rom. Praefatio:…sed ut aliqua sanctorum Patrum, et MAXIME BEATI AUGUSTINI, 
sensa in eam, vel scripta ex libris eorum et opusculis hinc inde collecta in unum hoc 
opusculum compingentes, suppressis quae in ea sunt quaestionum molestiis, unam 
continuam non nostrum, sed ipsorum texamus explanationem. Quae tanto debebit gratior 
esse lectoribus, quanto eam non novitas vel vanitatis praesumptio adinvenit, sed 
magnorum doctorum magna commendat auctoritas, praecipue, sicum dictum est, beati 
Augustini, dinde vero Ambrosii, Origenis et nonullorum aliorum doctorum; aliquorum 
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etiam magistorum nostril temporis, de quibus certum habemus non praeteriise eos in 
aliquot terminus quos posuerunt Patres nostri. 
 
Chapter 1, note 61: 
 
Nat. corp. 86: In eo enim quod ad imaginem Dei factus dicitur homo, tale est ac si 
diceretur quia humanam naturam participem omnis boni fecit Deus. Plenitudo enim 
omnium bonorum est Deus, imago autem Dei est homo. Igitur in eo quod sit plenitudinis 
omnis boni capax, ad principalem exemplum imago habet similitudinem. Compare with 
Gregory of Nyssa, De imagine 17. Cappuyns (1966) 234: Tale enim est hoc ac si diceret, 
quia omnis boni humanam naturam  participem fecit. Si enim plenitudo bonorum deus, 
illius autem hoc id est homo imago. Igitur in eo quod sit plenitudo omnis boni ad 
principale exemplum imago habet similitudinem.  
 
Chapter 1, note 119: 
 
Nat. am. 3:  Ut ergo Deo inhaeret creata in homine rationalis anima, memoriam sibi 
vindicavit Pater, rationem Filius, voluntate ab utraque procedentem ab utroque 
procedens Spiritus sanctus.  
 
Chapter 1, note 129: 
 
Nat. corp. 105-106: Haec omnia anima intellectu conspiciens, non iam tantum delectatur 
in sua formositate quam in forma formatrice, cui intendendo semper effictur formosior. 
Ipsum enim intendere formari est. Quicquid enim ad Deum afficitur non est suum, sed 
eius  a quo afficitur. 
 
Chapter 1, note 139: 
 
 31. Nat. am. 35: Accinxit ergo se quodammodo Dei Filius, et aggressus est per 
humilitatem recuperare eum, qui recuperari poterat, qui per superbiam perierat. Itaque 
inter Deum et hominem medium se faciens, qui recedens a Deo, captus erat et ligatus a 
diabolo, hoc modo mediatoris et personam induit et actum.  
 
Chapter 1, note 163: 
 
Ep. frat. 259: Et haec hominis perfectio est, similitudo Dei. Perfectum autem nolle esse, 
delinquere est. Et ideo huic  perfectioni nutrienda est semper voluntas, amor 
praeparandus; voluntas cohibenda ne in aliena dissipetur; amor servandus, ne 
inquinetur. Propter hoc enim solum et creati sumus et vivimus, ut Deo similes simus. Ad 
imaginem enim Dei creati sumus. 
 
Chapter 1, note 164:  
 
Aenig. 6: In interiore ergo homine similitudo ista est, qua renovatur homo de die in diem 
in agnitione Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ubi tanto ei efficimur 
similiores, quanto magis in eius cognitionem caritatemque proficimus; et in tantum eum 
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propinquius ac familiarius videmus, in quantum cognoscendo eum ac diligendo efficimur 
ei similiores. Compare with Augustine, ep. 92.3: In interiore igitur homine ista similitudo 
est; qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum. Et tanto 
efficimur similiores illi, quanto magis in eius cognitione et caritate proficimus. 
 
 
Chapter 1, note 165: 
 
Spec. 107: SIMILEM ENIM IBI ESSE DEO, VIDERE DEUM, SIVE COGNOSCERE ERIT; quem in 
tantum videbit sive cognoscet qui cognoscet vel videbit, in quantum similis ei erit; in 
tantum erit ei similis, in quantum eum cognoscet vel videbit. Videre namque ibi seu 
cognoscere Deum, similem est esse Deo; et SIMILEM EI ESSE, VIDERE SEU COGNOSCERE EUM 
EST. 
 
Chapter 1, note 166: 
 
Aenig.  6: Ibi enim sicut in Trinitate que Deus est, mutuo se vident Pater et filius et mutuo 
se videre, unum eos esse est, et hoc alterum esse quod alter est; sic qui ad hoc 
predestinati sunt, et in hoc assumpti fuerint videbunt Deum sicuti est, et videndo 
efficientur sicut ipse est, similes ei. Ubi etiam sicut in Patre et Filio, que visio, ipsa unitas 
est; sic in Deo et homine, que visio, ipsa et similitudo futura est. Spiritus sanctus unitas 
Patris et Filii, ipse etiam caritas et similitudo Dei et hominis. 
 
Chapter 1, note 168: 
 
Cant. 88: In hoc etenim homo ad imaginem Dei conditus est, ut pie Dei reminiscens, hoc 
est ad intelligendum, humiliter intelligens, hoc est ad amandum, ardenter ac sapienter 
amans, usque ad fruendi affectum, animal rationale existeret, hoc est enim Deum timere, 
et mandata eius observare, quod est omnis homo. Et haec est imago et similitudo Dei in 
homine. 
 
Chapter 2, note 194: 
 
civ. Dei 14.6: quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non 
solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo 
omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. 
 
Chapter 2, note 195: 
 
civ. Dei 14.7: RECTA itaque VOLUNTAS EST BONUS AMOR ET VOLUNTAS PERVERSA MALUS 
AMOR. amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque 
fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia 
est. proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus 
 
Chapter 2, note 202: 
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Nat. am. 14: Affectus est qui generali quadam potentia et perpetua quadam virtute firma 
et stabili, mentem possidet, quam per gratiam obtinuit. Affectiones vero sunt  quas varias 
varius rerum et temporum affert eventus. 
 
Chapter 2, note 253: 
 
Med. 3.9-10: Omnis sensus corporeus, ut sensus sit et sentiat, oportet ut quadam sensibili 
affectione aliquomodo mutetur in id quod sentit(…). Nisi enim, rem sensam sensu rationi 
renuntiante, anima sentiens quadam sui transformatione mutetur in rem vel rei 
qualitatem quae sentitur, nec sensus est, nec sentire potest. Ideoque si sentit amore, qui 
sensus suus est, Deum bonum, et amat quia bonum, non hoc potest nisi, bono ipsi affectu 
communicans et ipsa bona efficiatur. (…)Sic enim est quodammodo de sensu animae. 
Sensus enim animae amor est: per hunc, sive cum mulcetur sive cum offenditur, sentit 
quicquid sentit. Cum per hunc in aliquid anima extenditur, quadam sui transformatione 
in id quod amat transmutatur, non quod idem sit in natura, sed affectu rei amatae 
conformatur. Utpote non bonum  aliquem  amare potest quia bonus est, nisi et ipsa in 
ipso bono bona efficiatur. 
 
Chapter 2, note 255: 
 
Spec. 101: Quod multo potentius  digniusque agitur, cum ipse qui est substantialis 
voluntas Patris ac Filii, Spiritus Sanctus, voluntatem hominis sic sibi afficit, ut Deum 
amans anima, et amando sentiens, tota repente transmutetur non quidem in naturam 
divinitatis, sed tamen in quandam supra humanam, citra divinam formam beatitudinis; in 
gaudium illuminantis gratiae, et sensum illuminatae conscientiae 
 
Chapter 2, note 273: 
 
Cant. 76: Amor quippe Dei, intellectus eius est; qui non nisi amatus intelligitur, nec nisi 
intellectus amatur, et utique tantum intelligitur quantum amatur, tantum amatur quantum 
intelligitur. 
 
Chapter 2, note 296: 
 
Trin. 9.11.16: ita cum deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus 
antequam nossemus maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata uerbum 
est fitque aliqua dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est quia in inferiore natura est. 
 
Chapter 2, note 316: 
 
Trin. 6.5.7: SPIRITUS ERGO SANCTUS COMMUNE ALIQUID EST PATRIS ET FILII, quidquid illud 
est, aut ipsa COMMUNIO CONSUBSTANTIALIS ET COAETERNA; quae si amicitia convenienter 
dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur CARITAS; et haec quoque substantia quia DEUS 
SUBSTANTIA ET DEUS CARITAS, sicut scriptum est. 
 
Chapter 2, note 320: 
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Trin. 15.17.31: In hoc, inquit, cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis quia de 
spiritu suo dedit nobis. Sanctus itaque spiritus de quo dedit nobis facit nos in deo manere 
et ipsum in nobis. Hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipse est igitur deus dilectio. 
 
Chapter 2, note 325: 
 
s. 34.2-3: dedit se ipsum quem dileximus, dedit unde diligeremus (…) ut quia Spiritus 
Sanctus Deus est, nec diligere possumus Deum nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, amemus Deum 
de Deo. 
 
Chapter 2, note 327: 
 
conf. 13.31.46: Qui autem per spiritum tuum vident ea, TU VIDES IN EIS. Ergo cum vident, 
quia bona sunt, tu vides, quia bona sunt, et quaecumque propter te placent, tu in eis 
places, et quae per spiritum tuum placent nobis, tibi placent in nobis (…). Et admoneor, 
ut dicam: certe nemo scit, quae Dei sunt, nisi spiritus Dei. Quomodo ergo scimus et nos, 
quae a Deo donata sunt nobis? Respondetur mihi, quoniam quae per eius spiritum scimus 
etiam sic nemo scit nisi spiritus Dei (…). ITA QUIDQUID IN SPIRITU DEI VIDENT QUIA BONUM 
EST, NON IPSI, SED DEUS VIDET, QUIA BONUM EST. 
 
Chapter 2, note 333: 
 
s. 71.18: Quod ergo commune est patri et filio, per hoc nos voluerunt habere 
communionem et inter nos et secum, et per illud donum nos colligere in unum, quod 
ambo habent unum, hoc est per spiritum sanctum deum et donum dei. 
 
Chapter 2, note 334: 
 
Trin. 15.18.32: Dilectio igitur quae ex Deo est, et Deus est, proprie Spiritus Sanctus est, 
per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat 
Trinitas. 
 
Chapter 2, note 340: 
 
Contemp. 14: Amas ergo te, o amabilis Domine, in teipso, cum a Patre procedit et a Filio 
Spiritus sanctus, amor Patris ad Filium et Filii ad Patre; et tantus est amor ut sit unitas; 
tanta unitas ut sit omousion, id est eadem Patris et Filii substantia. 
 
Chapter 2, note 356: 
 
Ep. frat. 170: Amor enim Dei, vel amor Deus, Spiritus sanctus, amori hominis et spiritui 
se infundens, afficit eum sibi; ET AMANS  SEMETIPSUM DE HOMINE DEUS, UNUM SECUM 
EFFICIT et spiritum et amorem eius. Sicut enim non habet corpus unde vivat nisi de spiritu 




Chapter 2, note 392: 
 
Ep. frat. 235: Haec, cum sursum tendit, sicut ignis ad locum suum: hoc est, cum sociatur 
veritati, et movetur ad altiora, amor est; cum ut promoveatur, lactatur a gratia, dilectio 
est; cum apprehendet, cum tenet cum fruitur, caritas est, unitas spiritus est, Deus est, 
deus enim caritas est. 
 
Chapter 2, note 394: 
 
Ep. frat. 257: Magna enim voluntas ad Deum, amor est; dilectio, adhaesio sive 
conjunctio; caritas fruition. Unitas vero spiritus cum Deo, homini sursum cor habenti, 
proficientis in Deum, voluntatis est perfectio, cum iam non solummodo vult quod Deus 
vult, sed sic est non tantum affectus, sed in affectu perfectus ut non possit velle nisi quod 
Deus vult.   
 
Chapter 3, note 409: 
 
civ. Dei 22.30: A quo refecti et gratia maiore perfecti vacabimus in aeternum, videntes 
qui ipse est Deus (…) Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus at amabimus, amabimus et 
laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. 
 
Chapter 3, note 455: 
 
Contemp. 15: tu teipsum amas in nobis et nos in te cum te per te amamus et in tantum tibi 
unimur in quantum amare te meremur; et participes efficiemur, ut dictum est, orationis 
illius Christi filii tui: Volo ut, sicut ego et tu unum sumus, ita et ipsi in nobis unum sint. 
 
Chapter 3, note 456: 
 
Contemp. 14:… qui amor dicitur Patris et Filii et unitas et voluntas, per gratia suam 
nobis inhabitans et Dei in nos caritatem commendans, et  per ipsam ipsum nobis 
concilians, Deo nos unit…  
 
Chapter 3, note 472: 
 
Cant. 131: Ideoque quaecumque Sponsa est, hoc solum desiderat, hoc affectat, ut facies 
eius faciei tuae iungatur, jugiter in osculo caritatis hoc est unus tecum spiritus fiat per 
unitatem eiusdem voluntatis.    
 
Chapter 3, note 479: 
 
Ep. frat. 262: Dicitur autem haec unitas spiritus, non tantum quia efficit eam, vel afficit ei 
spiritum hominis Spiritus sanctus, sed quia ipsa ipse est Spiritus sanctus, Deus caritas; 
cum qui est amor Patris et Filii, et unitas et suavitas, et bonum et osculum, et amplexus et 
quicquid commune potest esse amborum, in summa illa unitate veritatis et in veritate 
unitatis, hoc idem fit homini suo modo ad Deum, quod consubstantiali unitate Filio est ad 
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Patrem vel Patri ad Filium. Cum in osculo et amplexu Patris et Filii mediam 
quodammodo se invenit beata conscientia; cum modo ineffabili et incogitabili, fieri 
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